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 ABSTRACT 
Essays on CEO cognitive complexity: Effects on corporate strategy,  
performance, and survival 
 by 
Jinyong [Daniel] Zyung 
 
The Chief Executive Officer’s (CEO’s) job involves a substantial amount of information 
processing. This dissertation explores the organizational implications of CEOs’ way of 
processing information, or cognitive style, in multiple contexts. I particularly focus on 
CEOs’ cognitive complexity, or their degree of differentiation and integration of 
information, and examine how it influences their corporate strategies and performance 
outcomes not only in general business settings but also in high-growth environments as 
well as crisis situations. First, I examine the influence of CEOs’ cognitive complexity on 
their firms’ growth strategies and how these relationships change as the industry in which 
they compete grows itself. Second, I focus on a particular research context, the recent 
financial crisis of 2007-2008, to examine how firm acquisitions prior to the crisis, in part 
driven by their CEOs’ cognitive complexity, influence acquisitions during the crisis 
which in turn may affect firms’ subsequent survival. Finally, while maintaining the focus 
on the recent financial crisis, I broaden the focus on firm strategies to their corporate 
restructuring activities—i.e., acquisitions and divestitures—to examine how these two 
strategies unfolded within each course and across each other, by comparing pre- and 
during-crisis periods. Further, I examine the role of CEOs’ cognitive complexity in these 
‘cross-strategy’ effects and the specific impacts of during-crisis restructuring activities on 
firms’ subsequent performance and survival.
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To what extent do chief executive officers (CEOs) of firms inject their way of 
thinking, or processing information, into their decisions? This question is of great 
practical significance, as it not only addresses the fact that CEOs’ job involves a 
substantial load of information processing (Mintzberg, 1973), but also brings to focus the 
potential importance of executives’ information processing styles in determining the 
behaviors and their consequences of our large business enterprises. Theoretically, this 
question also helps to frame a long-standing theoretical tension in the management field 
that managers may have very little influence over organizational outcomes (Augier & 
Teece, 2009; Lieberson & O’Connor, 1972) due to inertial and isomorphic constraints 
(e.g., DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Hannan & Freeman, 1977), or alternatively, exhibit 
significant influence over organizational behavior and outcomes through their self-driven 
interests (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1989) or personal orientations 
(Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Hambrick, 2007).  
This latter perspective, that executives may vary in their personal orientations, 
often adopted through the rubric of upper echelons theory (Hambrick & Mason, 1984; 
Hambrick, 2005), serves as the theoretical basis for this dissertation. The central premise 
of this view is that, as executives have idiosyncratic personalities, values, experiences, 
and ways of thinking, we can expect different firm behaviors and outcomes. This 
dissertation builds on a more specific underpinning that the way in which executives 
think—how their mind works, or how they gather and process information (Finkelstein, 
Hambrick, & Cannella, 2009)—can be injected into the strategies and shape further 
subsequent outcomes of the firms they run. It discusses and examines various ways 
through which CEOs’ particular way of processing information—namely, their cognitive 
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complexity—manifest in strategic actions and affect performance outcomes. As cognitive 
complexity refers to one’s degree of differentiation and integration of information (e.g., 
Tetlock, 1981), I expect CEOs’ cognitive complexity to have profound impacts on large 
firms’ strategic activities and performance.  
My motivation to examine the implications of CEOs’ cognitive complexity comes 
from several regards. Foremost, research on senior executives’ cognitive style has been 
sparse. This paucity of research in the strategic leadership arena contrasts with the fact 
that decision making of senior executives, particularly CEOs, typically entails high 
volumes of information processing (Henderson and Fredrickson, 1996; Mintzberg, 1973) 
– very often more than what they can fully comprehend (Simon, 1947). My focus on 
cognitive complexity is also driven by the possibility that an agency misalignment may 
arise between CEOs’ and owners’ interests to the extent that CEOs’ cognitive complexity 
vary, as it is likely to be relatively unobservable in their hiring process yet may still enter 
into their actions. As much as cognitive complexity can represent an important attribute 
of CEOs, it is expected to have important implications across different samples of firms 
spanning different business environments. 
The way in which the organizational environment poses challenges to managers 
can manifest through various outlets. For example, high rates of growth in the industry 
environment can open abundant opportunities and challenges for the incumbent 
executives to grasp and address. Alternatively, a sudden, exogenous, economy-wide 
impact can render organizations at a loss in dealing with the change and even threaten 
their continuity and existence. The three essays in this dissertation seek to address these 
issues by examining how CEOs’ cognitive complexity may independently shape their 
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strategic decisions and how these influences may change as their firms go through times 
of high industry growth or even unique situations of extreme turbulence such as in 
economy-wide crisis situations.  
Specifically, the three essays collectively address two key questions: (1) In 
general, how do CEOs’ cognitive complexity manifest in their strategic decisions? While 
this first question has already gained some academic attention in the past and has spurred 
a small body of research (e.g., Calori, Johnson, & Sarnin, 1994; McNamara, Luce, 
Tompson, 2002; Wally & Baum, 1994), it is this dissertation’s key argument that some 
presumptions about the implications of this construct may have led to limited 
understandings of it. I suggest that beyond the normative implications of cognitive 
complexity, that being more cognitively complex is better, there is also important 
implications arising from the fact that it is also a cognitive ‘style,’ such that individuals 
with different levels of cognitive complexity may have different preferences in ways of 
achieving ultimately similar objectives (e.g., growth). This dissertation also seeks to put 
cognitive complexity in context, and asks (2) To what extent can heterogeneity in firms’ 
performance, survival, and strategic actions be attributed to CEOs’ cognitive complexity 
in times of extreme turbulence in the environment, e.g., economic crisis situations?  
ORGANIZATION OF THIS DISSERTATION 
This dissertation consists of three essays. The first essay, entitled “CEO cognitive 
complexity and firm growth strategies: Evidence from acquisitions and internal 
innovations,” discusses the implications of CEOs’ cognitive complexity for firms’ growth 
strategies. As CEOs with high cognitive complexity tend to perceive and use multiple 
dimensions in the informational environment and draw intricate connections among 
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them, I argue that their information processing style aligns with the high information 
processing need of external firm growth strategies, represented by corporate acquisitions. 
On the other hand, CEOs with low cognitive complexity tend to have focused attention 
and use select dimensions of information in understanding issues and draw connections 
among those few constructs. This information processing style aligns with the 
information processing needs of internal firm growth strategies, represented by R&D 
investments and new product developments. As high industry growth creates more 
opportunities and managerial discretion, the strategic discrepancy between high and low 
cognitive complexity CEOs is expected to widen as they invest more into their own 
strategic courses. Using CEOs’ language used in conference earnings calls with securities 
analysts to capture their cognitive complexity, I find strong support for these predictions. 
The second essay, entitled “CEO cognitive complexity, firm acquisitions, and 
surviving a crisis: Evidence from the 2007-2008 financial crisis,” builds on one of the 
key conclusions from the first essay and discusses the implications of CEO cognitive 
complexity and firm acquisitions in the context of the recent financial crisis. As high 
cognitive complexity CEOs’ strategic tendency manifests in high volumes of acquisitions 
in general situations, a positive relationship exists between the two prior to the crisis. 
While the financial crisis represented a period of high consolidation and financial 
constraint, I predict that those firms that have engaged in significant volumes of 
acquisitions prior to the crisis accumulate the experience and resources to repeat their 
course of acquisitions during the crisis, resulting in a positive relationship between pre- 
and during-crisis acquisitions. High volumes of acquisitions during the financial crisis are 
expected to allow the firm to capitalize on their accumulated resources and opportunities, 
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improving its financial performance. Further, the gain of size through acquisitions during 
the crisis would allow organizations to achieve a status of being “too big to fail,” 
enhancing their likelihood of surviving the crisis. A series of analysis of the financial 
sector and their CEOs largely supports these predictions. 
The final essay, entitled “Antecedents and consequences of corporate 
restructuring during a crisis: Evidence from acquisitions and divestitures during the 
2007-2008 financial crisis,” draws upon the second essay to examine corporate 
restructuring activities, represented by firms’ acquisitions and divestitures as they 
transition from the pre- to during-crisis period, the role of CEOs’ cognitive complexity 
therein, and their performance and survival implications. Extending the second essay’s 
findings, the current essay’s findings suggest that acquisitions and divestitures reinforced 
each other as organizations went through the financial crisis, with CEOs with high 
cognitive complexity allowing the previously-divesting firms to engage more in 
acquisitions during the crisis. Interestingly, each of these restructuring activities during 
the crisis influenced survival differently. Specifically, while both activities improved 
firms’ financial performance, only acquisitions enhance their chance of survival, while 
divestitures led to lower chances of survival—confirming the institutional logic that some 
financial institutions, particularly in this crisis period, were rather “too big to fail,” than 
“too good to fail.” 
CONTRIBUTIONS 
This dissertation seeks to offer several contributions to the strategic management 
literature. First, it revisits the construct of executives’ cognitive complexity and seeks to 
expand its implications towards organizational outcomes, including growth strategies 
7 
 
 
(i.e., acquisitions and internal innovations), corporate restructuring activities (i.e., 
acquisitions and divestitures), and performance outcomes (i.e., financial performance and 
survival). Through the three essays, this dissertation seeks to offer a more balanced view 
of cognitive complexity—that important implications can be identified and further 
explored to the extent that it is viewed as a cognitive ‘style,’ which can lead to behavioral 
outcomes that span a broad horizon. Such approach extends the more traditional view that 
individuals and groups led by these individuals may be better off when they have higher 
levels of cognitive complexity.  
Relatedly, but at a broader level, by putting cognitive complexity into context and 
examining its implications as organizations go through exogenous shocks (e.g., financial 
crisis), this dissertation contributes to the research domain that explores how decision 
makers’ personal orientations shape organizational action in response to environmental 
stimuli. It argues and finds that why firms behave and perform differently in 
macroeconomic adversities can be in part attributed to their CEOs’ cognitive complexity. 
As it represents their way of gathering and processing information, it is found to have 
important implications in situations characterized by vast loads of information flow. 
Finally, this dissertation highlights the role of CEOs, more specifically their 
individual cognitive orientations, in understanding important corporate strategies, such as 
growth approaches (external/acquisitive, or internal/organic) and portfolio restructuring 
(acquisitions and divestitures). While studies on these strategic outcomes have 
emphasized some characteristics of the CEO (e.g., hubris, overconfidence, temporal 
focus, regulatory focus) in explaining individual modes of growth and restructuring 
activities (e.g., either acquisition or internal innovation), this dissertation focuses on one 
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of the most relevant attribute—CEOs’ way of processing information, or specifically 
their cognitive complexity—and takes a more holistic approach by simultaneously 
investigating multiple strategic courses within each study. 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
CEO Cognitive Complexity and Firm 
Growth Strategies: Evidence from 
Acquisitions and Internal Innovations 
 
 
  
 
 
ABSTRACT 
How firms manage the multiple conduits towards growth remains a central topic in 
management research. In this paper, I examine the role of CEOs’ cognitive style, more 
specifically, cognitive complexity, in firms’ growth strategies. Specifically, I argue that 
CEOs with higher cognitive complexity tend to prefer external, acquisitive growth 
strategies while those with lower cognitive complexity lean more towards internal, 
organic growth strategies (i.e., R&D investments and new product introductions). I 
further suggest that this divergence widens when the industry is experiencing a high 
growth rate. Using a sample of 3,144 large, public U.S. firms in the 2002-2013 period, I 
find that CEOs’ cognitive complexity, captured by their language use in conference calls, 
is positively associated with their firms’ acquisitive growth strategies while negatively 
associated with internal growth strategies. These relationships are found to be more 
pronounced in high industry growth periods. Further, I find that CEOs with higher 
cognitive complexity tend to pursue more acquisitions of unrelated targets. Findings from 
this study highlight the important yet complicated role of CEOs’ cognitive complexity in 
shaping firm growth strategies. 
 
Keywords: CEO cognitive complexity, firm growth, language use 
  
  
 
INTRODUCTION 
The primary job of the chief executive officer (CEO) is to make key strategic 
decisions. As strategic leadership research centers on understanding what factors 
influence top executives’ strategic decisions (Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Hambrick, 
2005), scholars have theorized and examined the influence of various indicators of 
managerial cognitive characteristics, mostly relying on demographic factors and 
observable experiences (Carpenter, Geletkanycz, & Sanders, 2004). More recent research 
has suggested that senior executives’ unobservable psychological factors underlying such 
observable attributes, or individual preferences, such as personalities (e.g., Nadkarni & 
Herrmann, 2010), motivations (e.g., Gamache, McNamara, Mannor, & Johnson, 2015), 
or values (e.g., Chin, Hambrick, & Trevino, 2013), can drive their strategic decisions. 
However, research on senior executives’ cognitive style—i.e., how they process 
information—has been relatively sparse. This paucity of research in the strategic 
leadership arena contrasts with the fact that decision making of senior executives, 
particularly CEOs, typically entails high volumes of information processing (Henderson 
& Fredrickson, 1996; Mintzberg, 1973) – very often more than what they can fully 
comprehend (Simon, 1947). In this paper, I focus on a particular cognitive style, namely, 
cognitive complexity—the extent to which one differentiates and integrates informational 
stimuli—and examine its role in corporate strategies. Recent research on managerial 
cognitive complexity has primarily assumed that higher cognitive complexity is more 
beneficial to the firm (e.g., Dow, Cuypers, & Ertug, 2016; Wally & Baum, 1994; Wong, 
Ormiston, & Tetlock, 2011) because high cognitive complexity allows managers to detect 
and combine informational cues more effectively. This study seeks to go beyond such a 
  
 
notion and argues that different levels of cognitive complexity, representing different 
information processing styles, may have differential influences over firms’ strategies for 
achieving their goals. 
In this study, I examine the relationship between CEOs’ cognitive complexity and 
their approach to firm growth. Firm growth represents a major corporate strategic goal for 
CEOs (Penrose, 1959) and multiple ways can be adopted to achieve it (McKelvie & 
Wiklund, 2010). I focus on two major, yet often contrasting approaches to firm growth—
acquisitions and internal innovations. The focus on these two growth modes allows us to 
examine the possible divergent impacts of CEO cognitive complexity on firm growth 
strategies.  
In essence, I argue that different growth strategies have different information 
processing requirements and the fit between CEOs’ level of cognitive complexity and a 
particular growth mode’s information processing requirement may determine the level of 
emphasis that is given to the particular mode by the CEOs. As acquisitions pose great 
information asymmetry and high volumes of new information to be processed by CEOs 
under time pressure, CEOs with higher cognitive complexity may tend to engage more in 
acquisitions than their counterparts with lower cognitive complexity. In comparison, 
CEOs with low cognitive complexity may lean towards internal growth through internal 
innovations such as research and development (R&D) and introduction of new products 
because these activities build more upon the firm’s existing routines and core 
competencies, which pose less information processing requirements to CEOs. I further 
argue that such relationships between CEO cognitive complexity and growth strategies 
will become more salient when industry growth rate is high, because the ample growth 
  
 
opportunities in the environment allow the two growth modes to be more reflective of 
CEOs’ preferences. 
I also seek to address the methodological challenge in cognitive complexity 
research in the strategic leadership domain by relying on an unobtrusive measure. Due to 
the difficulty in collecting primary data from large firm executives, most studies that 
intend to capture their cognitive styles rely upon surveying a small, selective sample of 
top executives, which not only limits the generalizability of their findings but also their 
theoretical implications. This study uses a language-based measure of cognitive 
complexity to address this concern (Abe, 2011), based on the notion that language use 
reflects one’s cognitive style (Tausczik & Pennebaker, 2010). Specifically, I use 
transcripts of firms’ conference calls from which data on CEOs’ spoken language are 
available. Using a sample of large, public U.S. firms in 2002-2013, I find that CEOs with 
higher cognitive complexity tend to pursue more acquisitions (and more unrelated 
acquisitions) and less internal innovations (i.e., R&D and new product developments), 
while CEOs with lower cognitive complexity tend to prefer more internal innovations 
than acquisitions. I also provide some evidence that this divergence between these CEOs 
is further magnified in faster-growing industries. 
These findings can make important contributions to the management literature. 
First, methodological challenges in capturing cognitive styles of top executives have 
limited comprehensive work on this important subject (Finkelstein et al., 2009). Adopting 
a novel approach that identifies people’s cognitive styles through their language use 
(Pennebaker & King, 1999; Sanford, 1942; Tausczik & Pennebaker, 2010), I address this 
critical issue by examining how CEOs’ cognitive styles may affect their firms’ growth 
  
 
strategies. The findings consistently suggest that CEOs’ cognitive styles can have 
important implications on their firms’ acquisitions and innovation. More important, the 
findings extend prior literature on managers’ cognitive complexity that has largely 
equated cognitive complexity to a cognitive ‘ability,’ and assumed that higher cognitive 
complexity is better. Instead, the findings offer a more balanced view, suggesting that 
cognitive complexity is a cognitive ‘style’ and various levels of cognitive complexity fit 
different growth strategies.  
Second, the findings of this study extend research on firms’ growth strategies. 
Penrose (1959) early noted that managerial characteristics play a significant role in firms’ 
growth. I provide evidence that firm acquisitions and internal innovations can be 
substantially influenced by CEOs’ cognitive complexity. Given that firms do not 
necessarily pursue only a single growth mode at a point in time (e.g., Stettner & Lavie, 
2014), envisioning and managing the multiplicity of the firm’s growth prospect and 
strategic paths represents a challenging task for corporate officers. This paper contributes 
to this literature by highlighting the role of CEOs’ idiosyncratic, dispositional cognitive 
styles in the configuration of multiple growth strategies, particularly as a response to fast-
growing industries. 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
CEO cognitive complexity 
Upper echelons researchers have shown vast interest in understanding the “black 
box” of CEOs’ decision-making processes—what they attend to and how they interpret 
and think of what they see (Finkelstein et al., 2009). Starting from earlier theorizing 
(Hambrick & Mason, 1984) and hypothesis-testing of the influences of executives’ 
  
 
demographics and observable experiences as proxies for their thoughts and cognitive 
tendencies, substantial effort has been made for better understanding the strategic choices 
executives make. Moving beyond the use of the demographic approach, recently 
researchers have made some headway in more directly tapping on psychological factors 
of senior executives, for example personalities (e.g., Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007, 2011; 
Nadkarni & Herrmann, 2010; Peterson, Smith, Martorana, & Owens, 2003) or values 
(e.g., Agle, Mitchell, & Sonnenfeld, 1999; Chin, Hambrick, & Trevino, 2013; Simsek, 
Veiga, Lubatkin, & Dino, 2005). Significantly less attention, however, has been given to 
corporate leaders’ cognitive styles—namely, how they gather and process information. 
While scholars have early recognized that even top executives differ from each other in 
terms of how they draw upon logic or intuition in perceiving and judging information 
(Barnard, 1938; Hurst, Rush, & White, 1989; Mintzberg, 1973; Nutt, 1986), a persistent 
stream of research on CEOs’ cognitive styles has been absent. Given high information 
processing loads they confront, examining the implications of CEOs’ cognitive 
complexity is of great importance. 
Psychology research suggests that cognitive complexity characterizes a person’s 
thinking style with two major cognitive components: the degree of differentiation, or the 
extent of perceiving several dimensions in a stimulus array, and the degree of integration, 
or the development of connections among the differentiated elements (Bartunek et al., 
1983; Calori et al., 1994; Fransella, Bell, & Bannister, 1977, Zimring, 1971). In essence, 
it represents a typical way of individuals’ processing of information and construal of 
stimuli (Bieri, 1961). Some research provides evidence of the implications of cognitive 
complexity in the corporate elite. For instance, Wally and Baum (1994) found from a 
  
 
survey of local manufacturers that CEOs with high cognitive complexity make faster 
strategic decisions while Calori et al. (1994) found from interviews with company 
executives that those with more complex cognitive maps pursue greater geographic and 
product scope of the firm. McNamara et al. (2002) provide evidence from survey 
questionnaires that top management teams with higher complexity in their knowledge 
structures of their competitive environment tend to give rise to greater firm performance. 
Recent research using Q-sort methodology suggests that top management teams with 
higher cognitive complexity pursue more corporate social activities and decentralized 
decision making (Wong, Ormiston, & Tetlock, 2011). In the international context, 
managers with greater linguistic and religious diversity are found to acquire more 
linguistically and religiously distant firms, presumably because they have higher levels of 
cognitive complexity (Dow et al., 2016). 
In essence, cognitive complexity can be understood as the idiosyncratic manner in 
which individuals think and view informational stimuli. More specifically, a CEO with 
high cognitive complexity tends to be more comfortable with observing and interpreting 
the multifaceted situations in the environment, tolerant of processing and accepting 
multiple perspectives, generating the links between them, and understanding the 
interplays of multiple factors considered to make an organizational decision. Conversely, 
a CEO with low cognitive complexity tends to draw upon a small number of dimensions 
in processing information and understanding issues, have more focused ranges of 
attention and search, and develop fewer links among the select constructs they apply 
when confronted with multifold situations.  
  
 
The prior literature tends to imply that higher cognitive complexity of managers is 
more beneficial to the firm in terms of enhancing performance (McNamara et al., 2002), 
addressing linguistic and religious distances (Dow et al., 2016), and faster decision 
making speed (Wally & Baum, 1994). However, this assumption does not provide a 
complete view of cognitive complexity, as simple heuristics and construal patterns may 
be more efficient in simple situations (Weick, 1979). Thus, cognitive complexity may be 
better understood as a ‘style’ of viewing informational stimuli rather than one’s general 
ability (Kovarova & Filip, 2015). Adopting this ‘style’ perspective, the central premise of 
this paper is that, as CEOs face situations to manage multiple interdependent options for 
configuring their firms’ strategic profiles, their cognitive inclinations play an important 
role in guiding their decisions on how to allocate organizational resources to different 
strategic alternatives.  
The influence of CEOs’ cognitive complexity on firm growth strategies 
Firm growth represents a major corporate strategic goal for managers (Penrose, 
1959), for the purpose of serving external stakeholders’ interests (Kim, Haleblian, & 
Finkelstein, 2011) and managers’ own incentives (Dalton & Kesner, 1985) or aspirations 
(Greve, 2008). Growing the firm includes outward expansion and development within the 
organization (Penrose, 1959). Among the multiple paths to growth, acquisitions and 
internal innovations represent two major, often substitutable, approaches that firms adopt 
(Hitt, Hoskisson, Ireland, & Harrison, 1991; Pitts, 1977).1 As engaging in multiple and 
simultaneous growth modes may require specific ways of thinking and processing 
                                                        
1 Hybrid modes (e.g., franchising, alliances, and joint ventures) also form important actions for growing 
companies (McKelvie & Wiklund, 2010), which merit a separate discussion. The focus of this paper is 
limited to acquisitive and organic growth, as they represent two distinct paths towards expansion. 
  
 
information, it is critical that I understand how managers’ idiosyncratic cognitive 
tendencies may drive various paths for firm growth. Such notion builds upon the premise 
that adopting a holistic view of firms’ growth paths—instead of focusing on individual 
growth paths—triggers the need for identifying cognitive sources that help explain the 
multi-strategy growth approaches.  
Different growth modes may be driven by different proclivities. For example, the 
agency theory view suggests that self-interested corporate agents tend to invest in 
acquisitions to build their empire and obtain short-term rewards (e.g., Agrawal & 
Walkling, 1994; Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman, 1997) than in internal innovations that 
require longer-term investments. Individual growth strategy may be associated with 
certain psychological attributes of CEOs. For example, CEOs’ hubris (Hayward & 
Hambrick, 1997), regulatory focus (Gamache et al., 2015), and overconfidence 
(Malmendier & Tate, 2008) have been found to be associated with acquisition decisions, 
while CEOs’ attention to technological trends (Eggers & Kaplan, 2009; Kaplan, 2008) 
and temporal orientation (Nadkarni & Chen, 2014; Yadav, Prabhu, & Chandy, 2007) 
have been found to predict new product introductions.  
Most previous studies have focused on explaining a single mode of growth. Not 
much has been done to identify why firms, as they engage in multiple growth modes, 
choose to put more emphasis on one growth mode over another. It is critical to 
understand how different weights on individual courses for growth are determined in the 
CEO’s decision calculus. My approach, which focuses on CEO cognitive complexity on 
multiple firm growth strategies, thus can offer a more comprehensive understanding of 
how the CEO, as a firm’s chief architect (Allaire, 1991; Bigley & Wiersema, 2002), and 
  
 
“cognizer” (Calori et al., 1994: 438; Nadkarni & Herrmann, 2010), may shape the firm’s 
pursuit of multiple growth modes. My core argument is that different growth strategies, 
more specifically acquisitions and internal innovations, require different information 
processing loads from CEOs; thus, CEOs with different levels of cognitive complexity 
may prefer different growth strategies.  
CEO cognitive complexity and acquisitions 
First, as acquisitions represent external growth activities that span firm 
boundaries, they involve high information asymmetry between the acquirer and the 
external pool of target candidates (e.g., Cuypers, Cuypers, & Martin, 2017; Officer, 
Poulsen, & Stegemoller, 2009), hence may require intense information processing for the 
CEO to mitigate such asymmetry. Specifically, CEOs need ex ante to discern across 
multiple candidates and weigh the pros and cons of each candidate; process the 
corresponding information collected from due diligence; and develop thorough planning 
during and after the acquisition to address the high uncertainty in post-acquisition phases 
(Pablo, Sitkin, & Jemison, 1996).  
Indeed, firms refer to past acquisition experiences (see Barkema & Schijven, 2008 
for a review) in guiding their subsequent acquisition decisions. However, every 
acquisition deal differs, which implies that, as the CEO signs the deal, there still exists a 
host of new information about the new entity to be acquired and integrated. Even for 
acquisitions of related or similar businesses, it is likely that differences exist between the 
acquirer and target in terms of their respective culture, organizational structure, decision 
processes, management styles, and operating procedures (Datta, 1991). Such differences 
  
 
are expected to present complex information bundles to the CEO before signing the deal 
(Hayward & Hambrick, 1997).  
Second, acquisitions involve intense negotiation processes among multiple 
internal and external parties (Walsh, 1989). As participants’ commitment to the deal 
escalates, this will put significant amounts of time in doing the deal and present high time 
pressure to the CEO to make the final decision that best addresses the multiple 
constituents’ interests (Jemison & Sitkin, 1986). Last, but not the least, when CEOs 
‘write the check’ for an acquisition deal, they take utmost responsibility in the decision 
that involve massive amounts of financial resources (Hayward & Hambrick, 1997). 
Indeed, failed acquisitions can lead to forced CEO turnovers (Lehn & Zhao, 2006). In all, 
I suggest that growing firms through acquisitions fits the information processing style of 
CEOs with high cognitive complexity. In proposing such relationship, I suggest that high 
cognitive complexity CEOs’ preference towards intensive acquisition activities may be 
manifested in both the number of acquisition deals made and the amount of financial 
investment associated with those deals. Formally, 
Hypothesis 1a: A firm’s CEO’s cognitive complexity is positively related 
to the firm’s number of acquisitions. 
Hypothesis 1b: A firm’s CEO’s cognitive complexity is positively related 
to the firm’s size of acquisitions. 
While I have proposed the relationship between CEOs’ cognitive complexity and 
acquisitions, I suggest that the strategic proclivity of CEOs with high cognitive 
complexity towards acquisitions may be further manifested in their penchant for 
acquisitions of less-related businesses rather than closely-related businesses. Whereas 
acquisitions of closely-related businesses offer great synergy and easy to integrate due to 
  
 
high overlap in knowledge bases, (Ahuja & Katila, 2001; Anand & Singh, 1997; Seth, 
1990), acquisitions of distant businesses can expand the scope of the acquiring firms’ 
knowledge bases and product lines (Vermeulen & Barkema, 2001).  
As argued earlier, CEOs with low levels of cognitive complexity are more likely 
to be focused in their strategic lookout of acquisition candidates. When they do come to a 
decision to acquire a target, it is likely that, compared to those with high cognitive 
complexity, they attend more to the familiar candidates that operate similar businesses 
than the unfamiliar ones. Their more focused attention scope and concise decision 
calculus (e.g., Calori et al., 1994), use of fewer cognitive categories for distinguishing 
candidates and more attention to the strategic benefits that the acquisition of similar 
businesses can offer may all lead them to drive their strategic efforts towards acquiring 
more related businesses. In comparison, CEOs characterized by high levels of cognitive 
complexity are likely to seek a variety of information (e.g., Tetlock, 2000) and search for 
potential acquisition targets beyond their firms’ industry boundaries. CEOs with high 
levels of cognitive complexity may also tend to feel more comfortable in collecting and 
processing new information to weigh pros and cons of targets outside the industry 
segments of their firms’ current businesses. As a result, CEOs with high cognitive 
complexity are more likely to acquire unrelated businesses than their counterparts with 
low cognitive complexity. CEOs with different levels of cognitive complexity not only 
differ in their preferences in acquisitions, but also differ in the choices of acquisition 
targets once they decide to go ahead with the acquisition strategy. Taken altogether, I 
hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 2: A firm’s CEO’s cognitive complexity is positively associated 
with the firm’s propensity for pursuing acquisitions of less related 
  
 
businesses. 
CEO cognitive complexity and internal innovations 
Parallel with my discussion on CEOs’ cognitive complexity and acquisitions, I 
suggest that the information processing needs of internal growth may better fit the 
information processing style of CEOs with low cognitive complexity. I present my 
hypotheses on the association of CEOs’ cognitive complexity with two related fronts of 
internal innovations—input (R&D investment) and output (new product developments). 
A critical engine for promoting internal growth is to make strategic investment in 
such activity—i.e., research and development (R&D) expenditures. A large literature has 
suggested that CEOs have significant influence over R&D activities, either driven by 
financial incentives (e.g., Balkin, Markman, & Gomez-Mejia, 2000; Hoskisson, Hitt, & 
Hill, 1993; Sanders & Hambrick, 2007), their demographic attributes or experiences (e.g., 
Barker & Mueller, 2002; Crossland, Zyung, Hiller, & Hambrick, 2014), or their personal 
dispositions (e.g., Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007; Li & Tang, 2010). I add to this stream 
of research by suggesting that CEOs’ cognitive style, i.e., cognitive complexity, can also 
have important implications on their firms’ R&D investments.  
R&D investment is a key organizational vehicle through which internal growth is 
promoted (Garcia-Majon & Romero-Merino, 2012; Hitt, Ireland, & Palia, 1982; Hitt & 
Ireland, 1985). As previous research suggests, developing new products involve gradual 
information gathering and processing that build upon core competencies that have 
already accumulated within the firm (Danneels, 2002) and may thus entail less 
information asymmetry and processing for the CEO. Relatedly, internal developments are 
built upon existing rules and routines (Danneels, 2002) that support the CEO’s decision 
making and lessen the amount and complexity of information to be processed by the 
  
 
CEO. As path dependent operations for internal development of new products may 
simplify the decision calculus for the CEO, those with low cognitive complexity may 
prefer internal growth through investing more in R&D.  
Hypothesis 3: A firm’s CEO’s cognitive complexity is negatively 
associated with the firm’s R&D expenditures. 
While R&D spending levels can be largely determined by the CEO, the CEO’s 
role is often to look at the big picture and bring the overall direction to the table, generate 
the energy, and procure, manage, and deploy organizational resources that are needed to 
translate new ideas into products (Van de Ven, 1986). This, in turn, is expected to be 
manifested in the outputs of R&D investment—i.e., new product developments.  
While gradual information gathering and processing that build upon core 
competencies and routines that have accumulated within the firm characterize internal 
innovations, such activities are mostly within the lower level individuals’ task domain. 
The CEO often delegates the decision authority of new product launches to lower level 
managers who are more directly involved in the development process. As such, multiple 
decision variables such as managing R&D teams, conducting lab tests, or making optimal 
use of the R&D budget are rather delegated to the middle managers or R&D personnel 
(Burgelman, 1983). While time is an important aspect also for new product launches, 
since new products need to meet market demands on time, grasping customers’ needs is 
rather mostly done by frontline managers (Burgelman, 1983; Christensen & Bower, 
1996), leading the time pressure perceived by the CEO to be less severe.  
In all, as internal organic growth focuses on internal developments of new 
products using the firm’s internal knowledge and core competencies and more likely 
builds upon path- dependent operations (Danneels, 2002), the information processing 
  
 
load for the CEO is relatively low and attention and search are rather directed towards the 
inner sector. Therefore, CEOs with lower cognitive complexity may feel more confident 
in growing internally and deploy firm resources and attention towards the corresponding 
activities, bringing new products to fruition. Therefore, I hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 4: A firm’s CEO’s cognitive complexity is negatively related to 
the firm’s number of new product developments. 
The moderating role of industry growth 
Industry growth is an environmental feature that has figured prominently in 
strategic management and organizational theory research (e.g., Caves & Porter, 1978; 
Datta & Rajagopalan, 1998; Datta, Guthrie, & Wright, 2005; McDougall, Covin, 
Robinson, & Herron, 1994; Porter, 1980). As industries grow at higher rates, they offer 
greater market opportunities, increased options for firm growth, and variance in 
competition (Hambrick & Abrahamson, 1995; Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987). Industries 
going through low growth periods, however, offer fewer opportunities, hence less 
discretion for CEOs to make deliberate strategic decisions.  
It follows that, as opportunities for growth increasingly abound in the 
environment, the discrepancy in strategic focuses between CEOs with different levels of 
cognitive complexity is expected to become more salient. Indeed, when growth 
opportunities are sparse, there exists little room for CEOs to willfully exert their strategic 
focuses (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987). Specifically, the growth approaches of CEOs, 
with high or low cognitive complexity, may not fully realize when they do not have much 
latitude to pursue their strategic approaches. However, high growth in the industry is 
likely to increase opportunities of both acquisitions and internal innovations. Therefore, 
as opportunities to grasp burgeon, the cognitive and strategic tendencies of CEOs with 
  
 
high and low cognitive complexity are likely to diverge further. Not only would increased 
strategic leeway support a high cognitive complexity CEO’s penchant for acquisitions, it 
would also strengthen a low cognitive complexity CEO’s inclination towards internal 
growth. While CEOs with low cognitive complexity are in general likely to focus on 
select aspects of the opportunities in the industry, increased stimuli would open room for 
pursuing greater investment in internal growth (Staw, Sandelands, & Dutton, 1981). As 
they allocate more of their attention and organizational resources towards internal growth 
in fast-growing contexts, relatively less focus is expected to be given to external growth. 
Taken together, I hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 5a: The positive relationship between CEO cognitive 
complexity and the number of acquisitions will be strengthened in higher 
industry growth situations. 
Hypothesis 5b: The positive relationship between CEO cognitive 
complexity and the size of acquisitions will be strengthened in higher 
industry growth situations. 
Hypothesis 5c: The negative relationship between CEO cognitive 
complexity and R&D investment will be strengthened in higher industry 
growth situations. 
Hypothesis 5d: The negative relationship between CEO cognitive 
complexity and the number of new product developments will be 
strengthened in higher industry growth situations. 
RESEARCH METHODS 
Data and sample 
The study was based on a longitudinal sample consisting of 3,144 public U.S. 
firms, whose quarterly earnings conference call data were available in the years 2002 
through 2013. Data on CEOs’ language use were based on companies’ quarterly 
conference calls collected from Thomson Reuters Street Events database. Firm 
  
 
acquisition data were collected from SDC Platinum, firms’ financial and strategic 
information from Compustat, and CEO compensation data from Execucomp. On average, 
I analyzed 6.37 firm-CEO years per firm panel across a variety of industries, which 
allowed great generalizability of the findings. 
Independent variable: CEO cognitive complexity 
While cognitive complexity has been a highly studied construct in psychology, as 
noted earlier, methodological challenges have been present in the management literature. 
First, studies that have used primary data (e.g., questionnaires, interviews) have mostly 
been restricted to a relatively small number of CEOs in specific geographical areas or 
industries (Calori et al., 1994; Hitt et al., 1991; McNamara et al., 2002; Wally & Baum, 
1994). As an effort to address these concerns, I adopt an approach that recent psychology 
research has developed—i.e., to use an unobtrusive measure that relies on individuals’ 
word usage revealed in text materials to capture their cognitive complexity (e.g., Abe, 
2011, 2012). This approach features the advantage of allowing one to study much larger 
samples over time so long as data on individuals’ language use are available. 
For decades, researchers have argued that people’s preferences, perceptions, and 
personalities are revealed by the words they use in written and verbal communication 
(e.g., Sanford, 1942; Webb et al., 1966). In essence, “[t]he way we use words reflect how 
we think” (Pennebaker, Chung, Frazee, Lavergne, & Beaver, 2014: 1). Unobtrusive 
measures based on language can help eliminate much of the reactivity, demand 
characteristics, and researchers’ expectations associated with other methods. Studies on 
the psychometrics of word use have shown that language patterns are remarkably stable 
across various topics, suggesting that language use is a reliable indicator of individual 
  
 
differences (Chung & Pennebaker, 2007; Mehl & Pennebaker, 2003; Pennebaker & King, 
1999). As such, studies in management have increasingly adopted this method to capture 
managers’ psychological constructs such as regulatory focus (Gamache et al., 2015), 
entrepreneurial orientation (Cho & Hambrick, 2006), commitment to status quo 
(McClelland et al., 2010), and attention (Eggers & Kaplan, 2009) (see Gao, Yu, & 
Cannella, 2016 for a review of strategy research on public language use). 
Based on this stream of research, I  collected data on CEOs’ word use through 
companies’ quarterly earnings conference calls with investors and securities analysts,2 
resulting in an average of 3 transcripts for each CEO annually and 66,024 transcripts in 
total. The transcripts were content-analyzed through an automated text-analysis software, 
LIWC (Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count: Pennebaker and Francis, 1996; Pennebaker, 
Booth, & Francis, 2007). LIWC uses a validated database of over 2,000 words and word 
stems to code text in terms of 72 different dimensions of language use, which are grouped 
in four main categories: 1) language composition (e.g., negations, pronouns), 2) 
psychological processes (e.g., optimism-energy, inhibition), 3) relativity (e.g., temporal 
references), and 4) current concerns (e.g., physical states). Based on these dimensions, 
LIWC calculates the percentage of words in a given text that match each dimension.3 
For each conference call transcript, I extracted all words spoken by the CEO 
during the call, all of which consisted of two major parts: 1) Prepared remarks, in which 
                                                        
2 Many studies in the managerial cognition literature have used letters to shareholders in company annual 
reports to capture various psychological constructs (e.g., Cho & Hambrick, 2006; Eggers & Kaplan, 2009). 
However, it may be questionable whether the texts from these scripted, formal letters accurately capture 
CEOs’ cognitive patterns or personality traits. Reflecting this concern, recent accounting and finance 
research has been increasingly using transcribed texts from various types of conference calls through 
demonstrating their validity as a useful indicator (e.g., Larcker & Zakolyukina, 2012; Matsumoto, Pronk, & 
Roelofsen, 2011; Price, Doran, Peterson, & Bliss, 2012). 
3 See Pennebaker and Francis (1996), Pennebaker, Booth, and Francis (2007), and Tausczik and 
Pennebaker (2010) for more detailed information and psychometric properties of LIWC analyses. 
  
 
the company’s CEO gives a formal presentation on various issues, and 2) Question and 
Answer, in which the company representatives are open to questions from the analysts 
present at the conference call. Using CEOs’ spoken language from these sessions, 
‘function’ words (e.g., conjunctions) that serve as the ‘cement’ to hold content words 
together (Chung & Pennebaker, 2007: 347) were used to create the index of one’s 
cognitive complexity, thereby ensuring that the use of these subconsciously used words 
captured the cognitive styles of CEOs during these speech sessions.  
The use of function words builds upon the premise that although conscious 
attention is seldom paid by the speaker/writer when actually using them, function words 
are known to have a strong impact on the listener/reader while reflecting a great deal 
about the speaker/writer (Abe, 2011). Again, these word categories do not contain 
content—i.e., context- or business-specific nouns (e.g., industry, product) or verbs (e.g., 
explore, innovate). This exclusive focus on function words and not on content words 
serves an important purpose. Specifically, it mitigates the concern that the words used in 
CEOs’ speeches may merely be verbatim descriptions of concurrent or prospective 
company activities and thus CEOs’ cognitive complexity captured in their language is 
simply a projection of complex activities in which their firms engage. Rather, this 
approach assumes and implies that the ways CEOs think are reflected in how they speak 
and not in what they say (Chung & Pennebaker, 2007; Pennebaker & King, 1999). In all, 
CEOs’ way of thinking is expected to be reflected in how they verbally deliver the 
prepared remarks as well as organize and manage the interactions with others during 
Q&A sessions. 
As discussed earlier, cognitive complexity refers to a combination of two major 
  
 
components of one’s reasoning: the extent to which one can differentiate between 
multiple, competing solutions and the extent to which one can integrate among those 
solutions (Tetlock, 1981). Following this definition, Abe (2011, 2012) employed an index 
that combines words that used for making precise distinctions and conjoining multiple 
thoughts together. Specifically, the index comprises four function-word categories—
exclusion (e.g., but, without), negations (e.g., no, not, never), tentativeness (e.g., maybe, 
perhaps), and conjunctions (e.g., and, also, although).4 For example, exclusion words are 
used when making distinctions between multiple categories (i.e., differentiate), while 
conjunctions help bring together multiple thoughts to create a coherent narrative (i.e., 
integrate) (Graesser, McNamara, Louwerse, & Cai, 2004). 
On average, CEOs spoke 2,962 words during the quarterly calls. Such procedure 
indicates that CEOs’ level of cognitive complexity is measured and updated annually. As 
psychology research has mostly treated cognitive complexity as an individual trait that 
stays largely constant over time (e.g., Burleson & Caplan, 1998; Leary & Hoyle, 2009), I 
show below the stability of the annually measured scores, which supports that one’s 
cognitive complexity is relatively consistent over time. However, I refrained from using a 
constant value over the tenure of CEOs in the main analysis since a constant value would 
imply a strong assumption that a CEO will produce the exact same language-based 
complexity score whenever measured. Thus, in line with recent research using linguistic 
measures of psychological variables (e.g., Gamache et al., 2015), I annually updated 
CEOs’ cognitive complexity scores in the analysis. The results remained consistent when 
using a constant measure of CEO cognitive complexity, i.e., the mean of cognitive 
                                                        
4 We provide in Appendix 1 the full list of words used for each category. For more information, please refer 
to the LIWC 2007 program which can be found on www.liwc.net. 
  
 
complexity scores across the CEO’s firm tenure years. Using LIWC, the number of 
words from each of these categories was counted to compute the extent to which these 
words were used in proportion to the total amount of words spoken by the CEO. After 
conducting a LIWC analysis on the transcripts, I ran a factor analysis of the scores 
(percentages) from the four word categories, which showed that all four word categories 
loaded on one factor with an Eigenvalue of over 2.56 explaining 64 percent of the 
variance, all loadings exceeding 0.61. I used the sum of the standardized scores as an 
index of a CEO’s cognitive complexity. 
While there were strong reasons for adopting the language-based measure, I 
conducted a supplementary study to gauge its correlation with the explicit, self-report 
measure of cognitive complexity based on Bieri et al.’s (1966) Repertory Grid. I recruited 
123 undergraduate students enrolled in a management course. The participants first 
completed the survey-based measure of cognitive complexity, i.e., the Repertory Grid. In 
brief, Bieri et al.’s (1966) instrument presents a 10×10 grid where the respondent is asked 
to evaluate 10 specific persons (e.g., self, mother, person s/he dislikes, friend of opposite 
sex) on 10 bipolar constructs (e.g., responsible-irresponsible, calm-excitable, outgoing-
shy) using a six-point scale, for a total of 100 ratings. From the ratings, the standard 
deviations of ratings of each person evaluated (10 for each respondent) are computed, 
which reflect the extent to which the respondent uses different constructs (categories) to 
evaluate an object. Thus, a higher standard deviation indicates greater degrees of 
distinction. Then, the standard deviations are averaged across the 10 individuals to 
represent the overall level of cognitive complexity for each respondent. 
Next, the respondents were asked to provide a sample writing to be content-
  
 
analyzed using the LIWC software to calculate the language-based cognitive complexity 
score (e.g., Abe, 2011, 2012). In this writing sample, participants were asked to situate 
themselves in a situation where multiple personal and occupational identities can collide 
(e.g., doctors striving to improve patients’ health outcomes vs. hospital’s financial 
outcomes) and express their thoughts and beliefs on how to address the conflicting 
situations. Using LIWC, the percentages of the four vocabulary dimensions (i.e., 
conjunctions, negations, tentativeness, and exclusions) were extracted and standardized to 
construct the language-based cognitive complexity score. The correlation between the 
language-based measure and grid-based measure of cognitive complexity was 0.20 (p < 
0.05), a magnitude commensurate with previous studies that have used linguistic markers 
of cognitive constructs (e.g., Pennebaker & King, 1999; see Hofmann, Gawronski, 
Gschwendner, Le, & Schmitt [2005] for a meta-analysis that reports correlations between 
implicit measures and explicit self-reported measures).5 
A measure of CEO attribute or firm-specific influence? One may argue that some 
firms have embedded practices that make their CEOs (appear to) possess high or low 
cognitive complexity. Accordingly, it could be questionable whether the level of 
cognitive complexity captured in the conference call texts is simply an indicator for the 
firm’s task contingencies as opposed to the CEO’s personal attribute. I address this 
concern in two ways. First, using a subset of the sample, I examined whether CEOs 
showed consistency in their complexity scores over time, regardless of whether they 
moved across firms. If the CEO’s cognitive complexity was to be highly influenced by 
the firm, his or her complexity score would change over time, reflecting any firm-specific 
                                                        
5 Hofmann et al. (2005) report that the implicit-explicit correlation in cognitive characteristics (r = 0.18) is 
often significantly lower than that in affective characteristics (r = 0.28). 
  
 
influences. Using a well-established stability (or dispersion) measure, I computed the 
coefficient of variation (CV) in CEOs’ complexity scores over the years observed in the 
sample (standard deviation over the mean). This yielded a value of 0.03, which indicates 
high stability (low variance) in CEOs’ cognitive complexity over time. Second, in 
addition to computing CVs of the sampled CEOs, I focused on the few CEOs who were 
observed at two different firms (i.e., moved from one firm’s CEO position to another 
firm’s CEO position within the sample period) to examine the consistency in their 
cognitive complexity scores across different firms. I found that there was a great degree 
of consistency for each individual across the successive placements (Pearson’s r = 0.84). 
Taken together, these results provide some evidence that CEOs may indeed have their 
own ‘styles’ in making corporate decisions (Bertrand & Schoar, 2003: 1170). In essence, 
the cognitive complexity scores gauged by CEOs’ linguistic use represent more the 
personal attributes of the CEOs themselves than the task contingencies of their firms. 
Dependent variables 
Acquisitions. Three variables that capture the magnitude and nature of 
acquisitions were collected from the SDC Platinum database. First, number of 
acquisitions was measured as the count of company announcements of acquisitions in a 
given year.6 To include only meaningful acquisitions from acquiring firm CEOs’ 
perspectives, I focus on acquisitions with transaction values over $1 million and in which 
acquiring firms have taken controlling stakes (Moeller, Schlingemann, & Stulz, 2005). 
Second, the size of acquisitions was measured as the total transaction values (log-
transformed) associated with the acquisitions in a given year. Unrelated acquisition was 
                                                        
6 Data on the number of acquisition announcements are also available in the Capital IQ database. The 
results based on these two different data sources were largely similar. 
  
 
determined based on the 2-digit SIC codes of the acquiring firm and target (Stettner & 
Lavie, 2014). If the target was classified as operating in a different 2-digit SIC code than 
that of the acquiring firm, the acquisition was considered as unrelated and was coded one, 
zero otherwise. The unrelated orientation of acquisition activities in a given year was 
computed as the number of unrelated acquisitions in proportion to the total number of 
acquisitions, resulting in a ratio ranging from 0 to 1. 
Internal innovations: R&D investment and new product developments. The two 
variables that capture the firm’s internal growth activities, R&D investment and new 
product developments, were collected from Compustat and the Key Developments 
database of Capital IQ, respectively.7 First, R&D investment was measured as the actual 
annual R&D spending as reported in Compustat. I use R&D investment instead of R&D 
intensity (R&D investment scaled by firm size) because the former avoids the potential 
for spurious associations arising from the correlation among the denominators of both 
right- and left-side variables (Wiseman, 2009). Second, the number of new product 
developments was the count of firms’ non-redundant announcements of new product 
introductions in a given year.  
Moderator: Industry growth 
Following prior research, industry growth was measured as the average five-year 
annual growth rate in industry sales (based on the 2-digit SIC codes) (e.g., Hambrick & 
Abrahamson, 1995; Datta et al., 2005; Rajagopalan & Datta, 1996). 
                                                        
7 This database offers structured summaries of key development events that may impact the market value of 
securities, extracted from sources such as PR Newswire, Business Wire, SEC Form 8Ks, and company 
press releases. The coverage of this database starts in 2002 and includes corporate events such as firms’ 
client and product announcements, SEC inquiries, expansions, reorganizations, corporate governance, 
dividends, and earnings.  
  
 
Control variables 
CEO-level controls. As CEOs’ strategic behaviors may change as they age 
(Hambrick & Mason, 1984), CEO age was controlled for. In addition, as contingent-
based pay is expected to affect CEOs’ corporate strategic choices (e.g., Sanders & 
Hambrick, 2007), I also controlled for CEO options, computed as the percentage of 
options relative to the total compensation awarded to a CEO. Further, as more powerful 
CEOs would have greater leeway in exerting their wills into firm actions (Finkelstein, 
1992), I also controlled for CEO duality, an indicator variable equaling one if a CEO was 
also the board chair in a year, zero otherwise.  
Firm-level controls. As the relative standing of firms has been found to influence 
managers’ strategic actions (Greve, 1998), I controlled for the performance levels of 
firms relative to their aspiration levels, measured by firms’ returns of assets (ROA). 
Specifically, a firm’s relative performance was calculated as the difference between the 
firm’s actual performance and its aspiration level, which was a weighted index of 
historical and social components (Cyert & March, 1963; Greve, 2003). Using the spline 
specification (Greene, 1993), separate variables for over- and underperformance were 
created. Overperformance was measured as the actual level of performance above the 
aspiration level while underperformance was actual performance below the aspiration 
level. Thus, when the actual performance was below (above) the aspiration level, 
overperformance (underperformance) was coded as zero. As firm resource slack allows 
greater leeway and triggers certain managerial decisions (Cyert & March, 1963; Greve, 
1998), the firm’s current ratio (current assets over current liabilities) and equity/debt ratio 
(common equity over total debt) were controlled for. Since R&D represents a firm’s input 
  
 
for innovation activities and is therefore an important contingency of new product 
developments (Sidhu, Commandeur, & Volberda, 2007), R&D spending was controlled 
for in the models predicting new product developments, computed as the firm’s actual 
R&D expenses. When predicting the number (size) of acquisitions, I controlled for the 
focal year’s size (number) of acquisitions. Firm size, measured as the natural log of the 
firm’s total revenues, was controlled for as it can influence the degree of strategic inertia 
(Dougherty & Hardy, 1996). As more diversified firms are more likely to make 
acquisitions (e.g., Bergh & Lawless, 1998), total firm diversification was also included, 
measured using an entropy measure of total product market diversification (Hoskisson et 
al., 1993; Palepu, 1985). This measure takes into account the number of segments in 
which a firm participates, and weights each segment based on its respective sales. Finally, 
because pursuing one growth mode can affect the decision of the other, I controlled for 
the level of prior year’s other growth activity (e.g., controlled for prior year’s new 
product development activities when predicting the focal year’s acquisitions). 
Industry-level controls. To control for inter-industry variability and temporal 
factors that may influence the outcome variables of interest, I included industry dummies 
at the two-digit SIC level and year dummies. In addition, as firms’ learning from peers’ 
behaviors can affect their stock of knowledge at a given point in time (e.g., Srinivasan, 
Haunschild, & Grewal, 2007), I controlled for the industry tendencies in growth 
activities, by including the previous year’s industry means of each growth strategy 
variable. 
Estimation 
Due to the different nature of the various dependent variables, I used three 
  
 
different methodological approaches to test the hypotheses. The first approach was 
employed to address the count-based nature of acquisitions and new product 
developments. As these events do not occur frequently, it is common to observe non-
occurrences in a given year, resulting in multiple zeros in the distributions of the 
dependent variables. Therefore, I used zero inflated negative binomial regressions with 
standard errors clustered at the firm-CEO level to test Hypotheses 1a, 1b, 2a, and 2b. In 
each model, the Vuong test statistics (1989) indicated that the zero-inflated negative 
binomial models were more appropriate in fitting the data than the standard negative 
binomial models. Further, to address the possibility of non-random assignment and 
selection bias that corporate boards may seek and hire CEOs with high cognitive 
complexity in certain types of businesses, I employed a propensity score-based weighting 
and regression method (Guo & Fraser, 2014; Yim, 2013). This involved predicting in the 
first-stage model the likelihood of a firm having a high cognitive complexity CEO (i.e., 
75 percentile) where its inverse is used as sampling weights in the second-stage model. 
An instrumental variable, the industry mean of CEOs’ cognitive complexity (excluding 
focal CEOs), in addition to the CEO- and firm-level variables that were used in the 
second-stage models predicting the volume of acquisitions and internal innovations, was 
included in this first-stage probit regression. The coefficient of this instrumental variable 
was statistically significant (β = 0.318, p < 0.01). 
Second, to predict the percentage of unrelated acquisitions, I applied fractional 
logit regressions. Specifically, I used the “fracglm” command in Stata with specifying a 
probit link function with robust standard errors. In addition, as examining the relatedness 
of an acquisition is conditional upon its actual initiation, I used the Heckman two-stage 
  
 
procedure (Heckman, 1979) to first predict the likelihood of the firm making an 
acquisition in a year. In the first-stage probit model, I used the same predictors used in 
the second-stage models in addition to an instrumental variable capturing the state-level 
number of bids, presuming that the state-level activity of acquisitions may have influence 
over the likelihood of focal firms’ engagement in acquisitions but not necessarily the 
unrelated nature of them. The coefficient of this instrumental variable was statistically 
significant (β = 0.692, p < 0.01). From this first-stage model, I computed the inverse 
Mill’s ratio and included it in the second-stage model.  
Finally, to predict the size of acquisitions (transaction values) and R&D 
investments, I used random effects Generalized Least Squares (GLS) regressions with 
standard errors clustered at the firm-CEO level.  
Results 
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics and zero-order correlations of the variables. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Hypotheses 1a, 1b, 5a, and 5b state that CEO cognitive complexity is positively 
related to the volume of acquisitions made in a given year, and this relationship is more 
pronounced when the industry is going through high-growth periods. As shown in Model 
3 (full model) of Table 2A, the coefficient for CEO cognitive complexity (β = 0.030, p < 
0.01) and its interaction term with industry growth (β = 0.342, p < 0.05) are both positive 
and statistically significant. As Models 2 and 3 of Table 2B indicate, the coefficient for 
CEO cognitive complexity (β = 0.006, p > 0.10) and its interaction with industry growth 
(β = -0.037, p > 0.10) are not statistically significant. Thus, Hypotheses 1a and 5a are 
supported while Hypotheses 1b and 5b are not supported. To graphically illustrate the 
  
 
interactive effect of CEO cognitive complexity and industry growth on the number of 
acquisitions, I used the “marginsplot” command in Stata. Industry growth was indicated 
as high (low) by computing the growth scores that were one standard deviation above 
(below) the mean. As shown in Figure 1, the positive relationship between CEO 
cognitive complexity and the number of acquisitions is stronger as the industry 
experiences a higher growth rate. 
[Insert Table 2A, 2B, and Figure 1 about here] 
Hypothesis 2 states that CEOs with higher cognitive complexity tend to engage in 
more unrelated acquisitions than those with low cognitive complexity, contingent upon 
their decision to make an acquisition. As shown in Model 2 of Table 3, the coefficient for 
CEO cognitive complexity is positive and statistically significant (β = 0.027, p < 0.01). 
Therefore, Hypothesis 2 was supported. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
Hypotheses 3 and 4 state that CEO cognitive complexity is negatively related to 
the firm’s R&D investment and new product developments, respectively. Hypotheses 5c 
and 5d further propose that these relationships are more pronounced in high-growth 
industries. As shown in Model 2 of Table 4 in which R&D investment is the dependent 
variable, the coefficient for CEO cognitive complexity is negative and statistically 
significant (β = -3.113, p < 0.05). However, the coefficient for its interaction with 
industry growth is not statistically significant (β = 8.903, p > 0.10). Thus, Hypothesis 3 is 
supported but Hypothesis 5c is not. As shown in Model 3 (full model) of Table 5 in 
which the number of new product developments is the dependent variable, the 
coefficients for CEO cognitive complexity (β = -0.039, p < 0.01) and its interaction term 
  
 
with industry growth (β = -0.320, p < 0.10) are both negative and statistically significant. 
Thus, Hypotheses 4 and 5d are supported. The interactive effect of CEO cognitive 
complexity and industry growth on new product developments is portrayed in Figure 2, 
using the same approach as above. As shown, the negative relationship between CEO 
cognitive complexity and the number of new product developments becomes stronger as 
the industry experiences a higher growth rate. 
[Insert Table 4, 5, and Figure 2 about here] 
Robustness checks and supplementary analyses 
In order to check the robustness of the main findings, I conducted a series of 
further analyses. First, as top executives in the top management team other than the CEO 
may also have significant influence over corporate decisions, I ran a separate analysis 
controlling for the chief finance officers’ (CFOs’) level of cognitive complexity, 
measured the same way CEOs’ cognitive complexity was measured (unlike CFOs, who 
are frequently present in earnings conference calls, data on other senior executives’ 
participation in conference calls and thus, measures on their cognitive complexity, are 
limited). Results remained largely similar, and are available upon request. 
Second, as the current year’s growth activities may be competing for the same 
pool of organizational resources, I also conducted separate analyses by controlling for the 
current year’s acquisitions (new product developments) when predicting new product 
developments (acquisitions). I found similar results.  
Third, I conducted a within-firm analysis by focusing on a subsample of firms that 
experienced CEO changes in the study period. The logic behind this analysis was that, (1) 
CEO cognitive complexity may vary much more across CEOs than within CEOs; and (2) 
  
 
such approach allows us to analyze the effect of CEO cognitive complexity with firm-
level fixed effects. This analysis yielded largely similar results—(1) the relationships 
between CEO cognitive complexity and the number of acquisitions and the proportion of 
unrelated acquisitions were both positive and statistically significant; (2) the relationships 
between CEO cognitive complexity and R&D investment and new product developments 
are both negative and statistically significant. 
Fourth, I used R&D intensity (R&D investment over total sales) as an alternative 
measure of internal growth investment. Consistent with the main analysis using actual 
R&D spending, results showed that firms run by CEOs with low cognitive complexity 
display higher R&D intensity compared to those run by CEOs with high cognitive 
complexity.   
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This paper was motivated by the desire to explore the role of CEOs’ cognition in 
firms’ growth strategies. Specifically, I examine how the fit between a CEO’s cognitive 
complexity and firm growth approaches (i.e., acquisitions and internal developments) can 
determine the relative emphasis given to certain growth approaches. I first proposed that 
the information processing styles of CEOs with higher cognitive complexity are more 
aligned with external acquisitive growth approach that requires a wider search scope and 
complex information processing. I further hypothesized that high cognitive complexity 
CEOs’ tendency to span the boundaries would carry over to pursue acquiring less-related 
businesses. Conversely, the information processing styles of CEOs with lower cognitive 
complexity tend to better fit with internal organic growth approach where the decision 
making replies more upon organizational routines and accumulated organizational 
  
 
competence. Finally, I argued that in rapidly growing industries, the divergence in 
strategic tendencies towards acquisitive and internal growth modes would widen between 
CEOs with high and low cognitive complexity.  
An analysis of a sample of large, U.S. firms supported the contention that CEOs 
with high cognitive complexity, compared to those with low cognitive complexity, show 
greater tendency to engage in more acquisitions while in less internal developments, 
where such discrepancy is magnified when the industry experiences high growth. Results 
also showed that the emphasis of CEOs with low cognitive complexity on internal growth 
was also manifested in the amount of R&D expenditures. Further, I found evidence that 
high complexity CEOs’ strategic inclination is manifested in acquiring more of remotely 
related businesses. In all, this study’s findings consistently support the core argument that 
firms’ growth strategies reflect their CEOs’ cognitive styles, i.e., cognitive complexity. 
These findings can offer important contributions to the management literature. 
First, the paper contributes to research on managerial cognition and the broader 
upper echelons research by elaborating on the implications of a particular individual-level 
construct, cognitive complexity. While the upper echelons perspective has been widely 
tested using a demographic approach, a closer examination of psychological factors still 
remains an underexplored domain. More recently, some research has made headway by 
studying CEOs’ narcissism (e.g., Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007; Gerstner, Konig, Enders, 
& Hambrick, 2013), Big Five (e.g., Peterson et al., 2003), affective traits (Delgado-
Garcia & De la Fuente-Sabate, 2010), hubris (e.g., Li & Tang, 2010), political ideologies 
(Chin et al., 2013), and cultural values (Geletkanycz, 1997). With only a few studies that 
have been sparsely conducted (e.g., Calori et al., 1994; McNamara et al., 2002; Wally & 
  
 
Baum, 1994), cognitive styles of CEOs have received significantly less attention. This 
void is significant considering that a large part of CEOs’ job is to process complex and 
ambiguous information for their strategic decisions. This study contributes to addressing 
this void by examining the effect of CEO cognitive complexity. While previous research 
on CEOs’ cognitive complexity has mainly viewed it as a cognitive ability and implied 
that higher cognitive complexity is better (e.g., Dow et al., 2016; Hambrick & 
Finkelstein, 1987; McNamara et al., 2002; Wally & Baum, 1994), I suggest that it may 
have broader implications, as a cognitive ‘style,’ on important firm outcomes, such as 
growth strategies. Methodologically, I used language markers as indicators of cognitive 
styles to expand the research sample to large, public companies, thereby addressing one 
of the major challenges from which prior research on managerial cognition has suffered. 
Second, it contributes to the research body on firms’ growth strategies. Given that 
firms do not necessarily pursue a single growth approach at a point in time (e.g., Stettner 
& Lavie, 2014), envisioning and managing the multiplicity of the firm’s growth prospect 
and strategy portfolio represents a challenging task for the firm’s chief decision maker. 
When the environment poses various demands, the dynamics in firms’ growth strategies 
are expected to change accordingly (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Thompson, 1967). Thus 
understanding the determinants of various firm growth strategies is of great importance. 
This paper contributes to this literature by highlighting the role of CEOs’ idiosyncratic, 
dispositional cognitive orientations in the configuration of multiple growth strategies. 
Specifically, the results suggest that CEOs with higher cognitive complexity may focus 
more on external acquisitive strategy (especially unrelated acquisitions) and less internal 
growth strategy, whereas CEOs with lower cognitive complexity tend to pursue less 
  
 
external growth strategy and more internal growth strategy by investing more in R&D 
and introducing more new products. Further, the divergent strategic patterns among high 
and low cognitive complexity CEOs are found to become more salient when the industry 
is growing at a greater pace, showing that the environment plays a significant role in 
understanding the heterogeneous firm growth approaches. 
Limitations and Future Research 
As with any other empirical project, the current study has limitations, which in 
turn suggest future research opportunities. First, while there has been strong evidence that 
top management teams (TMTs) are often stronger indicators of managerial influence on 
organizational outcomes, capturing the collective cognitive complexity of TMTs through 
the methodological approach employed here was unachievable due to data availability. 
However, I do note that expanding cognitive complexity to the top management team 
(TMT) level would provide richer understanding of “black box” of the senior 
management-firm action link (Carpenter et al., 2004; Lawrence, 1997). In pursuing this 
agenda, identifying the mechanisms through which TMT cognitive complexity is 
achieved should also be a fruitful research agenda. As this dominant coalition is often 
characterized by politics and bargaining processes in making strategic decisions, further 
investigating the political dynamics would be a promising avenue for future research. 
While CEOs may be inclined to seek other top executives who have similar levels of 
cognitive complexity, the presence of different levels of cognitive complexity at the top 
management team may complement each other and benefit the firm. It would be 
interesting to examine how heterogeneity/homogeneity in senior executives’ cognitive 
styles may affect organizational outcomes as well as personal outcomes of individual 
  
 
executives. While understanding the political dynamics arising from heterogeneous 
cognitive styles would be a promising area to pursue, at the same time, it is noteworthy 
that high cognitive complexity CEOs’ preference towards multiple viewpoints may 
influence integration within the senior management when making strategic decisions. In 
essence, the focus on the collective cognitive structure of the corporate office is expected 
to offer insights that go beyond the implications of the procedural comprehensiveness in 
decision making processes (e.g., Eisenhardt, 1989; Fredrickson & Mitchell, 1984). 
Second, I focused my attention on the independent individual-level impact of 
CEOs’ cognitive complexity, as individuals’ cognitive styles may work independently of 
other psychological drivers for strategic decision making. In this regard, future research 
may examine the interplay between CEOs’ cognitive complexity and other motivational 
attributes that have been found to affect firms’ growth strategies. For example, what may 
happen when a CEO has high cognitive complexity but low confidence? Would a 
hubristic and cognitively complex CEO have an even greater penchant towards 
acquisitions while disregarding organic growth? What would be the performance 
consequences in such cases? Exploring this multiplicative impact of motivational and 
cognitive aspects of CEOs’ decision making merits further attention.  
Last, but not the least, the performance implications of CEO cognitive complexity 
merit further attention, especially in various environmentally stimulating situations. The 
executive job demands literature (Hambrick, Finkelstein, & Mooney, 2005) suggests that 
certain managerial characteristics offer differential benefits under certain organizational 
and environmental situations. In addition, the dynamic managerial capabilities literature 
(Adner & Helfat, 2003; Helfat & Peteraf, 2015; Kor & Mesko, 2013) implies that some 
  
 
managers are capable of leading the firm into a more desirable status in uncertain 
situations. Perhaps, CEOs with various levels of cognitive complexity may be valuable to 
firms in different industry situations. 
Conclusion 
Understanding how firms grow—what paths they take and how each path is 
implemented—remains an important agenda in strategic management research (McKelvie 
& Wiklund, 2010). What is still less understood is how firms’ multiple conduits leading 
to growth can be attributed to the corporate leaders. This paper suggests that the inherent 
cognitive styles of CEOs enact certain ways of achieving growth, especially when 
confronting steep surges in the environment. Given that cognition of CEOs—how they 
think and process information—may have major influence over the strategic directions of 
their firms (Dutton & Jackson, 1987), theorizing and empirical testing of the link between 
idiosyncratic cognitive penchants and corporate actions deserve further scholarly 
endeavor. 
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ABSTRACT 
The 2007-2008 financial crisis marked a significant macroeconomic event in the 
U.S. and across the globe. As the financial industry experienced significant consolidation 
during the crisis, many financial institutions failed to survive the crisis. This historical 
context provides a great opportunity to examine why and how some firms survive a major 
economic crisis while others do not. I propose that heterogeneity in organizational 
outcomes during a crisis may be attributed to firms’ different acquisition strategies during 
and prior to the crisis, which can be further attributed to their managerial differences, i.e., 
CEOs’ levels of cognitive complexity. A series of analyses of 463 financial firms and 
their CEOs suggests that CEOs’ cognitive complexity played a significant role in shaping 
their firms’ acquisition activities prior to the crisis (what I label the ‘precondition’), 
setting a strong ground for subsequent acquisitions during the crisis (a ‘snowball effect’), 
which eventually influenced their survival during the crisis. I further find that CEO 
cognitive complexity not only independently improves the likelihood of firm survival but 
also amplifies the effect of during-crisis acquisitions on firm survival. Important 
implications of these findings for management theory and practice are discussed. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The 2007-2008 financial crisis marked a significant macroeconomic event in the 
U.S., with strong ripple effects across the globe. Many firms and industries were affected 
by the crisis, with the financial industry arguably impacted the most. During this crisis 
period, the financial industry experienced significant consolidation and many financial 
institutions did not survive the crisis. According to Federal Deposit Insurance Corporate 
[FDIC], the number of U.S. commercial banks and savings institutions dropped by 1,011, 
or 12 percent, between December 2006 and December 2010.8 Giants in this industry, 
such as Bear Stearns, Citigroup, Lehman Brothers, and Merrill Lynch, either collapsed or 
were bailed out by the government during this period. Despite the significance of the 
recent financial crisis, it has yet attracted much research attention in the strategy field, 
with only a few studies theorizing (Jacobides & Winter, 2012) or empirically examining 
the heterogeneity in the extent to which firms were affected (Gartenberg, 2014; 
Gartenberg & Pierce, 2017).  
The financial crisis provides an excellent context to examine heterogeneity in 
firms’ strategies and survival in turbulent environments. This study seeks to use this 
context to investigate why some firms are able to survive a major economic crisis while 
others cannot, with a focus on acquisitions and the CEOs’ cognitive orientation that 
drives these strategic decisions. Indeed, some financial institutions that were deemed “too 
big to fail” received government bailouts during the 2007-2008 financial crisis, 
exacerbating the long-standing controversy on banks gaining such status (e.g., Barth, 
Prabha, & Swagel, 2012; Hashmall, 2010; Kaufman, 2013). While higher executive pay 
                                                        
8 https://www5.fdic.gov/hsob/HSOBRpt.asp 
  
 
and government subsidies can motivate firms to gain size through acquisitions (see 
DeYoung, Evanoff, & Molyneux, 2009 for a review), this study rather seeks to 
understand how pre-crisis acquisition behaviors can carry over to during-crisis 
acquisition behaviors and eventually impact firms’ very survival, and what role CEOs’ 
cognitive orientations may play in this process. 
I propose that the heterogeneity in firms’ survival throughout a crisis period may 
be attributed to their different acquisition strategies prior to and during the crisis, which 
can be further explained by their managerial differences. More specifically, I first predict 
that prior to a crisis, financial firm CEOs with higher levels of cognitive complexity tend 
to engage in higher volumes of acquisitions. As acquisitions represent a mode of growing 
the firm through organizational boundary spanning (Kim & Finkelstein, 2009), 
overcoming high information asymmetry (Officer, Poulsen, & Stegemoller, 2009), and 
thorough planning through intense negotiation of multiple parties (Jemison & Sitkin, 
1986), I argue that CEOs with high cognitive complexity, who process information based 
on extensive differentiating and integrating of multiple sources (Tetlock, 1981), tend to 
pursue more acquisitions than their counterparts with low cognitive complexity. I label a 
firm’s magnitude of acquisitions before the crisis its ‘precondition,’ and propose that a 
stronger precondition allows the firm to do more acquisitions during the crisis, creating a 
‘snowball effect.’ Further, I suggest that the strategic tendency of CEOs with higher 
cognitive complexity to engage in more acquisitions than their counterparts may also 
manifest during the crisis.  
Finally, I posit that acquisitions during the crisis may improve firms’ subsequent 
chance of survival by providing opportunities for strengthening their pool of resources 
  
 
and capabilities (Wan & Yiu, 2009) and increasing in size to demonstrate reliability and 
garner support from key constituents. By becoming “too big to fail,” these firms are more 
likely to receive support from key constituents including the government to keep them 
afloat. As CEOs with high cognitive complexity may be more capable of exploiting the 
opportunities created through the acquisitions they have made during the crisis, I also 
expect the influence of during-crisis acquisitions on survival to be magnified when CEOs 
have high cognitive complexity. In addition, I suggest that high cognitive complexity 
CEOs’ tendency to seek diverse sources of support and ability to manage various 
stakeholder interest may engender an independent impact on firms’ survival. Figure 1 
illustrates the theoretical framework of this study. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
A series of analyses of financial firms (2-digit SIC codes 60-67) and their CEOs 
over the period of 2004-2011 largely supports these predictions. By capturing CEO 
cognitive complexity with their language use revealed in their conference calls with 
securities analysts and investors, I find that higher levels of CEO cognitive complexity 
are associated with higher volumes of acquisitions prior to the crisis. This precondition is 
further positively related to the volume of the firm’s acquisitions during the crisis—
confirming the ‘snowball effect.’ I also find that the volume of acquisitions done during 
the crisis is positively related to the chance of firm survival in subsequent quarters. 
Finally, I find that CEOs’ cognitive complexity not only enhances the likelihood of 
survival during the crisis in itself, but it also amplifies the impact of during-crisis 
acquisitions on survival. 
These findings can make important contributions to the management literature in 
  
 
several ways. First, it focuses on a recent, highly important context that had significant 
impact on firms and the entire U.S. economy, as well as the global economy, and seeks to 
explain why firms differed in terms of their strategies and survival during the crisis. A 
number of finance and economics studies burgeoned as soon as the crisis hit the U.S. 
economy to understand its causes (e.g., see Thakor, 2015 for a recent review) and 
aftermaths (e.g., Atkinson, Luttrell, & Rosenblum, 2013; Reinhart & Rogoff, 2009). 
Surprisingly, to date still not much has been done to understand firms’ behaviors and 
survival from a strategy perspective. The findings suggest that acquisitive growth pursued 
before and during the crisis, in part driven by CEOs’ cognitive orientations, has been an 
important mechanism through which some firms were able to survive the crisis while 
others were not. 
Second, by linking such heterogeneity to CEOs’ cognitive complexity, the study 
highlights the role of managerial differences in shaping firms’ strategy and their very 
survival in a crisis context. Specifically, the findings of this study provide evidence that, 
while previous studies have highlighted the cognitive biases and limitations of 
individuals in contributing to the financial collapse (e.g., Balachandran, Kogut, & Harnal, 
2010; Jacobides & Winter, 2012), cognitive orientations of senior-most executives, 
captured by their cognitive complexity, may have made a nontrivial difference in their 
firms’ survival, in part through their strategic inclinations towards acquisitive growth, 
search for diverse sources of support, and effective management of stakeholder interests. 
Lastly, it extends our understanding of the dynamics of acquisitions in a crisis 
period and their implications towards survival. While the influence of acquisitions on 
firm performance has not been so clear (e.g., Datta, Narayan, & Pinches, 1992; Haleblian, 
  
 
Devers, McNamara, Carpenter, & Davison, 2009), recent research, relevant to the current 
study, finds that acquisitions made during a crisis period, but not those made before and 
after the period, can contribute to better financial performance (Wan & Yiu, 2009). 
However, we know less about how acquisitions influence firms’ survival in crisis 
situations, what may drive the differences in firms’ acquisition behavior during the crisis, 
how it is shaped by acquisitions prior to the crisis, and what role CEOs may play in this 
entire process. The current study shows that acquisitions made prior to the crisis, in part 
driven by CEOs’ cognitive complexity, can in fact create a strong foundation for 
subsequent acquisitions during the crisis, that may improve the firm’s chances of survival 
therein—an effect that can be even furthered by CEOs cognitive complexity. 
RESEARCH CONTEXT: THE 2007-2008 FINANCIAL CRISIS 
The recent financial crisis of 2007-2008 has been regarded as the worst crisis ever 
since the Great Depression of the 1930s (e.g., Erkens, Hung, & Matos, 2012; Foster & 
Magdoff, 2009; Hillsenrath, Ng, & Paletta, 2008; Thakor, 2015). Most agree that the 
crisis originated from the U.S. housing market—as housing prices rose during the years 
preceding the crisis, lenders offered loans without due diligence of the borrowers’ credit 
quality, which were then securitized and sold off to the secondary markets. Many 
financial institutions, believing that households would be able to afford their regular 
mortgage payments and that housing prices would constantly rise, issued large amounts 
of debt to invest in mortgage-backed securities (Blackburn, 2008; Reinhart, 2011). 
However, as the housing price bubble burst after a peak in mid-2006, the default rates of 
subprime loans rose, accumulating losses on the securities backed by such loans.  
As major financial institutions, including government-sponsored enterprises such 
  
 
as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, started to collapse, the U.S. government made 
substantial attempts to rescue these entities and the financial system, which were 
nonetheless followed by a global economic downturn and the European debt crisis. As 
noted earlier, this was a time where substantive consolidation took place, where financial 
institutions that were already growing in size through consolidation gained even greater 
size through mega-mergers (see Appendix). Estimates show that the financial crisis cost 
the U.S. 6 to 14 trillion U.S. dollars, the equivalent of 40% to 90% of one year’s U.S. 
output, or $50,000 to $120,000 for every household (Atkinson et al., 2013). In addition, 
Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (SIGTARP) reports that 
up to $16.8 trillion was committed by the U.S. federal government to pay for bailouts of 
major financial institutions that were “too big to fail” (Collins, 2015). In all, this 
exogenous shock represents a major macroeconomic event, thereby providing a context 
to understand how the divergence in corporate-level actions before the shock, shaped by 
managerial differences, can widen during the shock and eventually lead to different 
survival outcomes. The current study provides evidence that the strategic inclination of 
CEOs with high cognitive complexity towards acquisitions before the crisis may lead to a 
diverging level of acquisitions across firms, which in turn contributes to different 
likelihoods of survival. 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Firm acquisitions before a crisis: The role of CEO cognitive complexity 
CEOs are often driven by their cognitive orientations to pursue certain strategies 
(Finkelstein, Hambrick, & Cannella, 2009). Specifically, I suggest that CEOs differ in 
their ways of gather and processing information—i.e., their cognitive styles—and their 
  
 
cognitive styles may have manifested in corporate strategic actions that had significant 
implications in the financial crisis setting.  
While scholars have early recognized that top executives differ from each other in 
terms of how they draw upon logic or intuition in perceiving and judging information 
(Barnard, 1938; Mintzberg, 1973), a persistent stream of research on CEOs’ cognitive 
styles has been absent. I focus on a particular cognitive style, cognitive complexity, 
which represents a typical way of individuals’ gathering and processing of information 
and construal of stimuli (Bieri, 1961). Specifically, a CEO with high cognitive 
complexity tends to be more comfortable with observing and interpreting the 
multifaceted situations in the environment, tolerant of processing and accepting multiple 
perspectives, generating the links between them, and understanding the interplays of 
multiple factors considered to make an organizational decision. Conversely, a CEO with 
low cognitive complexity tends to draw upon a small number of dimensions in processing 
information and understanding issues, have more focused ranges of attention and search, 
and develop fewer links among the select constructs they apply when confronted with 
multifold situations.  
In the management literature, although sparse, studies have suggested that higher 
cognitive complexity of managers is associated with greater firm performance 
(McNamara, Luce, & Tompson, 2002), increased geographic and product scope (Calori, 
Johnson, & Sarnin, 1994), addressing linguistic and religious distances (Dow, Cuypers, & 
Ertug, 2016), and faster decision making (Wally & Baum, 1994). I examine CEOs’ 
cognitive complexity in the context of the recent financial crisis and investigate its 
implications. I argue that, as CEOs of financial institutions are more inclined to 
  
 
differentiate and integrate the multiple inflows and outflows of information (Tetlock, 
1981), they may have engaged in voluminous acquisitions prior to the financial crisis. It 
is important to note that I do not assume that those CEOs have or could foresee the 
coming of the financial crisis. Rather, those CEOs’ preference towards high volumes of 
acquisitions can be understood from the fit between the information processing need 
posed by acquisitive decisions and the information processing style characterized by 
cognitive complexity.  
First, acquisitions represent external growth activities that span firm boundaries, 
involving high information asymmetry between the acquirer and the external pool of 
target candidates (e.g., Cuypers et al., 2017; Officer et al., 2009), hence may require 
intense information processing for CEOs to mitigate such asymmetry. CEOs need ex ante 
to evaluate multiple candidates; process the corresponding information collected from 
due diligence; and address the ample uncertainty in post-acquisition phases (Pablo, 
Sitkin, & Jemison, 1996). Second, while firms often refer to past acquisition experiences 
in guiding their subsequent acquisition decisions (see Barkema & Schijven, 2008 for a 
review), every acquisition deal differs, which implies that, as the CEO signs the deal, 
there still exists a host of new information about the new entity to be acquired and 
integrated. It is likely that differences exist between the acquirer and target in terms of 
their respective culture, organizational structure, decision processes, management styles, 
and operating procedures (Datta, 1991). Such differences are expected to present 
complex information bundles to the CEO. Third, acquisitions involve intense negotiation 
processes among multiple internal and external parties (Walsh, 1989). As participants’ 
commitment to the deal escalates, this will put significant amounts of time in doing the 
  
 
deal and present high time pressure to the CEO to make the final decision that best 
addresses the multiple constituents’ interests (Jemison & Sitkin, 1986). In all, as 
acquisitions represent high information asymmetry, time pressure, and responsibility for 
CEOs, they fit the information processing styles of CEOs with high cognitive complexity 
and are likely to be preferred by such CEOs. Therefore, I hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 1: A firm’s CEO’s cognitive complexity in the pre-crisis period 
is positively related to the volume of the firm’s acquisitions in the pre-
crisis period. 
The “snowball effect” of pre-crisis acquisitions on during-crisis acquisitions 
During the financial crisis, ample uncertainty surrounded the U.S. economy, 
particularly the financial system and the industry members therein. It was a period of 
intense consolidation (Wheelock, 2011), and those who have not grown in size and 
accumulated sufficient organizational resources may have not been able to acquire others, 
but rather be acquired by others. A key notion of this paper is that those firms that have 
engaged in high volumes of acquisitions prior to the crisis may have accumulated the 
experience and resources to encourage further acquisition behavior during the crisis. I 
specifically argue that a greater magnitude of acquisitions before the crisis, or the 
‘precondition,’ can constitute a strong foundation for firms to do more acquisitions 
during the crisis, creating a ‘snowball effect.’  
Several factors may collectively explain such snowballing. In essence, this effect 
can be understood from both the demand and supply sides of industry-wide acquisition 
activities. From the demand side, or the perspective of acquirers, it is known that past 
acquisition experience encourages subsequent acquisitions (Haleblian et al., 2009). As 
the organizational learning literature suggests, the routines and practices that accumulate 
through recurrent activities are expected to give rise to repeated actions in the subsequent 
  
 
periods (e.g., Amburgey, Kelly, & Barnett, 1993; Audia, Locke, & Smith, 2000; Gulati, 
1995; Kelley & Amburgey, 1991; Miller & Friesen, 1980; Shaver, Mitchel, & Yeung, 
1997). Indeed, scholars have found that prior acquisition experience breeds subsequent 
acquisitions (Baum, Li, & Usher, 2000; Yang & Hyland, 2006), particularly when past 
experiences had been rewarding (Haleblian, Kim, & Rajagopalan, 2006), but even when 
outcomes have not been so favorable (Amburgey & Miner, 1992). In this regard, the 
experience of acquisitions that had been conducted before the financial crisis may have 
promoted the inclination for financial firms to engage in acquisitions also during the 
crisis. However, as this period of financial distress have caused many organizations to 
become rigid (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2008, 2009), the history and experience alone may not 
be sufficient to explain the influence of the precondition on during-crisis acquisitions. 
In addition to the influence of prior acquisition experience, pre-crisis acquisitions 
may have allowed a great amount of resources for the firm to exploit and build upon 
during the crisis. As research on firm growth has suggested, larger firms are more visible 
and more rewarded by the financial market (Kim, Haleblian, & Finkelstein, 2011), which 
may make the firm more capable of procuring and combining resources (Penrose, 1959; 
Pfeffer & Salacik, 1978). As previous acquisitions have created slack resources for the 
firm to exploit, search is facilitated through stronger buffer against risk, and hence, more 
acquisitions are likely to take place (Iyer & Miller, 2008). Further, as acquiring another 
firm or business offers a new diverse set of resources and knowledge, the opportunity set 
of the firm increases (McKelvie & Wiklund, 2010).  
An analysis from the supply side, or from the perspective of the pool of potential 
target firms, supplements the explanations provided by the demand side of acquisitions. 
  
 
Specifically, a period of extensive industry consolidation represents a setting in which 
many firms’ vulnerability and weak chance of independent survival is likely to result in 
an increase of targets to be potentially acquired. During this period of an increased supply 
of targets, it is likely that the accumulation of experience and resources is perceived 
favorably by the acquiring firms’ key constituents and stakeholders. In the broader 
domain of corporate strategy, it has been found that firms that have experience, resources, 
and knowledge within a strategic domain can send a signal to the external parties of their 
capability and commitment in carrying out the focal strategic activities (e.g., Gulati, 
Lavie, & Singh, 2009; Kale, Dyer, & Singh, 2002). Similarly, in the eyes of the key 
stakeholders—the target firm executives in particular—a firm that has accumulated the 
expertise and resources through previous acquisition experiences may be perceived as 
more capable and reliable as a potential acquirer. In all, the snowball effect of pre-crisis 
acquisitions on during-crisis acquisitions may have been triggered by the demand driven 
by the acquisition experiences, which was arguably further facilitated by the growth and 
abundant resources accumulated throughout such experiences as well as the supply of 
potential targets, whose perceptions and preferences towards potential acquirers may 
have been shaped by the relevant experience and resources that acquirers possessed. In 
effect, the initial discrepancy between the strategic approaches towards acquisitive 
growth taken by CEOs with high vs. low cognitive complexity is expected to widen 
during the crisis. Therefore, I hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 2: The volume of a firm’s acquisitions during the crisis period 
is positively related to the volume of its acquisitions in the pre-crisis 
period. 
Similar to how CEOs’ cognitive complexity may be manifested in their strategic 
  
 
inclination towards acquisitions in general situations, or here, prior to the crisis, I expect 
that it will also be reflected in greater volumes of acquisitions in turbulent situations, or 
during the crisis. Indeed, crises provide a situation in which CEOs’ willingness and 
ability to seize opportunities and search broadly may make significant difference in terms 
of firm behavior. Rather than staying rigid in threatful situations (Staw, Sandelands, & 
Dutton, 1981), CEOs with high cognitive complexity are more likely to widen their 
search range and seek opportunities while considerable environmental change and 
uncertainty alters the opportunity set and the competitive landscape (Meyer, Brooks, & 
Goes, 1990). Indeed, the new opportunity set would indeed have less meaning if senior 
managers are less inclined to or less capable of perceiving ways to use them (Penrose, 
1959). With new opportunities residing in the environment, CEOs with higher cognitive 
complexity, characterized by the willingness and capability to perceive multiple 
dimensions in the environment and draw intricate connections among them, are expected 
to be more capable of understanding and integrating the ways that the newly created 
market dynamics, hence engage in more acquisitions to span the firm boundaries and 
seek outside resources. Therefore, consistent with Hypothesis 1, I suggest: 
Hypothesis 3: A firm’s CEO’s cognitive complexity in the during-crisis 
period is positively related to the volume of the firm’s acquisitions in the 
during-crisis period. 
Implications on firm survival 
During periods of radical environmental shifts, as was the case in the 2007-2008 
financial crisis, environmental munificence dramatically declines (Wan & Yiu, 2009), 
often rendering firms’ past strategic courses obsolete (Meyer et al., 1990). Firms are left 
with few options but to tighten their financial resources and cut down on their scope, and 
  
 
this particularly so for financial institutions in the recent crisis period (Brauer & 
Schimmer, 2010; Campello, Graham, & Harvey, 2010). This perhaps indicated their 
intensified rigidity that resulted from such external threat (Staw et al., 1981). Most recent 
studies in the financial sector have suggested that good corporate governance 
mechanisms, either captured at a comprehensive level (e.g., Gartenberg & Pierce, 2017; 
Peni & Vahamaa, 2012) or specifically indicated by board monitoring (e.g., Aebi et al., 
2012) or CEOs’ compensation and incentives (e.g., Fahlenbrach & Stulz, 2011), has 
allowed some firms to enjoy better performance than others during the financial crisis. 
Such analysis finds explanation of firm heterogeneity in performance and survival 
directly from the causes of the financial crisis—that the strength of corporate governance 
mechanisms for regulating excessive risk taking may have caused such difference. 
In this study, I propose that acquiring new businesses may contribute to greater 
firm survival during the crisis period. Indeed, acquisitions in general represent a high-risk 
corporate action that not only spans the firm boundaries in search of new knowledge and 
assets (Kim & Finkelstein, 2009) and involves major resource commitments (Pablo, 
Sitkin, & Jemison, 1986), but also often hurts firm performance (Cartwright & 
Scheonberg, 2006) and sometimes results in dismissal of the CEO when failed (Lehn & 
Zhao, 2006). However, acquisition deals made by firms during a crisis may improve 
financial firms’ subsequent chance of survival not only by providing greater opportunities 
for reconfiguration and expansion of resources and capabilities, but also by 
demonstrating the capability of growing in an era of significant consolidation to key 
constituents and gaining their support. 
As prior research suggests, acquisitions have the benefit of gaining access to new 
  
 
knowledge and assets that reside outside the firm (Harrison et al., 1991; Kim & 
Finkelstein, 2009). Indeed, these acquisitions are more likely to create value when the 
acquirer and target can complement each other’s resources (Harrison et al., 1991) and/or 
choices of strategies and market (Kim & Finkelstein, 2009). However, during a period in 
which industry players are majorly going through financial and structural constraint 
where the lack of necessary resources and experience may pose a major challenge to 
firms, the possession of a new, enlarged pool of assets may substantially contribute to 
improving the focal financial institution’s effectiveness. As the prior discussion on the 
snowball effect of pre-crisis acquisitions on during-crisis acquisitions suggests, it may 
have been those firms that have already grown in size that had the competitive edge to 
exploit more opportunities as well as the leeway to further explore other opportunities for 
improving their efficiency. 
Failure to yield good financial performance means poor ability of the firm to 
maintain its financial resources and operational efficiency. As the financial sector 
witnessed a period of consolidation during the crisis, firms that were incapable of 
producing good financial figures were either terminated or acquired by others (Wheelock, 
2011). In other words, building upon the signal of better financial performance figures, 
these firms are more likely to receive support from key constituents, including the 
government, through their demonstration of their ability to grow in times of extreme 
condensation. Indeed, the collapse of large firms has the potential of damaging the 
broader system because of their market dominance and interconnectedness—i.e., because 
they are “too big to fail” (Stern & Feldman, 2004)—yet the growth they have achieved 
through acquisitions may allow them to improve their financial operations through more 
  
 
resources and slack (e.g., Bromiley, 1991), especially in challenging settings (e.g., Tan & 
Peng, 2003), allowing them to gain more support from major organizational stakeholders. 
Taken together, I argue that the acquiring firms during the crisis are able to outperform 
others and enjoy an increased chance of survival. Therefore, I hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 4: The volume of a firm’s during-crisis acquisitions is 
positively related to its subsequent survival. 
While acquisitions made during the crisis may create a significant edge for 
enhancing the chance of survival, it is likely that CEOs’ cognitive complexity also has a 
stand-alone impact on firms’ survival in crisis situations. Indeed, it is known that simply 
replacing the senior management does not necessarily result in better chances of survival 
nor promotes shareholder interests in corporate failure situations (Daily, Dalton, & 
Cannella, 2003; Hambrick & D’Aveni, 1988, 1992). If this is the case, it is perhaps more 
appropriate to examine the incumbent CEO’s profile to understand his or her role in crisis 
situations. 
In crisis situations, gaining support from key constituents (e.g., regulators) and 
effectively managing the diverse, intertwined, and often conflicting interests of major 
stakeholders may become crucial strategic activities for firms. It is likely that CEOs with 
low cognitive complexity may be focused on the inner sector of the organization to 
improve internal measures of operational efficiency or on a selected group of constituents 
to reach for help. In contrast, as noted earlier, CEOs with high levels of cognitive 
complexity tend to have broader arrays of attention and search, while being inclined to 
refer to diverse sources of information for decisions (Tetlock, 2000). Indeed, prior 
research suggests that such behavioral tendency is manifested in their effective 
management of various groups of stakeholders (Wong, Ormiston, & Tetlock, 2011). 
  
 
Taken together, I hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 5: The firm’s CEO’s cognitive complexity is positively related 
to its survival during the crisis. 
Finally, I argue that CEO cognitive complexity may further amplify the effect of 
during-crisis acquisitions on firm survival. As during-crisis acquisitions set up a 
foundation for firms to become “too big to fail,” CEOs with high cognitive complexity 
may have a stronger ability to further exploit this advantageous position and secure 
support from various sources including regulators to keep the firms afloat. In this sense, I 
argue that CEOs’ cognitive complexity may play a self-reinforcing role in explaining the 
influence of during-crisis acquisitions on firm survival. Just as acquisitions prior to the 
crisis have created more opportunities that can be exploited and that can serve as 
foundations for further exploration, acquisitions made during the crisis may have 
enlarged the pool of resources and opportunities for the senior decision maker to draw 
upon (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987). While the expanded course of actions can 
contribute to a higher likelihood of survival, this effect may be strengthened as CEOs 
possess higher cognitive complexity.  
Compared to those with lower cognitive complexity, who rather tend to be 
focused in construing the surroundings and processing information, high cognitive 
complexity CEOs are characterized by an information processing style of perceiving 
several dimensions of the environment and connecting the dots (Bartunek, Gordon, & 
Weathersby, 1983)—both of which are critical in facilitating the exploitation of greater 
munificence within the firm boundaries. Therefore, CEOs with high cognitive complexity 
having such an expanded array of resources to utilize may contribute to strengthening the 
survival consequences of acquisitions made during the crisis. This leads to my final 
  
 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 6: The positive relationship between a firm’s during-crisis 
acquisitions and its subsequent survival likelihood will be strengthened 
when the firm’s CEO’s cognitive complexity is higher. 
RESEARCH METHODS 
Data and sample 
The study was based on a longitudinal sample consisting of 463 U.S. financial 
firms (2-digit SIC codes 60-67) and their CEOs, in the period of 2004-2011. Data on 
CEOs’ language use were obtained from companies’ quarterly conference calls collected 
by Thomson Reuters Street Events database. Firm acquisition data were collected from 
SDC Platinum, firms’ financial and strategic information and exit data from CRSP-
Compustat, and CEO demographic and compensation data from Execucomp. 
Measurement 
CEO cognitive complexity. Cognitive complexity refers to a combination of two 
major components of one’s reasoning: the extent to which one can differentiate between 
multiple, competing solutions and the extent to which one can integrate among those 
solutions (Tetlock, 1981). Following this definition, Abe (2011, 2012) constructed an 
index that combines words that used for making precise distinctions and conjoining 
multiple thoughts together. Specifically, the index comprises four function-word 
categories—exclusion (e.g., but, without), negations (e.g., no, not, never), tentativeness 
(e.g., maybe, perhaps), and conjunctions (e.g., and, also, although). For example, 
exclusion words are used when making distinctions between multiple categories (i.e., 
differentiate), while conjunctions help bring together multiple thoughts to create a 
coherent narrative (i.e., integrate) (Graesser, McNamara, Louwerse, & Cai, 2004). Using 
  
 
LIWC, the number of words from each of these categories was counted to compute the 
extent to which these words were used in proportion to the total amount of words spoken 
by the CEO. I used the sum of the four standardized scores as an index of a CEO’s 
cognitive complexity. 
For examining the relationship between CEO cognitive complexity and the pre-
crisis acquisition activities, I computed the mean cognitive complexity scores in the four 
quarters of 2004. For examining the role of CEO cognitive complexity as a main 
independent predictor for during-crisis acquisitions and firm survival as well as the 
moderator of the relationship between during-crisis acquisitions and firm survival, I used 
the concurrent quarterly scores of CEOs’ cognitive complexity. 
Volume of acquisitions prior to the crisis (i.e., 2005-2006) and that during the 
crisis (i.e., 2007-2010). Two variables that capture the volume of acquisitions in each of 
the two time periods were collected from the SDC Platinum database. First, number of 
acquisitions was measured as the total count of acquisitions conducted in 2005-2006 for 
operationalizing pre-crisis acquisitions and as the running sum of quarterly acquisitions 
done in 2007-2010 for during-crisis acquisitions. Such operationalization can reflect the 
snowball effect of precondition on the during-crisis acquisitions. Consistent with prior 
studies, I chose the year of 2007 to mark the onset of the crisis, as prominent signs 
emerged in early 2007 when the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie 
Mac) announced that it will no longer buy risky subprime mortgages/mortgage-related 
securities and New Century Financial Corporation filed for bankruptcy (Marshall, 2009; 
Thakor, 2015), triggering the meltdown of the financial sector (USA Today, 2013). 
Second, the size of acquisitions were measured by the transaction value of acquisitions 
  
 
(log-transformed) conducted in these time periods, again as the total amount for the pre-
crisis period and the running sum for the during-crisis period. 
Firm survival. To determine firm survival, I first identified whether financial 
institutions were delisted from the Compustat-CRSP database on a quarterly basis (e.g., 
Carr, Haggard, Hmieleski, & Zahra, 2010) and created a time-varying binary outcome 
measure coded 1 during the quarter a firm was delisted and 0 otherwise. I chose to 
measure firm survival on a quarterly base rather than a yearly base because firm exits 
occurred more frequently during a crisis than a normal situation.  
Control variables. I included a set of variables at the CEO- and firm-level to 
control for alternative explanations for the predicted outcomes. First, I controlled for firm 
size, which was measured as the logarithm of total assets, as size can influence the extent 
of strategic inertia (Dougherty & Hardy, 1996). In addition, financial slack, measured as 
the equity-debt ratio (common equity over total debt) was also controlled for as it can 
provide buffers for risky strategic actions such as acquisitions (Bourgeois, 1981; 
Bromiley, 1991; Iyer & Miller, 2008). As the senior-most executives may have greater 
control over risk and strategic management in holding companies than in individual 
commercial banks or savings institutions, I also included a binary variable which 
indicated whether the firm is a holding company, coded 1 if the institution’s 2-digit SIC 
code equaled 67 and 0 otherwise. As noted earlier, corporate governance has been 
suggested as a critical factor in explaining financial firms’ performance during the crisis 
(e.g., Aebi et al., 2012; Gartenberg & Pierce, 2017). In line with this recent research, I 
also controlled for two corporate governance mechanisms—board independence, 
measured as the ratio of independent directors on board and CEO duality, coded 1 if the 
  
 
CEO also assumed chairpersonship and 0 otherwise. Finally, I controlled for CEO 
shareholdings, measured by the percentage of CEOs’ shares out of the total amount of 
firm shares, as CEOs’ ownership of the firm can provide financial incentives for 
undertaking riskier moves, such as acquisitions (Sanders, 2001; Sanders & Hambrick, 
2007; Wright, Kroll, Lado, & van Ness, 2002). 
When examining the snowball effect, or the effect of a firm’s pre-crisis 
acquisitions on its during-crisis acquisitions, I controlled for prior period return on assets 
(ROA) as recent performance can affect strategic behavior (Cyert & March, 1963; Greve, 
1998). ROA not only represents the most often used performance measure in 
management studies (e.g., Reger, Duhaime, & Stimpert, 1992; Deephouse, 1999) and 
finance studies (e.g., Aebi et al., 2012; Gilbert, 1984; Gorton & Rosen, 1995; Peni & 
Vahamaa, 2012) of the financial industry, but is also regarded as the best indicator of 
earnings efficiency (McNamara et al., 2002). Finally, I included binary indicators for 
each year-quarter to control for the temporal effect in all models except for when testing 
the cross-sectional relationship between CEO cognitive complexity and pre-crisis 
acquisitions (Hypothesis 1). 
Analyses 
Due to the different nature of outcomes and the relationships among them, I took 
three methodological approaches to test the hypotheses. Hypothesis 1 predicted that 
CEOs’ cognitive complexity will be positively related to pre-crisis acquisitions (the 
‘precondition’). To test this hypothesis, I used cross-sectional negative binomial 
regression to predict the number of acquisitions and ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression to predict their sizes. 
  
 
Hypotheses 2 and 3 predicted the relationship between CEO cognitive 
complexity, firms’ pre-crisis acquisitions, and during-crisis acquisitions. These 
hypotheses were tested through longitudinal Generalized Estimating Equation (GEE) 
models (Liang & Zeger, 1986). GEE models provide maximum likelihood estimates that 
account for non-independence of multiple observations from the same firm (Hanley, 
Negassa, Edwardes, & Forrester, 2003). A fixed-effects generalized least squares model 
would not be appropriate for estimation as the precondition (i.e., a firm’s pre-crisis 
acquisitions) does not vary over time. In all models, I specified a Gaussian distribution 
with an identity link function, an autoregressive (one year) within-group correlation 
structure, and robust standard errors (White, 1982).  
Finally, to test Hypotheses 4, 5 and 6, which predicted the influence of during-
crisis acquisitions and CEO cognitive complexity on firm survival, I conducted an event 
history analysis to model the risk of failure (i.e., firm exit, or the reverse of firm 
survival). Specifically, as each firm had quarterly data for each observation on delisting, I 
conducted a discrete-time event history analysis to account for the fact that the same 
firms are observed over multiple time intervals (quarters) (e.g., Agarwal, Sarkar, & 
Echambadi, 2002; Carr, Haggard, Hmieleski, & Zahra, 2010; Fischer & Pollock, 2004; 
Jenkins, 2005). I used a random-effects complementary log-log specification (e.g., 
Agarwal et al., 2002; Baum & Oliver, 1991; Henderson, 1999) that allows for 
incorporation of time-varying covariates and estimation with standard errors clustered at 
the firm level to account for the non-independence of observations of the same firm 
across quarters, or the unobserved heterogeneity, also known as ‘frailty’ (Jenkins, 2005). 
As the complementary log-log model assumes an asymmetric cumulative distribution 
  
 
function—which better fit data with relatively rarer events—and builds in a proportional 
hazards assumption, as does the Cox regression model for analyzing continuous time 
(Allison, 1982), it was considered appropriate for fitting the data. 
Results 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics and correlations, except for quarter 
dummies, for the studied variables. There was no serious evidence of multicollinearity, as 
shown by the maximum Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) of 2.84, which is well below the 
generally accepted threshold of 10 for indication of multicollinearity (Cohen, Cohen, 
Aiken, & West, 2013). 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Hypothesis 1 proposed a positive relationship between CEO cognitive complexity 
and a firm’s pre-crisis acquisitions, or the precondition. As shown in Model 2 of Table 2, 
the number of acquisitions done prior to the crisis (2005-2006) is positively associated 
with CEO cognitive complexity (2004), as indicated by the statistically significant 
positive coefficient (β = 0.077, p < 0.05). However, there was no statistically significant 
relationship between CEO cognitive complexity and the acquisition sizes prior to the 
crisis. Therefore, I find partial support for Hypothesis 1. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Hypotheses 2 and 3 proposed a positive relationship between a firm’s pre-crisis 
and its during-crisis acquisitions, examining the snowball effect, and the role of CEOs’ 
cognitive complexity on during-crisis acquisitions. As shown in Models 2 and 5 of Table 
3, pre-crisis and during-crisis acquisitions are positively related, as indicated by the 
statistically significant positive coefficient for the number of acquisitions (β = 0.316, p < 
  
 
0.01) and the size of acquisitions (β = 0.017, p < 0.01). Thus, Hypothesis 2 was strongly 
supported. However, Hypothesis 3 was not supported, as I did not find any significant 
relationship between the concurrent levels of CEOs’ cognitive complexity and during-
crisis acquisitions. Perhaps, the impact of high CEO cognitive complexity is already 
reflected in the level of during-crisis acquisitions through pre-crisis acquisitions so that 
no salient impact is revealed in the during-crisis period when compared with the 
strategies of those CEOs with low cognitive complexity. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
Hypotheses 4, 5 and 6 proposed a positive relationship between a firm’s during-
crisis acquisitions and firm survival and the independent and interactive effect of CEOs’ 
cognitive complexity on firm survival. As the dependent variable was coded as 1 if the 
firm was delisted or exited, negative coefficients were predicted for the hypothesized 
relationships. As shown in Model 3 and 6 (full models) of Table 4, firms that have 
engaged in more acquisitions during the crisis were less likely to exit, as indicated by the 
significant and negative coefficient for number (β = -0.612, p < 0.01) and size of 
acquisitions (β = -0.471, p < 0.01), and these effects were more pronounced when CEOs 
had higher cognitive complexity (β number = -0.109, p < 0.01; β size = -0.036, p < 0.01). 
Further, the effect of CEO cognitive complexity on firm survival was also positive and 
significant (β = -0.314, p < 0.01 in Model 3; β = -0.295, p < 0.01 in Model 6), when 
controlling for both the number and size of during-crisis acquisitions. As the 
complementary log-log model assumes that 
log [–log (1 – h(t))] = α + βX 
where X represents the vector of explanatory variables and h(t) the probability of 
  
 
exit, we can use the negative coefficients of the interaction terms between CEO cognitive 
complexity and during-crisis acquisitions (β number = -0.109 and β size = -0.036) to interpret 
that when holding the number and size of during-crisis acquisitions constant, an increase 
of one unit in the CEO cognitive complexity index reduces the firm’s chance of exit by 
10% ([exp (-0.109) − 1] × 100%) and by 3.5% ([exp (-0.036)-1] × 100%), respectively. 
Figure 2 graphically illustrates the comparison between the estimated probabilities (i.e., 
Kaplan-Meier survival estimates) of financial institutions surviving the crisis in 2007 and 
onward, depending on their volume of acquisitions done during the crisis.  
[Insert Table 4 and Figure 2 about here] 
Robustness checks 
I conducted several additional analyses to check the robustness of the findings. 
First, as the presence and inputs of chief financial officers (CFOs) may have influence 
over CEOs’ acquisition decisions, I tested all the models controlling for the CFO’s level 
of cognitive complexity. The direction and statistical significance of the hypothesized 
effects remained largely similar, where the only exception was that only the size (but not 
the number) of during-crisis acquisitions was positively related to firm survival. It is 
worth noting, however, that CFOs’ cognitive complexity did not have significant impact 
in these supplementary analyses. Several speculations could be made for such finding. 
First, although the financial crisis period was a time where CFOs might have had 
significant roles, it may have been an extreme situation where CEOs took the utmost 
responsibility and sole voice in making acquisition decisions. Alternatively, CFOs may 
have had influence over these corporate decisions that involve heavy use of financial 
resources, yet their cognitive complexity may have been of less significance. This may be 
  
 
in part due to the homophily tendency of CEOs—i.e., the behavioral tendency of CEOs to 
surround themselves with or seek out individuals that share key characteristics (e.g., 
McDonald & Westphal, 2003; McDonald, Khanna, & Westphal, 2008), such as their 
information processing style, or cognitive complexity. 
Second, although the relatively less frequent occurrences of firm delisting (exit) 
justified the use of contemporary log-log models (Allison, 1982), I checked the 
robustness of these models by using a random effects logit specification, which is another 
popular alternative for analyzing discrete-time survival data, again estimated with robust 
standard errors to incorporate unobserved heterogeneity. In addition, I also estimated 
with Cox regression models, which is best known for analyzing continuous time data but 
also suitable for discrete-time event history analysis. This set of analyses yielded largely 
similar results. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This paper was motivated by the desire to understand the role of CEOs and their 
strategic actions in explaining firms’ survival in situations of highly uncertain and radical 
environmental shifts. Specifically, the current study examines the impact of CEOs’ 
cognitive complexity on financial firms’ acquisitive growth in the context of the recent 
financial crisis and how this eventually affected their survival thereafter. Findings suggest 
that, in pre-crisis periods, CEOs with high cognitive complexity tend to engage in 
voluminous acquisitions, which may set the ground for further acquisitions during the 
crisis. The acquisitive growth achieved throughout these periods, are in turn found to 
contribute to higher chances of survival of the firm. As CEOs with higher cognitive 
complexity not only have set stronger grounds for growth through acquisitions in the pre-
  
 
crisis stage, their tendency to engage in acquisitions to grow the firm is found to 
strengthen the positive impact of during-crisis acquisitions on firm survival, let alone 
independently improve the chance of survival.  
These findings imply that the strategic inclinations of CEOs with high cognitive 
complexity to engage in acquisitions can play a meaningful role in understanding firm 
behaviors during the crisis, while their capability and tendency to further exploit the 
opportunities created through their past decisions may contribute to higher likelihood of 
surviving the crisis. Indeed, I intend to interpret the findings with caution. The greater 
volumes of acquisitions prior to the crisis, may or may not be attributed to high cognitive 
complexity CEOs’ foresight of the crisis looming. However, there are strong theoretical 
reasons to believe that CEOs with higher cognitive complexity may be more inclined to 
pursue greater volumes of acquisitions, and such behavioral tendency may prepare firms 
to deal with the challenges that spur from the crisis more effectively. Relatedly, and more 
importantly, while many studies have suggested that financial institutions were aiming to 
become too large and interconnected for federal governments to simply let them fail (e.g., 
DeYoung et al., 2008), being able to gain size during crisis periods—while most others 
are condensing and shrinking—may have in fact allowed them to survive the crisis. With 
such precaution in mind, I suggest that the findings can collectively offer important 
contributions to the management literature. 
First, the focus on the recent financial crisis sheds light on the importance of 
studying this macroeconomic event by allowing to understand why firms differ in terms 
of their strategies and survival during crises situations. While we have seen a number of 
academic studies in finance and economics (e.g., Atkinson et al., 2013; Reinhart & 
  
 
Rogoff, 2009; Thakor, 2015) as well as federal reports (e.g., The Financial Crisis Inquiry 
Report) investigating the causes and consequences of the financial and economic crisis in 
the U.S., still not much work—both theoretical and empirical—has been done in the 
strategic management domain to understand the heterogeneity in firms’ behaviors, 
performance, and survival (cf. Jacobides & Winter, 2012; Gartenberg & Pierce, 2017). 
While numerous exogenous shocks have existed throughout the U.S. history, the financial 
crisis of 2007-2008 has been known for having the severest financial impact not only on 
the U.S. financial system but also the global economy, ever since the Great Depression in 
the 1930s (e.g., Thakor, 2015). This period of 2007 onwards marks a time of intensive 
consolidation of industry members in the financial sector, implying numerous changes in 
the industry dynamics representing changes in firm boundaries and even decease 
(Wheelock, 2011). The findings of this current study suggest that acquisitive growth 
pursued before and during the crisis, in part driven by CEOs’ cognitive orientations, 
represents an important mechanism through which some firms were able to survive the 
crisis through improved firm effectiveness. 
Second, the findings highlight the role of CEOs’ cognitive orientations—
specifically, cognitive complexity—in understanding the heterogenous firm behaviors 
before and during the crisis, as well as survival outcomes. Specifically, the findings of 
this study provide evidence that cognitive complexity of CEOs—the extent to which they 
differentiate and integration information surrounding them—manifests in strong 
preference towards acquisitive growth. These acquisitions, done in stable periods before 
the crisis, are found to lead to even more acquisitions in turbulent periods during the 
crisis where others rather suffer from resource constraints. This, in turn, is found to 
  
 
eventually improve their survival odds. Further, high cognitive complexity is found to not 
only directly improve firm survival, but also magnify the influence of acquisitions on 
survival. Such findings highlight that, while previous studies have pointed to the 
cognitive biases and limitations of decision makers in bringing about the financial 
collapse (e.g., Balachandran et al., 2010; Jacobides & Winter, 2012), some cognitive 
orientations of the senior-most executives may actually contribute to superior outcomes. 
Lastly, the findings enrich our understanding of the implications of acquisitions in 
crisis periods. Indeed, the existing literature suggests that the influence of acquisitions on 
firm performance is best understood when examining the contingencies (e.g., Datta, 
Narayan, & Pinches, 1992; Haleblian et al., 2009; Wan & Yiu, 2009). This study 
provides evidence that acquisitions made in the preceding period (before the crisis) may 
have substantial influence over explaining firms’ ultimate survival by creating a strong 
foundation for subsequent acquisitions during the crisis. As noted earlier, the study 
further suggests CEOs’ cognitive complexity is an important managerial-level antecedent 
of these acquisitions made prior to the crisis. 
Future research 
Several research opportunities related to this study merit further discussion. First, 
the implications of CEOs’ cognitive complexity can be further explored. While academic 
attention on managers’ cognitive complexity has stalemated in recent years, contexts such 
as macroeconomic exogenous shocks, institutional change (e.g., deregulation), or 
executives’ social surroundings can provide opportunities for revisiting the implications 
of corporate leaders’ cognitive complexity. Relatedly, while most studies have focused 
on the differentiation element of cognitive complexity, a careful examination of both 
  
 
differentiation and integration may offer opportunities for more nuanced understanding of 
CEOs’ strategic decisions in these unique business settings. 
Second, as the financial crisis period can be characterized by significant 
consolidation, further research can be done on examining financial institutions’ corporate 
restructuring activities that altered their firm boundaries. Specifically, an interesting 
opportunity lies in examining the implications of CEOs’ cognitive complexity for their 
divestiture decisions in the crisis context, as such decisions mirror corporate acquisition 
activities. One could examine how divestiture decisions, along with or separated from 
CEOs’ acquisition decisions, can help explain performance outcomes in the during- and 
post-crisis period.  
Last, but not the least, future research in this domain can further investigate 
government bailouts of large financial firms. As some financial institutions were deemed 
“too big to fail,” the U.S. and international governments’ decision to support and provide 
subsidies for such entities has been a topic of heated discussion (e.g., Barth et al., 2012). 
Not only does government bailouts represent a major performance outcome for financial 
institutions in this period, it should also be interesting to understand how CEOs with 
various levels of cognitive complexity acted differently to gain such support from the 
government. Perhaps, those with high cognitive complexity were inclined to and capable 
of gathering relevant information comprehensively and to extensively seek out ways for 
obtaining the status of being too big to fail. Alternatively, as CEOs with different 
characteristics may have had different penchants for leading their firm, one could 
examine the implications of (mis)match between the firm’s dominant logic shaped by the 
senior managers and the institutional logic. As being “too big to fail,” rather than being 
  
 
“too good to fail,” has represented the institutional logic of this sector, some financial 
firm CEOs may have chosen to chase the goal of growing the firm rather than bettering 
the firm, or vice versa, depending on their cognitive orientations.  
Conclusion 
How firms behave and even survive in contexts of drastic environmental changes 
has been one of the central questions for management scholars. This paper focuses on the 
recent financial crisis and finds evidence that senior leaders’ dispositional cognitive 
differences can in part explain how firm strategies prior to the crisis can vary, how these 
different strategies can substantiate during the crisis, and how this may all help 
understand the difference in firms’ survival during the crisis. Given that cognition of 
CEOs—how they think and process information—may have major influence over the 
strategic directions of their firms (Dutton & Jackson, 1987), theorizing and empirical 
testing of the link between idiosyncratic cognitive penchants and corporate actions in 
extreme business situations merit further scholarly endeavor. 
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ABSTRACT 
The financial industry experienced intense acquisitions and divestitures during the 
recent financial crisis, leading to significant consolidation of the industry. This historical 
context provides a great opportunity to examine why and how firms take different 
reconstructing strategies in a crisis context and how their reconstructing strategies affect 
their performance and survival. I propose that firms’ restructuring strategies during a 
crisis depend upon their strategies prior to the crisis in a way that not only prior-crisis 
acquisitions (divestitures) affect during-crisis acquisitions (divestitures), but also prior-
crisis acquisitions (divestitures) affect during crisis divestitures (acquisitions)—namely, 
‘cross strategy’ effects. As such cross-effects deviate from firms’ path dependence in 
strategies, they may require great managerial effort, and thus I propose that these cross 
effects can be moderated by the firms’ CEOs, specifically their cognitive complexity. I 
further propose that during-crisis acquisitions and divestitures, while both may improve 
performance, will have divergent impacts on firm survival depending upon the dominant 
institutional logic of the crisis. Analyses of 463 financial firms during the recent 2007-
2008 financial crisis largely support these predictions. Important implications of these 
findings for management theory and practice are discussed. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The 2007-2008 financial crisis marked a significant macroeconomic event in the 
U.S., with strong ripple effects across the globe. Many firms and industries were affected 
by the crisis, with the financial industry arguably impacted the most. During this crisis 
period, firms in the financial industry engaged in frequent and enormous restructuring 
strategies, e.g., acquisitions and divestitures, leading to significant consolidation of this 
industry. According to Federal Deposit Insurance Corporate [FDIC], the number of U.S. 
commercial banks and savings institutions dropped by 1,011, or 12 percent, between 
December 2006 and December 2010.9 Despite the significance of the recent financial 
crisis as a research context, it has yet attracted much research attention in the strategy 
field, with only a few studies theorizing (Jacobides & Winter, 2012) or empirically 
examining the heterogeneity in firms’ restructuring strategies and the impacts of their 
restructuring strategies (Gartenberg, 2014; Gartenberg & Pierce, 2017).  
In turbulent settings, such as in crisis situations, what firms do and how their 
strategic actions affect their performance and very survival have become important 
questions for management scholars. This study seeks to use the recent financial crisis 
context to investigate the antecedents and consequences of firms’ restructuring activities, 
more specifically, acquisitions and divestitures, during a crisis.  
I first discuss the dynamics of firms’ different corporate restructuring strategies 
prior to and during a crisis. In doing so, I label a firm’s magnitudes of acquisitions and 
divestitures before the crisis its ‘preconditions,’ and propose that stronger preconditions 
may encourage and allow the firm to do more within each restructuring activity during 
                                                        
9 https://www5.fdic.gov/hsob/HSOBRpt.asp 
  
 
the crisis. More specifically, I expect that a firm’s magnitude of acquisitions 
(divestitures) prior to a crisis will be positively related to the firm’s magnitude of 
acquisitions (divestitures) during the crisis. Further, while these activities represent two 
different courses of altering the scope and structure of the firm (e.g., Bowman & Singh, 
1993; Brauer, 2006)—by expanding and contracting, respectively—I argue that each of 
these strategies may also create opportunities for the other strategy as firms enter the 
crisis period. That is, a firm’s magnitude of acquisitions (divestitures) prior to a crisis 
may be positively related to the firm’s magnitude of divestitures (acquisitions) during the 
crisis, which I label as ‘cross strategy’ effects. These ‘cross-strategy’ effects may be 
further moderated by firm CEOs’ cognitive orientations—i.e., their cognitive 
complexity—as breaking the strategic path-dependence may not only be triggered by 
environmental shocks (e.g., Oliver, 1991), but also by senior managerial actions of 
processing relevant information and seeking strategic alternatives (e.g., Rajagopalan & 
Spreitzer, 1997).  
Finally, I posit that firms’ acquisitions and divestitures during the crisis may have 
important implications for the firms’ subsequent performance and survival. While during-
crisis acquisitions are likely to provide opportunities for reconfiguring their pool of 
resources and capabilities for adapting to the new environment (Wan & Yiu, 2009), 
during-crisis divestitures may strengthen their operational efficiency to achieve a leaner 
balance sheet (e.g., Markides, 1992), both of which thus may improve performance. 
However, I predict that these positive performance implications may not necessarily 
correspond to positive survival outcomes, as the dominant logic of the financial industry 
in this financial crisis was ‘too big to fail’ rather than ‘too good to fail.” As such, I expect 
  
 
that those firms that have gained size through acquisitions throughout the crisis period 
would have a higher chance of survival because collapses of large financial firms could 
severely damage the entire economic system (Stern & Feldman, 2004) and thus they 
would be more likely to garner support from key constituents (e.g., government). In 
contrast, those that have engaged in significant divestiture activities during the crisis, 
while having improved their operational performance, have shrunk in size and become 
less critical to the whole economic system and thus would be less likely to be supported 
by key constituents (e.g., government). The overall theoretical framework is illustrated in 
Figure 1. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
A series of analyses of financial firms (2-digit SIC codes 60-67) over the period 
of 2004-2011 largely supports these predictions. Results show that the preconditions in 
acquisitions and divestitures not only induce greater volumes within their strategic 
courses, but also result in greater volumes across strategic courses, such that pre-crisis 
acquisitions (divestitures) are positively related to during-crisis divestitures 
(acquisitions). The results also show that CEOs’ cognitive complexity, captured through 
their language use during earnings conference calls, promotes the effect of pre-crisis 
divestitures on during-crisis acquisitions, but does not moderate the effect of pre-crisis 
acquisitions on during-crisis divestitures. Finally, findings suggest that the volumes of 
acquisitions and divestitures during the crisis are positively related to subsequent 
financial performance, yet have differential impacts on the chance of firm survival in 
subsequent quarters, such that acquisitions enhance the chance of survival, while 
divestitures dampen it. 
  
 
These findings can make important contributions to the management literature. 
First, it focuses on a recent, highly important context that had significant impact on firms 
and the entire U.S. economy, as well as the global economy, and seeks to explain how 
firms differed in terms of their strategies and performance/survival during the crisis. A 
number of finance and economics studies burgeoned as soon as the crisis hit the U.S. 
economy to understand its causes (e.g., Thakor, 2015) and aftermaths (e.g., Atkinson, 
Luttrell, & Rosenblum, 2013). Surprisingly, to date still not much has been done to 
understand firms’ behaviors, performance, and survival from a strategy perspective. The 
findings suggest that two major corporate restructuring strategies exhibited interesting 
within- and cross-strategy dynamics before and during the crisis, thereby affecting firms’ 
survival to various degrees. 
Second, it extends our understanding of the dynamics of major corporate 
restructuring activities represented by acquisitions and divestitures in a crisis period and 
their implications towards performance and survival. While the impacts of acquisitions 
and divestitures on firm performance has not been conclusive (e.g., Brauer, 2006; 
Haleblian, Devers, McNamara, Carpenter, & Davison, 2009), recent research shows the 
importance of contexts and contingencies in proposing performance implications of these 
strategies (e.g., Lee & Madhavan, 2010; Wan & Yiu, 2009). This study echoes this call 
and investigates how acquisitions and divestitures done before and during crisis situations 
can influence firm performance and survival.  
RESEARCH CONTEXT: THE 2007-2008 FINANCIAL CRISIS 
The recent financial crisis of 2007-2008 has been regarded as the worst crisis ever 
since the Great Depression of the 1930s (e.g., Erkens, Hung, & Matos, 2012; Foster & 
  
 
Magdoff, 2009; Hillsenrath, Ng, & Paletta, 2008; Thakor, 2015). Most agree that the 
crisis originated from the U.S. housing market—as housing prices rose during the years 
preceding the crisis, lenders offered loans without due diligence of the borrowers’ credit 
quality, which were then securitized and sold off to the secondary markets. Many 
financial institutions, believing that households would be able to afford their regular 
mortgage payments and that housing prices would constantly rise, issued large amounts 
of debt to invest in mortgage-backed securities (Blackburn, 2008; Reinhart, 2011). 
However, as the housing price bubble burst after a peak in mid-2006, the default rates of 
subprime loans rose, accumulating losses on the securities backed by such loans.  
As major financial institutions, including government-sponsored enterprises such 
as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, started to collapse, the U.S. government made 
substantial attempts to rescue these entities and the financial system, which were 
nonetheless followed by a global economic downturn and the European debt crisis. As 
noted earlier, this was a time where substantive consolidation took place, where financial 
institutions that were already growing in size through consolidation gained even greater 
size through mega-mergers (see Appendix). Estimates show that the financial crisis cost 
the U.S. 6 to 14 trillion U.S. dollars, the equivalent of 40% to 90% of one year’s U.S. 
output, or $50,000 to $120,000 for every household (Atkinson et al., 2013). In addition, 
Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (SIGTARP) reports that 
up to $16.8 trillion was committed by the U.S. federal government to pay for bailouts of 
major financial institutions that were “too big to fail” (Collins, 2015). In all, this 
exogenous shock represents a major macroeconomic event, thereby providing a context 
to understand how the heterogeneity in corporate-level actions before the shock can affect 
  
 
corporate actions during the shock and eventually lead to different performance 
outcomes.  
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Acquisitions and divestitures represent two major, distinct ways of corporate 
renewal through changes in the firm’s scope and structure (Bowman & Singh, 1993). 
Reflecting their importance, much research has been done to better understand the 
individual-, firm- or industry-level antecedents and consequences of each activity (see 
Brauer, 2006; Haleblian et al., 2009 for reviews). While understanding how firms persist 
with or alter the paths of certain strategies is of much importance to strategy scholars, less 
understood in the domain of restructuring research, however, is how firms pursue the 
strategic path of each restructuring activity as they experience economy-wide shocks (cf. 
Kang, Lee, & Na, 2010; Wan & Yiu, 2009)—whether and how they change their 
strategic courses. In the following, I first discuss how firms’ acquisitions and divestitures 
may unfold by comparing periods prior to the crisis with those during the crisis. 
Within-strategy effect: The impact of pre-crisis acquisitions on during-crisis 
acquisitions 
During the financial crisis, ample uncertainty surrounded the U.S. economy, 
particularly the financial system and the industry members therein. It was a period of 
intense consolidation (Wheelock, 2011), and those that have not gained size and 
accumulated sufficient experience may have not been able to acquire others, but rather be 
acquired by them. I argue that a greater magnitude of acquisitions before the crisis can 
constitute a strong foundation for firms to do more acquisitions during the crisis. 
Although previous research has often suggested that major changes in the environment 
triggers firms to accordingly change strategic directions (e.g., Smith & Grimm, 1987), 
  
 
several factors may collectively explain such ‘snowballing.’ 
From the perspective of acquirers, it is known that past acquisition experience 
encourages subsequent acquisitions (Haleblian et al., 2009). As the organizational 
learning literature suggests, the routines and practices that accumulate through recurrent 
activities are expected to give rise to repeated actions in the subsequent periods (e.g., 
Amburgey, Kelly, & Barnett, 1993; Audia, Locke, & Smith, 2000; Gulati, 1995; Kelley 
& Amburgey, 1991; Miller & Friesen, 1980; Shaver, Mitchel, & Yeung, 1997). Indeed, 
scholars have found that prior acquisition experience breeds subsequent acquisitions 
(Amburgey & Miner, 1992; Baum, Li, & Usher, 2000; Haleblian, Kim, & Rajagopalan, 
2006; Yang & Hyland, 2006). In this regard, the experience of acquisitions before the 
financial crisis may have promoted the inclination for financial firms to engage in 
acquisitions also during the crisis. However, as this period of financial distress have 
caused many firms to become rigid (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2008, 2009), the history and 
experience alone may not be sufficient to explain the influence of the precondition on 
during-crisis acquisitions. 
In addition to the influence of prior acquisition experience, pre-crisis acquisitions 
may have provided the firm with a larger scale that makes them more visible and 
rewarded by the financial market (Kim, Haleblian, & Finkelstein, 2011), which may in 
turn make the firm more capable of procuring and combining resources (Penrose, 1959; 
Pfeffer & Salacik, 1978). Further, as acquiring another firm or business expands the 
acquiring firm’s scope and offers a new diverse set of resources and knowledge, the 
opportunity set of the firm’s subsequent acquisitions increases (McKelvie & Wiklund, 
2010). Hence, more acquisitions are likely to take place. 
  
 
An analysis from the perspective of the potential target firms supplements the 
explanations provided above. Specifically, a period of extensive industry consolidation 
represents a setting in which many firms’ vulnerability and weak chance of independent 
survival is likely to result in an increase of targets to be potentially acquired. During this 
period of an increased supply of targets, it is likely that the accumulation of experience 
and visibility is perceived favorably by the acquiring firms’ key constituents and 
stakeholders. In the broader domain of corporate strategy, it has been found that firms 
that have experience, resources, and knowledge within a strategic domain can send a 
signal to the external parties of their capability and commitment in carrying out the focal 
strategic activities (e.g., Gulati, Lavie, & Singh, 2009; Kale, Dyer, & Singh, 2002). 
Similarly, in the eyes of the key stakeholders—the target firm executives in particular—a 
firm that has accumulated the expertise through previous acquisition experiences may be 
perceived as more capable and reliable as a potential acquirer, in other words, a ‘white 
knight’ that can save the target firm. In all, the effect of pre-crisis acquisitions on during-
crisis acquisitions may have been triggered by the past experiences, which was arguably 
further facilitated by the increased scale and credibility accumulated throughout such 
experiences, in conjunction with the increased supply of potential targets, whose 
preferences towards potential acquirers may have been shaped by the relevant experience 
and scale that acquirers possessed. Therefore, I hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 1: The volume of a firm’s acquisitions prior to the crisis is 
positively related to the volume of its acquisitions during the crisis. 
Within-strategy effect: The impact of pre-crisis divestitures on during-crisis 
divestitures 
Similar to how past acquisition experience can encourage subsequent acquisitions, 
  
 
prior divestiture experience can allow a firm to establish routines and knowledge in 
executing divestments of business units, helping the firm divest business units in 
subsequent periods when needed (e.g., Allen, 1998; Bergh & Lim, 2008; Shimizu, 2007; 
Shimizu & Hitt, 2005; Villalonga & McGahan, 2005). As the implementation of 
divestitures involves a variety of processes including determining the specific mode (e.g., 
spin-offs, sell-offs, equity carveouts), identifying potential acquirers, and dealing with 
governance entities such as internal/external owners (e.g., Bergh & Sharp, 2015), boards 
(e.g., Johnson et al., 1993), corporate and divisional managers (e.g., Ghertman, 1988), in 
addition to various other administrative processes, having such experience of divestitures 
helps senior managers better evaluate the costs and benefits of divesting units in the 
current situation (Shimizu & Hitt, 2005).  
Divesting a business or asset involves breaking inertia and a psychological 
process of departing from the status quo (Staw, 1997). In this sense, it is likely that the 
experience of breaking the inertia in the past allows the decision makers to feel more 
comfortable or less painful in divesting additional operating units. On the other hand, 
lacking such experience may only strengthen the tendency to maintain the status quo 
(Ross & Staw, 1993). In this case, even when the economic adversity in the crisis period 
poses a threat to firms, they tend to be strategically rigid and hold on to their business 
units even when they see negative feedback pointing to the need of divestment (Staw, 
Sandelands, & Dutton, 1981). While this behavioral tendency may conflict with the 
industry-wide movement of consolidation and corporate lean-downs during crisis periods, 
firms may be able to engage in divestitures of business units during the crisis to the extent 
that they had experience in divestitures before the crisis.  
  
 
An analysis from the potential acquirers’ perspective also supports such 
prediction. Potential acquirers in the market are likely to favor firms that have had 
previous experience in divestitures. As divestitures often involve private transactions and 
negotiations between the seller and a single buyer, rather than open auctions (Sicherman 
& Pettway, 1992; Slovin, 1995), the prior experience of the divestiture process may 
convey a signal to the potential acquirers that such divesting firms are better candidates to 
transact with since they have such experience in negotiations. Further, as divestitures 
require cutting the business linkages between the divested units and the divesting firms, 
potential acquirers tend to favor those firms with prior divesting experience because such 
firms have experience in business de-integration and thus can accelerate the process of 
integration of the divested units and the acquiring firms. In all, I hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 2: The volume of a firm’s divestures prior to the crisis is 
positively related to the volume of its divestures during the crisis. 
While I have thus far argued how firms’ acquisitions and divestitures prior to a 
crisis may affect the firms’ acquisitions and divestitures during the crisis, respectively, it 
is important to also discuss how they may influence each other as they represent the two 
major tools (expansion and contraction) through which firms (re)shape their boundaries. 
Most studies on corporate strategy have focused on either one of the two; in studies 
examining both strategic modes together, they have been considered as alternative 
governance modes (e.g., Villalonga & McGahan, 2005) or two independent outcomes 
that represent major corporate decisions (e.g., Sanders, 2001; Williams, Paez, & Sanders, 
1988) with less focus on how one can influence the other. While some studies have 
examined how firms decide to divest business units that they have previously acquired 
(e.g., Bergh, 1997; Capron, Mitchell, & Swaminathan, 2001; Hayward & Shimizu, 2006), 
  
 
significantly less studies have examined how these strategic activities may impact each 
other over time, especially when firms go through major crisis situations. 
Cross-strategy effect: The impact of pre-crisis divestitures on during-crisis 
acquisitions 
As discussed earlier, prior experience in acquisitions and the expanded 
opportunity pool created through the accumulated size before the crisis can encourage 
more acquisitions as firms move into the crisis period. However, a continuation of the 
same strategic course of acquisitions may not be the only path through which firms could 
do more acquisitions as they go through the crisis period. Specifically, I predict that those 
that have divested business units prior to the crisis may also be able to engage in more 
acquisitions during the crisis. While few studies thus far have examined this relationship, 
I provide two interrelated reasons to support this view. 
First, divestitures prior to the crisis improve firms’ operational efficiency through 
refocusing their corporate portfolios, or discarding negative synergies and assets that are 
less related or contributive to the core business (e.g., Bergh, 1998; Brauer & Wiersema, 
2012; Markides, 1992). Such refocusing can open room for the firm to explore new 
opportunities that can strengthen the firm’s core business and supplement it through new 
synergies. From the corporate officers’ perspective, a leaner organizational structure and 
refocused portfolio would allow them to allocate more attention to opportunities that 
reside outside the firm, facilitating more search activities for acquisition targets. At the 
same time, while the crisis period displays an increase in supply of potential targets 
overall, it is likely that targets outside the focal firm not only seek potential acquirers that 
are reliable and capable, but also those firms refocused through pre-crisis divestitures that 
have the relevant experience to recognize the potential synergy created from acquiring 
  
 
them. 
This enlarged opportunity set is supplemented by the fact that divestitures prior to 
the crisis generate cash proceeds that can allow firms to acquire more during the crisis. 
Acquisitions often require substantial financial resources, which include considerable 
search costs for reducing the uncertainty accompanied by acquiring new businesses (Iyer 
& Miller, 2008). The majority of such financial resources come from debt (Hitt, 
Hoskisson, & Ireland, 1990; Hoskisson, Hitt, & Ireland, 1994), which may require new 
cash flows for repayment and reduction of the associated financial risk (Hitt & Smart, 
1994). As such, these resource requirements may encourage firms to divest assets for 
greater cash flow (Hitt, Hoskisson, Johnson, & Moesel, 1996). As the financial crisis 
period represents a time where firms are heavily constrained financially, generating the 
cash flow from divestitures may hugely aid in getting in shape for acquiring others. 
Taken together, I hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 3: The volume of a firm’s divestitures prior to the crisis is 
positively related to the volume of its acquisitions during the crisis. 
While refocusing may in general provide the corporate officers with greater 
leeway for exploring outside opportunities, crises provide a situation in which CEOs’ 
willingness and ability to seize opportunities and search broadly may make significant 
difference in terms of firm behavior (Boin, Hart, Stern, & Sundelius, 2005; Meyer, 
Brooks, & Goes, 1990). In this regard, I suggest that CEOs’ cognitive complexity may 
strengthen the firm’s motivation driven from divestitures prior to the crisis to engage in 
more acquisitions during the crisis. 
CEOs’ cognitive complexity refers to the degree to which they differentiate and 
integrate dimensions of information, representing a cognitive style of gathering and 
  
 
processing information (Finkelstein, Hambrick, & Cannella, 2009). Those with high 
levels of cognitive complexity perceive several dimensions in the informational array and 
have wide ranges of attention and search, drawing multiple connections between the 
perceived constructs; while those with low cognitive complexity employ fewer constructs 
in understanding issues and processing information, have more focused attention, and 
draw linkages among the select dimensions used (Tetlock, Peterson, & Berry, 1993; 
Tetlock, 2000).  
Given the definition of cognitive complexity, I predict that, rather than staying 
rigid in threating situations (Staw, Sandelands, & Dutton, 1981), CEOs with high 
cognitive complexity are more likely to widen their search range and seek opportunities 
as considerable environmental change alters the opportunity set and the competitive 
landscape (Meyer et al., 1990). Indeed, although pre-crisis divestitures may create greater 
efficiency and focus for firms to seek new opportunities, they would indeed have less 
meaning if senior managers are less inclined to or less capable of identifying those 
opportunities and evaluating potential targets. With new opportunities residing in the 
environment, CEOs with higher cognitive complexity, characterized by the willingness 
and capability to perceive multiple dimensions in the environment and draw intricate 
connections among them, are expected to be more capable of understanding and 
integrating the ways for adapting to the newly created market dynamics, hence 
facilitating more acquisitions to span the firm boundaries and seek outside resources after 
a period of divestitures. Therefore, I hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 4: The positive relationship between a firm’s pre-crisis 
divestitures and during-crisis acquisitions is strengthened when the CEO’s 
cognitive complexity is higher. 
  
 
Cross-strategy effect: The impact of pre-crisis acquisitions on during-crisis 
divestitures  
The impact of acquisitions on subsequent divestitures has been straightforward in 
the literature. In general, there would be little motivation for CEOs to contract the firm 
given that they aspire to run large and growing firms (Donaldson & Lorsch, 1983; Jensen, 
1989; Mueller, 1987) and receive big compensation packages for managing them 
(Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1995). However, firms that grow through acquisitions often 
eventually experience the need for divestitures (Porter, 1987) as acquisitions do not 
necessarily result in increased value for the acquiring firm (Haleblian et al., 2009; Jensen, 
1988). Further, it is unlikely that every piece of the acquired firm (or business) would fit 
the acquiring firm’s need. Sometimes, the acquiring firms would need to or have 
promised regulators to divest some parts of the acquired firms/businesses in order to get 
regulatory approvals. In line with this stream of research, I expect that firms that have 
conducted a large amount of acquisitions prior to a crisis will also divest a large amount 
of businesses as they enter the crisis period.  
As noted throughout the paper, crisis situations engender a setting in which firms 
face considerable financial constraints, which was particularly the case during the 
financial crisis (e.g., Atkinson et al., 2013). As acquisitions prior to the crisis may 
provide firms with a broader opportunity set through reconfigurations of their resource 
bases, they may simultaneously experience during the crisis greater needs to identify and 
divest the units that are not contributing to increased value. In part, this may be because, 
compared to the time during the crisis, firms that have engaged in greater volumes of 
acquisitions in a more munificent pre-crisis period may have overestimated the value of 
targets and the potential synergy with the targets (Lubatkin & Chatterjee, 1991; Wan & 
  
 
Yiu, 2009). As achieving a financially healthy status becomes key in crisis situations, 
firms that engaged in voluminous acquisitions are more likely to experience the need for 
leaning down and removing parts that are less contributing to firm value. Therefore, I 
hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 5: The volume of a firm’s acquisitions prior to the crisis is 
positively related to the volume of its divestitures during the crisis. 
Similar to how I discussed CEOs may play a role in influencing the relationship 
between pre-crisis divestitures and during-crisis acquisitions, I suggest that CEO 
cognitive complexity may influence how pre-crisis acquisitions affect during-crisis 
divestitures. Specifically, while firms may have a larger pool of opportunities and options 
during the crisis created by acquisitions prior to the crisis, I expect that CEOs with lower 
cognitive complexity may facilitate divestitures of the acquired businesses and assets 
during the crisis. As noted earlier, compared to those higher cognitive complexity, CEOs 
with lower cognitive complexity are characterized by their tendency to be more focused 
in attention and search of information, using fewer constructs to differentiate multiple 
dimensions of the surrounding situation and drawing select connections among them 
(Tetlock et al., 1993). As such, they are expected to be more internally focused in 
understanding and integrating the ways of how the newly acquired diversity of 
knowledge and resources can complement the existing firm resources. This implies that 
they would also be more focused on evaluating the synergies created from the new and 
existing businesses, hence more intensely discerning which ones should be divested, 
thereby employing a decision calculus that strengthens the firm’s inner core. Therefore, 
to the extent that their CEOs’ cognitive complexity is lower, firms that have engaged in 
active acquisitions before the crisis would experience greater likelihood of divestitures as 
  
 
they can be more focused on assessing the needs and values in the existing and newly 
acquired assets and businesses. In this regard, I hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 6: The positive relationship between a firm’s pre-crisis 
acquisitions and during-crisis divestitures is strengthened when the CEO’s 
cognitive complexity is lower. 
Implications for firm performance and survival during a crisis 
During periods of radical environmental shifts, environmental munificence 
dramatically declines (Wan & Yiu, 2009), often rendering firms’ past strategic courses 
obsolete (Meyer et al., 1990). Firms are left with few options but to tighten their financial 
resources and cut down on their scope (Brauer & Schimmer, 2010; Campello, Graham, & 
Harvey, 2010), perhaps indicating their intensified rigidity that resulted from such 
external threat (Staw et al., 1981). Most recent studies on the financial sector have 
suggested that good corporate governance, either captured at a comprehensive level (e.g., 
Gartenberg & Pierce, 2017; Peni & Vahamaa, 2012) or specifically reflected in the level 
of board monitoring (e.g., Aebi et al., 2012) or CEOs’ incentive alignment (e.g., 
Fahlenbrach & Stulz, 2011), has allowed some firms to enjoy better performance than 
others during the financial crisis. Such analysis finds explanation of firm heterogeneity in 
performance and survival directly from the causes of the financial crisis—that the 
strength of corporate governance mechanisms for regulating excessive risk taking may 
explain the differences in performance. 
In this study, I propose that both acquisitions and divestitures during crisis 
situations may contribute to greater firm financial performance. Indeed, prior research 
suggests that acquisitions, in general, represent a high-risk corporate action that involves 
major resource commitments (Pablo, Sitkin, & Jemison, 1986), often hurting firm 
  
 
performance (Cartwright & Schoenberg, 2006) and sometimes resulting in replacing the 
CEO when failed (Lehn & Zhao, 2006). Divestitures also are often regarded as risky 
moves (Sanders, 2001), as they often result in negative market reactions (Markides, 
1992) or losses in employee morale and key resources relevant to remaining businesses 
(Freeman & Cameron, 1993; Markides, 1995). However, I suggest crisis situations 
provide a context in which both strategies may have significant potential for creating 
value. 
Acquisition deals made by firms during a crisis may improve firms’ subsequent 
performance by enhancing their visibility and market presence which may in turn lead to 
more opportunities for reconfiguration of resources and capabilities. This altering of 
resource and capabilities bases is expected to allow the firm to better adapt to the 
changing environment (Wan & Yiu, 2009). As prior research suggests, acquisitions have 
the benefit of gaining access to new knowledge and assets that reside outside the firm 
(Harrison et al., 1991; Kim & Finkelstein, 2009). These acquisitions are more likely to 
create value when the acquirer and target can complement each other’s resources 
(Harrison et al., 1991) and/or choices of strategies and market (Kim & Finkelstein, 2009). 
However, during a period in which industry players are majorly going through financial 
and structural constraint where the lack of necessary resources and experience may have 
posed a major challenge to firms, the projection of higher visibility and market 
dominance may have substantially contributed to improving the focal firm’s 
effectiveness. As the prior discussions on the effect of pre-crisis acquisitions on during-
crisis acquisitions suggest, it may have been those firms that have already grown in size 
that had the competitive edge to exploit more opportunities as well as the leeway to 
  
 
further explore other opportunities for improving their efficiency. Therefore, I 
hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 7: The volume of a firm’s during-crisis acquisitions is 
positively related to its subsequent financial performance. 
Divestitures during the crisis period are also expected to create value to firms and 
improve their financial performance. While the impact of divestitures on firm 
performance has been a popular subject in corporate strategy research, evidence has been 
mixed (see Brauer, 2006 for a review). First, research from transaction cost economics 
and resource-based perspective collectively suggest that divestitures can lead to better 
utilization of resources by eliminating negative synergies or diseconomies of scale and 
scope across a firm’s portfolio, resulting in better financial performance (e.g., Bergh, 
1998; Bergh & Lawless, 1998; Kose, Poulsen, & Stulz, 1995). However, as noted earlier, 
strong evidence also exists that divestitures sometimes decrease shareholder value 
(Freeman & Cameron, 1993; Markides, 1992, 1995). In response to these conflicting 
findings, more recent research has suggested that performance outcomes of divesting 
firms are much subject to specific contexts and contingencies (Lee & Madhavan, 2010; 
Mulherin & Boone, 2000).  
Building upon such notion, I posit in this study that the recent financial crisis 
specifically provides a context of extreme financial constraint and environmental 
resource scarcity in which firms’ divestiture activities resulted in better financial 
performance. The impact of divestitures on firm financial performance in environmental 
jolt situations, such as the financial crisis context, can be understood through several 
aspects. As the crisis reconfigures the opportunity set and competitive landscape, firms 
are encouraged to devise new ways of competing (Meyer et al., 1990). As adhering to 
  
 
past business models and the strategies for implementing them may lower firms’ 
effectiveness during radical environmental shifts (e.g., Audia, Lock, & Smith, 2000), 
trimming out such inefficiencies and perhaps redundancies can allow firms to improve 
their management of resources with more focused attention on key business units.  
Furthermore, the cash flows generated from selling assets and units will offer 
critical competitive advantage to the divesting firms in situations of low environmental 
munificence by creating opportunities for reinvestments and reallocations of these cash 
proceedings for improving other items of the firm’s balance sheet. In other words, 
alternative uses of freed resources and the resulting resource reallocation can allow firms 
to better adapt to an environment that cannot offer much resources itself. At the same 
time, firms can now allocate energy and resources to seek new ways that address the 
environmental change and augment the core businesses. As prior research suggests, firms 
maintaining balance between exploring new opportunities and exploiting existing 
strengths enjoy enhanced performance (He & Wong, 2004; March, 1991; Stettner & 
Lavie, 2014). Therefore, I hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 8: The volume of a firm’s during-crisis divestitures is 
positively related to its subsequent financial performance. 
Financial performance and survival of firms are often closely related in that firms 
with better firm performance are more likely to survive (e.g., Delios & Beamish, 2001). 
This linkage can also be expected for firms during crisis situations. For example, as the 
financial sector witnessed a period of consolidation during the recent financial crisis, 
firms that were incapable of yielding good financial performance were either terminated 
or acquired by others (Wheelock, 2011). However, in this study, while I have proposed 
that acquisitions and divestitures that firms have conducted during a crisis may both 
  
 
contribute to better subsequent financial performance, I expect that these two corporate 
restructuring efforts may have differential impacts on firm survival during the crisis. 
First, I expect that firms that have done a larger volume of acquisitions during the 
financial crisis are more likely to survive the crisis. As recent research has suggested, the 
collapse of large firms has the potential of damaging the broader financial and economic 
system because of their market dominance and interconnectedness. In other words, they 
are “too big to fail” (Stern & Feldman, 2004), and such phenomenon represented the 
dominant institutional logic of the financial sector, particularly in this crisis period.  
This explanation may be further supplemented with a more cognitive view to 
understand how firms that grew through acquisitions were more likely to survive the 
crisis than those that engaged less in acquisition activities. As firms engage in 
acquisitions, the strategic and operational reasons underlying such decisions are often 
publicly exposed through “road shows” that provide detailed information to investors 
(Brauer & Wiersema, 2012; Reuer & Shen, 2003). As stakeholders are provided with 
such information, their perception of firms that have gained size in times of financial 
hardship may work favorably towards these acquiring firms in the form of greater levels 
of support. Research on organizational cognition suggests that when faced with abundant 
stimuli, which was apparently the case during the financial crisis, individuals act as 
“cognitive misers” (Taylor, 1981) who sort out expected stimuli while paying more 
attention to stimuli that differ from expectations (Barnett, 2014; Kiesler & Sproull, 1982). 
Accordingly, the increased size of firms may loom larger to stakeholders in the industrial 
and economic context of financial shrinkage, resulting in greater support towards them. 
As a result, these firms are also more likely to receive support from key constituents, 
  
 
including the government, through the demonstration of their ability to grow in times of 
extreme condensation. Taken together, I propose that acquisitions conducted by firms 
during the crisis  may increase the chance that firms survive the crisis.  
Hypothesis 9: The volume of a firm’s during-crisis acquisitions is 
positively related to its subsequent survival. 
Regarding divestitures, however, while I have argued that divestitures during the 
financial crisis can improve subsequent firm financial performance, I expect they will 
reduce the chance that the firms will survive the crisis. Although firms’ divestitures in a 
financially constrained setting can improve their operation and financial outcomes, the 
financial sector was characterized by the institutional logic, as noted earlier, that firms 
that are extremely large and interconnected with others are less likely to fail or die 
because their collapse would result in extremely costly damages to a country’s financial 
system and even its entire economy. In this sense, I posit that although divesting firms 
may have been able to improve their financial performance, they may experience higher 
likelihood of exiting—either through decease or being acquired by other acquiring firms. 
This is because divestitures reduce the size of the divesting firms, thus reducing their 
importance to and interconnectedness with the country’s entire economy. As a result, 
divesting firms become less likely to attract support from key stakeholders, especially the 
government. Moreover, firms that have focused on divesting in the crisis period tend to 
be perceived by outsiders as failing and declining. This could in part be attributed to the 
fact, as noted earlier, that information (e.g., selling price) about divestiture transactions 
are not often disclosed to the public with the strategic and operational rationales behind 
divestiture decisions left ambiguous to many stakeholder groups (Brauer & Wiersema, 
2012). Due to this information asymmetry, garnering stakeholder support for survival 
  
 
would be extremely difficult when firms are perceived as active divestors, as divestitures 
may send a false signal to stakeholders that the firm is failing or their managers had made 
mistakes in the past (e.g., Markides & Singh, 1997). In all, as the dominant institutional 
logic of this industry, particularly in this period, suggested, some firms were not allowed 
to fail or die simply because they were too “big”, rather than too “good.” In essence, I 
suggest that while the operational efficiency of firms and their survival outcomes are 
often considered to go hand in hand, they can be decoupled to represent two different 
consequences during crisis situations. This leads to my final hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 10: The volume of a firm’s during-crisis divestitures is 
negatively related to its subsequent survival. 
RESEARCH METHODS 
Data and sample 
The study was based on a longitudinal sample consisting of 463 U.S. financial 
firms (2-digit SIC codes 60-67) and their CEOs, in the period of 2004-2011. Firm 
acquisition and divestiture data were collected from SDC Platinum, firms’ financial and 
strategic information and exit data from CRSP-Compustat. Data on CEOs’ language use 
were obtained from companies’ quarterly conference calls collected by Thomson Reuters 
Street Events database, and CEO demographic and compensation data were gathered 
from Execucomp.  
Measurement 
CEO cognitive complexity. As noted earlier, cognitive complexity refers to a 
combination of two major components of one’s reasoning: the extent to which one can 
differentiate between multiple, competing solutions and the extent to which one can 
integrate among those solutions (Tetlock, 1981). Following this definition, Abe (2011) 
  
 
constructed an index that combines words that used for making precise distinctions and 
conjoining multiple thoughts together. Specifically, the index comprises four function-
word categories—exclusion (e.g., but, without), negations (e.g., no, not, never), 
tentativeness (e.g., maybe, perhaps), and conjunctions (e.g., and, also, although). For 
example, exclusion words are used when making distinctions between multiple categories 
(i.e., differentiate), while conjunctions help bring together multiple thoughts to create a 
coherent narrative (i.e., integrate) (Graesser, McNamara, Louwerse, & Cai, 2004). Using 
LIWC, the number of words from each of these categories was counted to compute the 
extent to which these words were used in proportion to the total amount of words spoken 
by the CEO. I used the sum of the four standardized scores as an index of a CEO’s 
cognitive complexity. 
For examining the relationship between CEO cognitive complexity and the pre-
crisis acquisition activities, I computed the mean cognitive complexity scores in the four 
quarters of 2004. For examining the role of CEO cognitive complexity as a moderator of 
the relationship between pre-crisis and during-crisis acquisitions and the relationship 
between during-crisis acquisitions and firm survival, I used the concurrent quarterly 
scores of CEOs’ cognitive complexity. 
Volume of acquisitions prior to the crisis (i.e., 2005-2006) and during the crisis 
(i.e., 2007-2010). Two variables that capture the volume of acquisitions in each of the 
two time periods were collected from the SDC Platinum database. First, number of 
acquisitions was measured as the total count of completed acquisitions conducted in 
2005-2006 for operationalizing pre-crisis acquisitions and as the running sum of quarterly 
acquisitions done in 2007-2010 for during-crisis acquisitions. Such operationalization can 
  
 
reflect the effect of precondition on the during-crisis acquisitions. Consistent with prior 
studies, I chose the year of 2007 to mark the onset of the crisis, as prominent signs 
emerged in early 2007 when the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie 
Mac) announced that it will no longer buy risky subprime mortgages/mortgage-related 
securities and New Century Financial Corporation filed for bankruptcy (Marshall, 2009; 
Thakor, 2015), triggering the meltdown of the financial sector (USA Today, 2013). 
Second, the size of acquisitions was measured by the transaction value of acquisitions 
(log-transformed) conducted in these time periods, again as the total amount for the pre-
crisis period and the running sum for the during-crisis period. 
Volume of divestitures prior to the crisis (i.e., 2005-2006) and during the crisis 
(i.e., 2007-2010). Similar to acquisitions, two variables that capture the volume of 
divestitures in each of the two time periods were collected from the SDC Platinum 
database. First, number of divestitures was measured as the total count of divestitures 
conducted in 2005-2006 for operationalizing pre-crisis divestitures and as the running 
sum of quarterly divestitures done in 2007-2010 for during-crisis acquisitions. Again, 
such operationalization can reflect the effect of precondition on the during-crisis 
divestitures. Second, the size of divestitures was measured by the transaction value of 
acquisitions (log-transformed) conducted in these time periods, again as the total amount 
for the pre-crisis period and the running sum for the during-crisis period. 
Firm performance. Following prior studies on the financial industry, I measured 
financial firms’ performance using their annual return on assets (ROA) (e.g., McNamara 
et al., 2002; Mehra, 1996; Simpson & Kohers, 2002). ROA not only represents the most 
often used performance measure in management studies (e.g., Reger, Duhaime, & 
  
 
Stimpert, 1992; Deephouse, 1999) and finance studies (e.g., Aebi et al., 2012; Gilbert, 
1984; Gorton & Rosen, 1995; Peni & Vahamaa, 2012) of the financial industry, but is 
also regarded as the best indicator of earnings efficiency (McNamara et al., 2002). 
Firm survival. To determine firm survival, I first identified whether financial 
institutions were delisted from the Compustat-CRSP database on a quarterly basis (e.g., 
Carr, Haggard, Hmieleski, & Zahra, 2010) and created a time-varying binary outcome 
measure coded 1 during the quarter a firm was delisted and 0 otherwise. I chose to 
measure firm survival on a quarterly base rather than a yearly base because firm exits 
occurred more frequently during a crisis than a normal situation.10  
Control variables. I included a set of variables at the CEO- and firm-level to 
control for alternative explanations for the predicted outcomes. First, I controlled for firm 
size, which was measured as the logarithm of total assets, as size can influence the extent 
of strategic inertia (Dougherty & Hardy, 1996). In addition, financial slack, measured as 
the equity-debt ratio (common equity over total debt) was also controlled for as it can 
provide buffers for risky strategic actions such as acquisitions (Bourgeois, 1981; 
Bromiley, 1991; Iyer & Miller, 2008). As the senior-most executives may have greater 
control over risk and strategic management in holding companies than in individual 
commercial banks or savings institutions, I also included a binary variable which 
indicated whether the firm is a holding company, coded 1 if the institution’s 2-digit SIC 
code equaled 67 and 0 otherwise. Since the amount of cash holdings of firms may have 
influence over firms’ performance during the crisis (e.g., Campello et al., 2010), I 
                                                        
10 Data indicated that out of the sampled firms that were present in 2007, which marked the onset of the 
financial crisis, approximately 20% exited the industry at various points of time by 2011 (5% in 2007, 4.7% 
in 2008, 4.3% in 2009, 3.6% in 2010, and 3.4% in 2011). 
  
 
controlled for cash holdings when predicting firm performance. In addition, I controlled 
for each corporate restructuring activity when predicting the other (e.g., controlled for 
divestitures when examining the impact of pre-crisis acquisitions on during-crisis 
acquisitions). As noted earlier, corporate governance has been suggested as a critical 
factor in explaining financial firms’ performance during the crisis (e.g., Aebi et al., 2012; 
Gartenberg & Pierce, 2017). In line with this recent research, I also controlled for two 
corporate governance mechanisms—board independence, measured as the ratio of 
independent directors on board and CEO duality, coded 1 if the CEO also assumed 
chairpersonship and 0 otherwise. Finally, I controlled for CEO shareholdings, measured 
by the percentage of CEOs’ shares out of the total amount of firm shares, as CEOs’ 
ownership of the firm can provide financial incentives for undertaking riskier moves, 
such as acquisitions (Sanders, 2001; Wright, Kroll, Lado, & van Ness, 2002). 
When examining the effect of a firm’s pre-crisis acquisitions and divestitures on 
during-crisis acquisitions and divestitures, I controlled for prior period return on assets 
(ROA) as recent performance can affect strategic behavior (Cyert & March, 1963; Greve, 
1998). Finally, I included binary indicators for each year-quarter to control for the 
temporal effect in models using quarterly observations (models predicting during crisis 
acquisitions and divestitures and firm survival) and binary indicators for each year in 
models using annual observations (models predicting firm performance). 
Analyses 
Due to the different nature of outcomes and the relationships among them, I took 
two methodological approaches to test the hypotheses. Hypothesis 1 through 6 predicted 
the relationship between firms’ pre-crisis acquisitions and divestitures, during-crisis 
  
 
acquisitions and divestitures, CEO cognitive complexity, and subsequent financial 
performance. These hypotheses were tested through longitudinal Generalized Estimating 
Equation (GEE) models (Liang & Zeger, 1986). GEE models provide maximum 
likelihood estimates that account for non-independence of multiple observations from the 
same firm (Hanley, Negassa, Edwardes, & Forrester, 2003). A fixed-effects generalized 
least squares model would not be appropriate for estimation as the precondition (i.e., a 
firm’s pre-crisis acquisitions) does not vary over time. In all models, I specified a 
Gaussian distribution with an identity link function, an autoregressive (one year) within-
group correlation structure, and robust standard errors (White, 1982).  
To test Hypotheses 7 through 10, which predicted the influence of during-crisis 
acquisitions and divestitures on firm survival, I conducted an event history analysis to 
model the risk of failure (i.e., firm exit, or the reverse of firm survival). Specifically, as 
each firm had quarterly data for each observation on delisting, I conducted a discrete-time 
event history analysis to account for the fact that the same firms are observed over 
multiple time intervals (quarters) (e.g., Agarwal, Sarkar, & Echambadi, 2002; Carr, 
Haggard, Hmieleski, & Zahra, 2010; Fischer & Pollock, 2004; Jenkins, 2005). I used a 
random-effects complementary log-log specification (e.g., Agarwal et al., 2002; Baum & 
Oliver, 1991; Henderson, 1999) that allows for incorporation of time-varying covariates 
and estimation with standard errors clustered at the firm level to account for the non-
independence of observations of the same firm across quarters, or the unobserved 
heterogeneity, also known as ‘frailty’ (Jenkins, 2005). As the complementary log-log 
model assumes an asymmetric cumulative distribution function—which better fit data 
with relatively rarer events—and builds in a proportional hazards assumption, as does the 
  
 
Cox regression model for analyzing continuous time (Allison, 1982), it was considered 
appropriate for fitting the data. 
Results 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics and correlations, except for quarter 
dummies, for the studied variables. There was no serious evidence of multicollinearity, as 
shown by the maximum Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) of 2.84, which is well below the 
generally accepted threshold of 10 for indication of multicollinearity (Cohen, Cohen, 
Aiken, & West, 2013). 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Hypothesis 1 proposed that pre-crisis acquisitions would be positively related to 
during-crisis acquisitions. As shown in Models 2 and 4 of Table 2, both the number and 
size of pre-crisis acquisitions are positively related to the number and size of during-crisis 
acquisitions (β number = 0.235, p < 0.01; β size = 0.467, p < 0.01). Thus, Hypothesis 1 is 
supported. Hypothesis 2 stated that pre-crisis divestitures would be positively related to 
during-crisis divestitures. As shown in Model 6 of Table 2, the number of pre-crisis 
divestitures is positively related to during-crisis divestitures (β number = 0.632, p < 0.01). 
However, the size of divestitures did not show statistically significant evidence of 
positive association between pre- and during-crisis divestitures. Therefore, Hypothesis 2 
was partially supported. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Hypotheses 3 proposed a positive relationship between a firm’s pre-crisis 
acquisitions and its during-crisis divestitures. As shown in Models 2 and 5 of Table 3, 
pre-crisis acquisitions and during-crisis divestitures are positively related, both in terms 
  
 
of the number and size of divestments (β number = 0.271, p < 0.01; β size =0.065, p < 0.01). 
Thus, Hypothesis 3 was strongly supported. Hypothesis 4 proposed the moderating role 
of CEO cognitive complexity in this relationship, yet was not supported (β number = 0.004, 
p > 0.10; β size =0.002, p > 0.10). Hypothesis 5 stated that pre-crisis divestitures would be 
positively related to during-crisis acquisitions. As shown in Models 9 (full model for 
number of divestitures) and 11 of Table 3, the number and size of pre-crisis divestitures 
had significant positive impact on during-crisis acquisitions (β number = 0.950, p < 0.01; β 
size = 0.629, p < 0.01). Furthermore, as Hypothesis 6 proposed, and shown in Model 9 of 
Table 3, CEOs’ cognitive complexity had a significant moderating role in this 
relationship, amplifying the positive effect of pre-crisis divestitures on during-crisis 
acquisitions (β number = 0.004, p <0.01). Thus, Hypothesis 6 was supported. Comparing 
the results for Hypotheses 4 and 6, it could be the case that making acquisition decisions 
when firms had engaged in significant divestitures required greater managerial effort than 
the other way around. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
Hypothesis 7 proposed a positive relationship between a firm’s during-crisis 
acquisitions and its subsequent financial performance. As shown in Models 3 (full model) 
of Table 4, firms’ number of acquisitions done during the crisis is positively associated 
with their financial performance going through the crisis period (β number = 0.001, p < 
0.10). However, the size of during-crisis acquisitions did not show significant influence 
on performance (β size = 0.000, p > 0.10). Therefore, Hypothesis 7 was partially supported. 
Hypothesis 8 stated that firms’ during-crisis divestitures would be positively related to 
their subsequent performance. As shown in Model 6 of Table 4, the size of divestitures 
  
 
has positive relationship with financial performance during the crisis (β size = 0.001, p < 
0.10). However, the number of divestitures did not have significant influence on 
performance (β number = 0.000, p > 0.10). Therefore, Hypothesis 8 was also partially 
supported. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
Hypotheses 9 proposed a positive relationship between during-crisis acquisitions 
and firm survival. As the dependent variable was coded as 1 if the firm was delisted or 
exited, a negative coefficient was predicted. As shown in Model 3 of Table 5, firms that 
have engaged in a greater number of acquisitions during the crisis were less likely to exit, 
as indicated by the significant and negative coefficient (β number = -0.666, p < 0.01). 
However, the size of acquisitions did not significantly increase the chance of firms’ 
survival (β size = -0.924, p > 0.10). Thus, Hypothesis 9 was partially supported. Finally, 
Hypothesis 10 stated that during-crisis divestitures would decrease the likelihood of 
subsequent firm survival. As also shown in Model 3 of Table 5, firms with a greater 
number of divestitures were indeed more likely to exit during the crisis (β number = 0.895, p 
< 0.01). However, the size of divestitures did not appear to have a significant influence 
over survival (β size = 0.444, p > 0.10). Therefore, Hypothesis 10 was also partially 
supported.  
As the complementary log-log model assumes that  
log [–log (1 – h(t))] = α + βX 
where X represents the vector of explanatory variables and h(t) the hazard of exit, 
we can use the negative coefficient of during-crisis acquisitions and positive coefficient 
of during-crisis divestitures (β acq. = -0.666; β div. = 0.895) to interpret that when holding 
  
 
all else constant, an increase of one acquisition (divestiture) during the crisis reduces 
(increases) the firm’s chance of exit by 48.6% ([exp (-0.666) − 1] × 100%) and by 
144.7% ([exp (0.895)-1] × 100%), respectively. Figure 2 graphically illustrates the 
comparison between the estimated probabilities (i.e., Kaplan-Meier survival estimates) of 
financial institutions surviving the crisis in 2007 and onward, depending on their volume 
of acquisitions and divestitures done during the crisis.  
[Insert Table 5 and Figure 2 about here] 
Robustness checks and supplementary analysis 
To further provide evidence of the robustness of the current findings and expand 
upon the main findings, I conducted several additional analyses. First, as the presence and 
inputs of chief financial officers (CFOs) may have influence over firms’ strategic 
decisions in the financial sector, I tested the models predicting the moderating effect of 
CEOs’ cognitive complexity on the relationship between pre-crisis acquisitions 
(divestitures) on during-crisis divestitures (acquisitions), controlling for the CFO’s level 
of cognitive complexity. Consistent with the main analysis, the positive moderating 
impact of CEOs’ cognitive complexity on the relationship between pre-crisis divestitures 
and during-crisis acquisitions was supported. It is worth noting, however, that CFOs’ 
cognitive complexity did not have significant impact in this analysis. Perhaps, CFOs may 
have had influence over these corporate decisions that involve heavy use of financial 
resources, yet their cognitive complexity may have been of less significance. 
Second, while the role of CEO cognitive complexity in this study has been 
examined only in the relationship between pre-crisis acquisitions and during-crisis 
divestitures and vice versa, it is possible that it influences other relationships as well. In a 
  
 
separate analysis, I found that CEOs’ cognitive complexity has direct, positive 
relationships with acquisitions and divestitures in the pre-crisis period. Perhaps, the 
extent of differentiation and integration of information that characterizes CEOs with high 
cognitive complexity correspond with high volumes of acquisitions and divestitures. 
Further, it was also found to be positively related to firms’ survival, evidenced by its 
independent effect as well as by strengthening the positive impact of during-crisis 
acquisitions and mitigating the negative impact of divestitures. These findings suggest 
that CEOs’ cognitive complexity may in itself play a nontrivial role in seeking and 
garnering support from major constituents. 
Third, although the relatively less frequent occurrences of firm delisting (exit) 
justified the use of contemporary log-log models (Allison, 1982), I checked the 
robustness of these models by using a random effects logit specification, which is another 
popular alternative for analyzing discrete-time survival data, again estimated with robust 
standard errors to incorporate unobserved heterogeneity. In addition, I also estimated 
with Cox regression models, which is best known for analyzing continuous time data but 
also suitable for discrete-time event history analysis. This set of analyses yielded largely 
similar results. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This paper was motivated by the desire to understand how corporate restructuring 
activities of firms interrelate to each other and eventually influence their performance and 
survival during situations of highly uncertain and radical environmental shifts. Using the 
recent financial crisis context, the current study examines the how acquisitions and 
divestitures done prior to the crisis influence those done during the crisis, both within and 
  
 
across each strategic activity, and how they eventually affect firms’ performance and 
survival. Further, it investigates the role of CEOs’ cognitive complexity in firms’ 
strategic maneuvers for contracting (expanding) prior to the crisis and expand (contract) 
during the crisis. Analyses of financial firms and their CEOs spanning years prior to and 
during the recent financial crisis suggests that acquisitions and divestitures done prior to 
the crisis strengthen not only their own strategic course but also each other during the 
crisis. In particular, results show that firms’ strategy to divest prior to the crisis and 
acquire during the crisis is further facilitated when their CEOs have higher cognitive 
complexity. Further, while increases in acquisitions and divestitures are both found to 
contribute to improved performance, they exhibit contrasting impacts on firms’ 
survival—while firms that have grown during the crisis through acquisitions enjoy higher 
chances of survival, those that have focused on divestments to lean down during the crisis 
experience higher chances of exit. These findings can offer important contributions to 
strategic management research. 
First, it focuses on a recent, highly important context that had significant impact 
on firms and the entire U.S. economy, as well as the global economy, and seeks to 
explain how firms differed in terms of their strategies and performance/survival during 
the crisis. A number of finance and economics studies burgeoned as soon as the crisis hit 
the U.S. economy to understand its causes (e.g., Thakor, 2015) and aftermaths (e.g., 
Atkinson, Luttrell, & Rosenblum, 2013). Surprisingly, to date still not much has been 
done to understand firms’ behaviors, performance, and survival from a strategy 
perspective. The findings suggest that two major mechanisms of corporate restructuring 
exhibited interesting within- and cross-strategy dynamics before and during the crisis, 
  
 
thereby affecting firms’ survival to various degrees. By doing so, it also confirms the 
institutional logic of the financial sector, which became particularly salient in the crisis 
period, that it was those firms that grew bigger that were less likely to fail/die, while 
those that strengthened their balance sheet through divestitures and refocusing improved 
performance based on accounting and financial measures but not the chance of their 
survival. 
In the same vein, it extends our understanding of the dynamics of major corporate 
restructuring activities represented by acquisitions and divestitures in a crisis period and 
their implications towards performance and survival. While the influence of acquisitions 
and divestitures on firm performance has not been so clear (e.g., Brauer, 2006; Haleblian 
et al., 2009), recent research points to the importance of context and contingencies in 
proposing their performance implications (e.g., Lee & Madhavan, 2010; Wan & Yiu, 
2009). This study echoes this call and investigates how acquisitions and divestitures done 
before and during crisis situations can influence firm performance and survival. This 
study provides evidence that crisis situations, especially those that involve economic 
adversities, create a context in which firms that grow and gain magnitude through 
acquisitions enjoy greater performance and chance of survival through garnering more 
support from key stakeholders while those that contract and shrink through divestitures 
may be able to improve financial performance, but suffer lower chances of survival as 
they fail to attract support from external constituents. 
Future research 
Several research opportunities related to this study merit further discussion. First, 
while this study focused on firms’ acquisitions and divestitures and their performance 
  
 
implications, it is important to note that governmental interventions were nontrivial 
drivers in explaining specific acquisition decisions, at least for a subset of firms in this 
industry. In this regard, how the government’s intervention in firms’ decision of specific 
acquisition targets influenced the industry dynamics and subsequent firm behavior should 
be of much interest. Further, bailouts of some institutions by the government were events 
that had significant practical meaning while creating heated debate among the public, 
academics, and industry leaders (Thakor, 2015). As such, the level of financial support to 
financial institutions by governmental forces should be another important outcome to 
investigate. 
Second, and relatedly, exploring the role of the leaders of financial institutions in 
understanding their relational dynamics with governmental authorities. Specifically, it is 
likely that the cognitive complexity of financial firm CEOs may shape their tendency and 
capability of seeking and garnering support from diverse groups of constituents, an 
extremely influential one being the government. Perhaps, those with higher cognitive 
complexity may have been more able to seek sources of support for survival and 
performance improvement, while maintaining the ability to manage the diverse and often 
conflicting interests of existing stakeholders. 
Third, the specific types of businesses that firms decided to acquire or divest—for 
instance, the extent to which the acquired or divested businesses are outside or within the 
core business lines of the focal firm—are also worthwhile examining further. Some 
financial institutions may have certain strategic motivations for acquiring or divesting 
ones that fall within or outside their major product/service line as firms often have 
different exploratory and exploitative orientations. Further, it is also possible that 
  
 
acquisition and/or divestitures of such assets or businesses result in different performance 
outcomes. Intra- vs. inter-industry may not be the only metric for categorizing the 
acquired/divested businesses and assets, and further examining the specific nature of 
these acquisitions and divestitures is worthwhile pursuing. 
Conclusion 
How firms behave, perform, and even survive in contexts of drastic 
environmental changes has been one of the central questions for management scholars. 
This paper focuses on the recent financial crisis and finds evidence that corporate 
restructuring activities show interesting temporal dynamics within and across strategic 
courses, which eventually influence firms’ performance and survival during the crisis. It 
also notes that CEOs, through their cognitive orientations, may play important roles 
therein. While this study has taken an initiative to understand the antecedents and 
consequences of major corporate restructuring activities, further examination of the ins 
and outs of firm behavior in crisis situations remains a fruitful research agenda. 
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Appendix B: Figures 
Figure 1 
CEO cognitive complexity and number of acquisitions in response to industry growth 
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Figure 2 
CEO cognitive complexity and number of new product developments in response to 
industry growth 
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Figure 3 
Consolidation of financial institutions, 1990-2009 
 
 
(Sources: Federal Reserve; Government Accountability Office [GAO]) 
  
Figure 4 
CEO cognitive complexity, Acquisitions, and Firm effectiveness in the Financial Sector 
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Figure 5 
Estimated probability of surviving the crisis after 2007, by volume of during-crisis acquisitions 
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Figure 6 
Corporate Restructuring, CEO cognitive complexity, and Firm effectiveness in the Financial Sector 
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Figure 7 
Estimated probability of surviving the crisis after 2007, by volume of during-crisis acquisitions and divestitures 
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Appendix A: Tables 
Table 1 
Descriptive statistics and correlations of variables studied in Chapter 2 
Variables Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
1. Number of acquisitions 0.381 0.990           
2. Size of acquisitions 1.100 2.198 0.738***          
3. Unrelated acquisitions (%)a 0.423 0.468 0.083*** 0.016         
4. R&D investments 84.306 507.756 0.153*** 0.182*** 0.019        
5. Number of new prod. dev. 1.679 6.849 0.141*** 0.159*** 0.018 0.434***       
6. CEO cognitive complexity 0.045 3.024 0.024*** 0.031*** 0.013 -0.013** -0.005      
7. CEO age 55.766 7.983 0.017*** 0.027*** 0.011 0.035*** -0.011* 0.044***     
8. CEO duality 0.143 0.236 -0.002 0.029*** -0.011 0.089*** 0.046*** 0.013* 0.012*    
9. CEO options 0.506 0.500 0.052*** 0.055*** 0.021 0.030*** 0.001 0.083*** 0.206*** -0.047***   
10. Over performance 0.027 0.088 -0.038*** -0.049*** -0.034** 0.016** 0.007 -0.04*** -0.025*** 0.068*** -0.047***  
11. Under performance -0.045 0.075 0.054*** 0.065*** 0.078*** 0.031*** 0.016** 0.062*** 0.039*** -0.024*** 0.043***  
12. Firm size 7.027 1.989 0.182*** 0.277*** 0.061*** 0.242*** 0.164*** 0.11*** 0.149*** 0.084*** 0.141***  
13. Total diversification 0.522 0.568 0.117*** 0.156*** 0.104*** 0.125*** 0.098*** 0.028*** 0.125*** -0.003 0.079***  
14. Current ratio 2.245 2.265 -0.077*** -0.095*** -0.031** -0.008 0.037*** -0.039*** -0.044*** 0.089*** -0.092***  
15. Equity/debt ratio 1.604 2.250 -0.045*** -0.077*** -0.02 -0.023*** 0.033*** -0.025*** -0.075*** 0.043*** -0.061***  
16. Industry mean number of acq. 0.424 0.164 0.101*** 0.095*** 0.055*** -0.028*** 0.025*** 0.039*** -0.043*** -0.031*** 0.000  
17. Industry mean size of acq. 1.100 0.320 0.146*** 0.146*** 0.087*** -0.005 0.013** 0.02*** -0.013** -0.051*** 0.010  
18. Industry mean R&D investments 1.503 1.410 0.004 -0.003 0.007 0.179*** 0.167*** -0.059*** -0.037*** 0.110*** -0.054***  
19. Industry mean new prod. dev. 4.171 3.063 0.027*** 0.011* -0.013 0.080*** 0.237*** -0.024*** -0.058*** 0.046*** -0.033***  
20. Industry growth 0.143 3.348 0.086*** 0.010 -0.013 0.010 0.000 -0.004 -0.004 -0.012* 0.009  
 
Variables 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
11. Under performance 0.183***          
12. Firm size -0.205*** 0.219***         
13. Total diversification -0.141*** 0.067*** 0.417***        
14. Current ratio 0.218*** -0.054*** -0.398*** -0.209***       
15. Equity/debt ratio 0.155*** -0.008 -0.359*** -0.218*** 0.73***      
16. Industry mean number of acq. -0.061*** 0.032*** 0.008 -0.003 -0.102*** 0.002     
17. Industry mean size of acq. -0.067*** 0.040*** 0.079*** 0.033*** -0.107*** -0.010 0.654***    
18. Industry mean R&D investments 0.200*** -0.056*** -0.316*** -0.012* 0.420*** 0.271*** -0.092*** -0.023***   
19. Industry mean new prod. dev. -0.012* -0.037*** -0.204*** -0.019*** 0.209*** 0.203*** 0.127*** 0.079*** 0.571***  
20. Industry growth -0.005 -0.017*** -0.008 -0.004 0.004 0.001 0.004 0.061*** 0.012* 0.011* 
***p < .01, **p < .05, *p < .10; a N = 5,570; To conserve space, statistics of industry and year dummies are not shown. 
  
Table 2 
CEO cognitive complexity and number of acquisitions 
Zero-inflated negative binomial regressions with clustered standard errors 
Variables 
Number of acquisitions 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Over performance -0.572** -0.548* -0.550* 
 [0.289] [0.283] [0.284] 
Underperformance 0.719** 0.706** 0.733** 
 [0.356] [0.357] [0.346] 
Firm size -0.216*** -0.219*** -0.221*** 
 [0.018] [0.018] [0.018] 
Total diversification 0.034 0.037 0.043 
 [0.047] [0.046] [0.046] 
Current ratio -0.021 -0.021 -0.021 
 [0.016] [0.016] [0.016] 
Equity/Debt ratio 0.022 0.022 0.020 
 [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] 
CEO age 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] 
CEO options 0.115 0.103 0.099 
 [0.103] [0.103] [0.104] 
CEO duality 0.017 0.009 0.023 
 [0.046] [0.047] [0.045] 
Number of new product developments 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] 
Focal year size of acquisitions 0.604*** 0.603*** 0.605*** 
 [0.011] [0.011] [0.011] 
Industry mean number of acquisitions -10.172** -9.900** -9.421** 
 [4.641] [4.660] [4.589] 
Industry growth -0.029 -0.026 0.397 
 [0.174] [0.152] [0.576] 
CEO cognitive complexity (CC)  0.016** 0.030*** 
  [0.008] [0.010] 
CEO CC ×    0.342** 
Industry growth   [0.150] 
    
Constant 4.085* 3.985* 3.800* 
 [2.306] [2.325] [2.262] 
    
Log-likelihood -26,123.950 -26,107.572 -26,094.170 
Likelihood Ratio (LR) χ2 42,901.689 42,934.446 42,961.250 
N 12,373 12,373 12,373 
***p < .01, **p < .05, *p < .10; two-tailed tests 
Standard errors were clustered at the firm-CEO level.  
Coefficients for industry and year dummies are not reported. 
 
  
  
Table 3 
CEO cognitive complexity and size of acquisitions 
Random effects GLS regressions with clustered standard errors 
Variables 
Size of acquisitions 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Over performance 0.247** 0.252** 0.252** 
 [0.101] [0.101] [0.101] 
Underperformance 0.472*** 0.462*** 0.460*** 
 [0.146] [0.146] [0.146] 
Firm size 0.149*** 0.148*** 0.148*** 
 [0.011] [0.011] [0.011] 
Total diversification 0.061** 0.062** 0.061** 
 [0.031] [0.031] [0.031] 
Current ratio 0.026*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 
 [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] 
Equity/Debt ratio -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] 
CEO age -0.003* -0.004* -0.004* 
 [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] 
CEO options 0.036 0.035 0.035 
 [0.062] [0.062] [0.062] 
CEO duality 0.009 0.006 0.006 
 [0.026] [0.026] [0.026] 
R&D investments 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Focal year number of acquisitions 1.913*** 1.913*** 1.912*** 
 [0.094] [0.094] [0.094] 
Industry mean size of acquisitions -0.317 -0.369 -0.456 
 [0.638] [0.633] [0.742] 
Industry growth 0.226 0.232 0.038 
 [0.262] [0.261] [0.040] 
CEO cognitive complexity (CC)  0.006 0.006 
  [0.004] [0.004] 
CEO CC ×    -0.010 
Industry growth   [0.010] 
    
Constant 0.114 0.232 0.417 
 [1.313] [1.304] [1.511] 
    
R2 0.666 0.666 0.666 
N 14,140 14,140 14,140 
***p < .01, **p < .05, *p < .10; two-tailed tests 
Standard errors were clustered at the firm-CEO level.  
Coefficients for industry and year dummies are not reported. 
 
  
  
Table 4 
CEO cognitive complexity and unrelated acquisitions 
Fractional logit regressions with clustered standard errors 
Variables 
Unrelated acquisitions (%) 
Model 1 Model 2 
Over performance -0.059 -0.001 
 [0.518] [0.517] 
Underperformance 1.657** 1.607** 
 [0.747] [0.748] 
Firm size 0.014 0.006 
 [0.066] [0.066] 
Total diversification 0.233*** 0.232*** 
 [0.072] [0.071] 
Current ratio 0.005 0.006 
 [0.025] [0.025] 
Equity/Debt ratio -0.005 -0.004 
 [0.026] [0.026] 
CEO age -0.010** -0.010** 
 [0.004] [0.004] 
CEO options -0.070 -0.068 
 [0.126] [0.126] 
CEO duality 0.070 0.058 
 [0.065] [0.065] 
Inverse Mill’s ratio -0.686 -0.816 
 [1.616] [1.606] 
CEO cognitive complexity (CC)  0.027
*** 
  [0.010] 
   
Constant -0.105 0.015 
 [1.333] [1.329] 
   
Pseudo-R2 0.084 0.086 
N 3,909 3,909 
***p < .01, **p < .05, *p < .10; two-tailed tests 
Standard errors were clustered at the firm-CEO level.  
Coefficients for industry and year dummies are not reported. 
 
 
  
  
Table 5 
CEO cognitive complexity and R&D investment 
Random effects GLS regression with clustered standard errors 
 R&D investment 
VARIABLES   Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Over performance -29.085 -29.962 -29.838 
 [21.375] [21.444] [21.454] 
Underperformance -55.715** -55.832** -56.248** 
 [28.081] [28.111] [28.143] 
Firm size 126.638*** 127.775*** 127.676*** 
 [13.325] [13.452] [13.446] 
Total diversification 0.029 -0.138 -0.259 
 [10.940] [10.946] [10.959] 
Current ratio -4.481* -4.344* -4.321* 
 [2.370] [2.371] [2.373] 
Equity/Debt ratio -1.334 -1.360 -1.362 
 [2.106] [2.103] [2.103] 
CEO age -2.761 -2.772 -2.773 
 [2.878] [2.873] [2.874] 
CEO options 16.753 18.009 18.202 
 [16.409] [16.469] [16.465] 
CEO duality 17.047 18.186 18.172 
 [11.947] [11.930] [11.922] 
Number of new product developments 4.559 4.565 4.567 
 [3.117] [3.114] [3.115] 
Size of acquisitions 11.398*** 11.371*** 11.376*** 
 [3.612] [3.603] [3.603] 
Number of acquisitions -22.177*** -22.288*** -22.301*** 
 [8.120] [8.092] [8.089] 
Industry mean R&D investments 4.074*** 4.046*** 3.924*** 
 [1.345] [1.346] [1.393] 
Industry growth 0.109 0.098 24.087 
 [2.495] [2.493] [22.539] 
CEO cognitive complexity (CC)  -3.113
** -3.910** 
 
 [1.552] [1.614] 
CEO CC ×    8.903 
Industry growth   [7.849] 
    
Constant -1,768.828*** -1,764.399*** -1,714.328*** 
 [610.850] [611.027] [630.733] 
    
R2 0.336 0.337 0.337 
N 10,329 10,329 10,329 
***p < .01, **p < .05, *p < .10; two-tailed tests 
Standard errors were clustered at the firm-CEO level.  
Coefficients for industry and year dummies are not reported. 
 
  
  
Table 6 
CEO cognitive complexity and new product developments 
Zero-inflated negative binomial regressions with clustered standard errors 
Variables 
Number of new 
product developments 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Over performance 1.095*** 1.097*** 1.122*** 
 [0.301] [0.303] [0.304] 
Underperformance -0.560 -0.526 -0.551 
 [0.403] [0.410] [0.408] 
Firm size 0.340*** 0.345*** 0.345*** 
 [0.028] [0.028] [0.028] 
Total diversification -0.004 -0.005 -0.001 
 [0.065] [0.065] [0.064] 
Current ratio 0.033* 0.033* 0.033* 
 [0.018] [0.018] [0.018] 
Equity/Debt ratio 0.024 0.025 0.025 
 [0.017] [0.017] [0.017] 
CEO age -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 
 [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] 
CEO options 0.649*** 0.660*** 0.660*** 
 [0.149] [0.148] [0.148] 
CEO duality 0.040 0.050 0.050 
 [0.080] [0.080] [0.079] 
Number of acquisitions 0.017 0.019 0.020 
 [0.028] [0.027] [0.027] 
Industry mean number of  0.302 0.302 0.304 
new product developments [0.235] [0.228] [0.225] 
R&D investments 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Industry growth -0.101 -0.115 -0.333 
 [0.177] [0.225] [0.554] 
CEO cognitive complexity (CC)  -0.025** -0.039*** 
  [0.012] [0.015] 
CEO CC ×    -0.320* 
Industry growth   [0.166] 
    
Constant -3.573*** -3.665*** -3.700*** 
 [0.670] [0.653] [0.655] 
    
Log-likelihood -71,657.684 -71,623.211 -71,600.344 
Likelihood Ratio (LR) χ2 30,455.024*** 30,523.971*** 30,569.704*** 
N 12,317 12,317 12,317 
***p < .01, **p < .05, *p < .10; two-tailed tests 
Standard errors were clustered at the firm-CEO level.  
Coefficients for industry and year dummies are not reported. 
 
  
  
Table 7 
Descriptive statistics and correlations of variables studied in Chapter 3 
 
 Mean S.D. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11 
1. Financial performance (ROA) 0.021 0.094 --           
2. During-crisis acquisitions (number) 0.593 1.402 -0.014 --          
3. During-crisis acquisitions (size) 2.056 4.191 -0.015 0.322*** --         
4. Pre-crisis acquisitions (number) 1.134 2.255 -0.021 0.235*** 0.054*** --        
5. Pre-crisis acquisitions (size) 1.487 2.261 -0.033* 0.179*** 0.171*** 0.751*** --       
6. CEO cognitive complexity 0.008 3.085 0.039** 0.062*** 0.047*** 0.013 0.011 --      
7. Firm size 8.481 1.852 -0.048*** 0.204*** 0.252*** 0.112*** 0.347*** 0.075*** --     
8. Financial slack 0.800 1.789 0.184*** -0.022 -0.037** -0.068*** -0.079*** 0.014 -0.357*** --    
9. CEO shareholdings 0.008 0.021 0.065*** -0.059*** -0.042** -0.014 -0.065*** 0.012 -0.207*** 0.067*** --   
10. CEO duality 0.498 0.500 0.021 -0.008 0.001 0.030* 0.07*** 0.098*** 0.079*** 0.025 0.186*** --  
11. Board independence 0.743 0.130 -0.058*** 0.041** -0.009 -0.051*** -0.098*** -0.119*** -0.020 -0.034* -0.089*** -0.174*** -- 
12. Holding company dummy 0.261 0.439 0.035** 0.114*** -0.035** 0.248*** 0.152*** 0.079*** -0.268*** 0.24*** -0.009 -0.027 -0.139*** 
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
  
Table 8 
CEO cognitive complexity and Pre-crisis acquisitions (2005-2006): “Precondition” 
Cross-sectional negative binomial regression and OLS regression with robust standard errors 
  DV: Pre-crisis acquisitions 
 Number of acquisitions Size of acquisitions 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
        
Firm size 0.030 -0.001 0.454*** 0.452*** 
 [0.059] [0.059] [0.116] [0.118] 
Financial slack -0.143** -0.138** 0.014 0.014 
 [0.069] [0.067] [0.124] [0.125] 
Board independence 0.461 0.862 0.347 0.365 
 [1.049] [1.010] [1.316] [1.318] 
CEO shareholdings -8.594 -9.876 -13.160* -13.170* 
 [8.778] [9.220] [6.887] [6.918] 
CEO duality 0.201 0.196 0.198 0.194 
 [0.244] [0.237] [0.363] [0.374] 
Holding company 0.892*** 0.858*** 1.454*** 1.449*** 
 [0.302] [0.294] [0.411] [0.414] 
CEO cognitive complexity   0.077**  0.006 
(pre-crisis: 2004): H1 (+)  [0.036]  [0.055] 
     
Constant -0.390 -0.353 -2.424* -2.408* 
 [1.036] [0.974] [1.357] [1.374] 
     
Chi2 12.24* 18.27**   
R2   0.151 0.151 
N 176 176 174 174 
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01; two-tailed tests 
  
  
Table 9 
Pre-crisis (2005-2006) and During-crisis (2007-2010) acquisitions a 
GEE models with robust standard errors b 
  DV: During-crisis acquisitions (running sum) a 
 Number of acquisitions Size of acquisitions 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
          
Firm size 0.302*** 0.238*** 0.302*** 0.022*** 0.015*** 0.022*** 
(quarterly log of total assets) [0.076] [0.055] [0.076] [0.008] [0.006] [0.008] 
Financial slack  -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
(quarterly) [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Prior quarter ROA -0.255 -0.215 -0.255 -0.073 -0.069 -0.073 
(quarterly) [0.429] [0.404] [0.429] [0.056] [0.055] [0.056] 
Holding company -0.009 -0.302 -0.009 0.034 0.014 0.034 
 [0.241] [0.305] [0.241] [0.022] [0.022] [0.022] 
Precondition: H2 (+)  0.316***   0.017***  
  [0.116]   [0.007]  
CEO cognitive complexity    0.001   0.000 
(during-crisis, quarterly): H3 (+)   [0.002]   [0.000] 
       
Constant -2.421*** -2.199*** -2.421*** -0.162** -0.122** -0.162** 
 [0.641] [0.521] [0.641] [0.064] [0.052] [0.064] 
       
Chi2 94.47** 95.97** 94.47** 63.97** 66.04** 63.97** 
N 2,690 2,690 2,690 2,525 2,525 2,525 
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01; two-tailed tests 
a measured quarterly 
b coefficients of dummies for year-quarters are not reported  
  
  
Table 10 
During-crisis acquisitions and firm exit (2007-2011) a 
Discrete-time event history analysis with clustered standard errors b 
 DV: Firm exit a 
 Number of acquisitions b Size of acquisitions b 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
          
Prior quarter ROA -109.635*** -106.811*** -114.023*** -109.635*** -111.264 -112.207*** 
 [4.708] [5.345] [5.212] [4.708] [0.000] [4.907] 
Prior quarter financial slack -6.130*** -6.117*** -6.308*** -6.130*** -6.244*** -6.300*** 
 [0.308] [0.323] [0.312] [0.308] [0.277] [0.308] 
Holding company 3.840*** 3.718*** 3.720*** 3.840*** 4.249 4.316*** 
 [0.286] [0.291] [0.303] [0.286] [0.000] [0.276] 
During-crisis number of acquisitions   -0.397*** -0.612***  -0.445*** -0.471*** 
(quarterly running sum) c: H4 (-)  [0.057] [0.080]  [0.029] [0.044] 
CEO cognitive complexity   -0.304*** -0.314***  -0.297*** -0.295*** 
(during-crisis, quarterly): H5 (-)  [0.027] [0.005]  [0.027] [0.027] 
During-crisis number of acquisitions   -0.109***   -0.036*** 
× CEO cognitive complexity: H6 (-)   [0.018]   [0.012] 
       
Constant  -10.697*** -11.171***  -11.097*** -11.093*** 
  [0.153] [0.165]  [0.147] [0.145] 
       
Log-likelihood -31.75 -31.00 -30.89 -31.75 -30.34 -30.31 
N 1,482 1,482 1,482 1,482 1,482 1,482 
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01; two-tailed tests 
a coefficients of dummies for year-quarters are not reported  
b measured quarterly  
c lagging 2, 3, and 4 quarters all yielded similar results 
 
  
  
Table 11 
Descriptive statistics and correlations of variables studied in Chapter 4 
 
 Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Financial performance (ROA) 0.012 0.028         
2. During-crisis acquisitions (number) 0.257 1.962 -0.006        
3. During-crisis acquisitions (size) 0.426 2.484 -0.023*** 0.510***       
4. Pre-crisis acquisitions (number) 1.360 2.666 -0.067*** 0.124*** 0.215***      
5. Pre-crisis acquisitions (size) 1.531 2.292 -0.105*** 0.133*** 0.218*** 0.772***     
6. During-crisis divestitures (number) 0.062 0.510 -0.020*** 0.386*** 0.519*** 0.144*** 0.233***    
7. During-crisis divestitures (size) 0.172 1.359 -0.026*** 0.321*** 0.501*** 0.111*** 0.201*** 0.815***   
8. Pre-crisis divestitures (number) 0.124 0.575 -0.037*** 0.174*** 0.210*** 0.208*** 0.305*** 0.252*** 0.211***  
9. Pre-crisis divestitures (size) 0.377 1.885 -0.029*** 0.097*** 0.208*** 0.199*** 0.230*** 0.186*** 0.143*** 0.700*** 
10. CEO cognitive complexity 0.141 3.048 0.006 0.122*** 0.100*** 0.049*** 0.052*** 0.06*** 0.041*** 0.134*** 
11. Firm size 7.489 2.112 -0.203*** 0.190*** 0.248*** 0.184*** 0.361*** 0.235*** 0.221*** 0.309*** 
12. Financial slack 1.247 4.771 0.184*** -0.024*** -0.029*** -0.069*** -0.070*** -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.042*** 
13. Cash holding 0.095 0.154 0.360*** -0.047*** -0.084*** -0.119*** -0.170*** -0.065*** -0.052*** -0.105*** 
14. Holding company 0.481 0.500 0.178*** -0.083*** -0.063*** 0.167*** 0.107*** -0.080*** -0.084*** -0.093*** 
15. Board independence 0.739 0.130 -0.130*** 0.032*** 0.015* -0.024*** -0.074*** -0.004 0.019** -0.061*** 
16. CEO shareholdings 0.009 0.020 0.135*** -0.057*** -0.075*** -0.033*** -0.076*** -0.078*** -0.068*** -0.085*** 
17. CEO duality 0.504 0.500 0.052*** 0.033*** -0.021** 0.015* 0.044*** 0.042*** 0.027*** 0.014 
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10. CEO cognitive complexity 0.128***        
11. Firm size 0.217*** 0.120***       
12. Financial slack -0.035*** -0.010 -0.258***      
13. Cash holding -0.105*** -0.090*** -0.415*** 0.218***     
14. Holding company -0.030*** 0.038*** -0.176*** 0.271*** -0.08***    
15. Board independence -0.092*** -0.100*** -0.025*** -0.001 0.021 -0.157***   
16. CEO shareholdings -0.060*** 0.008 -0.225*** 0.061*** 0.091*** -0.010 -0.076***  
17. CEO duality 0.021** 0.091*** 0.070*** 0.051*** 0.020 -0.030*** -0.168*** 0.182*** 
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01 
  
Table 12 
Within-strategy effects: Pre-crisis (2005-2006) and During-crisis (2007-2010) acquisitions and divestitures a 
GEE models with robust standard errors b 
  DV: During-crisis acquisitions (running sum) a DV: During-crisis divestitures (running sum) a 
 Number  Size Number Size 
VARIABLES M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 M8 
            
Firm size 0.191*** 0.146*** 0.404*** 0.276** 0.087** 0.056 0.291*** 0.258*** 
(quarterly) [0.051] [0.050] [0.137] [0.117] [0.044] [0.040] [0.097] [0.097] 
Financial slack  -0.006 -0.006 -0.020 -0.022 0.002 0.001 0.006 0.006 
(quarterly) [0.007] [0.007] [0.024] [0.024] [0.001] [0.001] [0.005] [0.005] 
Prior quarter ROA -0.204 -0.175 -1.474 -1.397 -0.335* -0.321* -0.141 -0.133 
(quarterly) [0.388] [0.373] [1.020] [1.002] [0.174] [0.174] [0.411] [0.406] 
Holding company -0.320 -0.531* 0.083 -0.271 -0.227* -0.289** -0.481 -0.668* 
 [0.263] [0.295] [0.678] [0.707] [0.129] [0.126] [0.307] [0.361] 
CEO cognitive complexity  0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 0.013** 0.013** 
(quarterly) [0.002] [0.002] [0.008] [0.008] [0.002] [0.002] [0.006] [0.006] 
Pre-crisis divestitures 1.158*** 0.993*** 0.536** 0.461**  0.632***  0.129 
 [0.281] [0.208] [0.217] [0.213]  [0.198]  [0.096] 
Pre-crisis acquisitions  0.235***  0.467*** 0.130** 0.069** 0.289*** 0.245** 
  [0.081]  [0.167] [0.055] [0.028] [0.106] [0.099] 
         
Constant -1.769*** -1.586*** -3.438*** -2.894*** -0.817** -0.653* -2.727*** -2.465*** 
 [0.448] [0.429] [1.159] [1.015] [0.386] [0.338] [0.876] [0.860] 
         
χ2 122.3 141.4 85.84 86.18 36.17 41.70 55.24 58.57 
N 2,690 2,690 2,690 2,690 2,690 2,690 2,690 2,690 
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01; two-tailed tests 
a measured quarterly 
b coefficients of dummies for year-quarters are not reported  
  
  
Table 13 
Cross-strategy effects: Pre-crisis (2005-2006) and During-crisis (2007-2010) acquisitions and divestitures a 
GEE models with robust standard errors 
 DV: During-crisis acquisitions (running sum) a DV: During-crisis divestitures (running sum) a 
 Number Size Number Size 
VARIABLES M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 M8 M9 M10 M11 M12 
                 
Firm size 0.186*** 0.113** 0.114** 0.347** 0.258** 0.259** 0.046** 0.193*** 0.191*** 0.269*** 0.035* 0.034* 
 [0.055] [0.046] [0.046] [0.140] [0.122] [0.122] [0.020] [0.070] [0.070] [0.090] [0.020] [0.020] 
Financial slack -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.020 -0.021 -0.021 0.001 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.001 0.001 
 [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.024] [0.023] [0.023] [0.001] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.001] [0.001] 
ROA -0.064 -0.077 -0.083 -1.463 -1.499 -1.512 -0.231 0.432 0.421 0.436 -0.231 -0.238 
 [0.403] [0.383] [0.382] [1.400] [1.386] [1.384] [0.155] [0.483] [0.480] [0.491] [0.156] [0.156] 
Holding company -0.159 -0.301 -0.301 0.532 -0.320 -0.317 -0.252** -0.898** -0.899** -0.634** -0.310** -0.309** 
 [0.301] [0.280] [0.280] [0.661] [0.666] [0.666] [0.119] [0.359] [0.358] [0.321] [0.124] [0.123] 
CEO cognitive complexity 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.003 -0.007 0.000 0.011* 0.005 0.011* 0.000 -0.002 
(quarterly) [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.002] [0.006] [0.005] [0.006] [0.002] [0.002] 
Pre-crisis acquisitions 0.246** 0.167** 0.166** 0.648*** 0.457** 0.457**  0.271** 0.271**  0.065** 0.065** 
 [0.117] [0.069] [0.069] [0.250] [0.184] [0.184]  [0.114] [0.114]  [0.026] [0.026] 
Pre-crisis divestitures  0.957*** 0.950***  0.629*** 0.622*** 0.796*** 0.205** 0.204** 0.242** 0.746*** 0.743*** 
  [0.256] [0.256]  [0.172] [0.177] [0.191] [0.090] [0.089] [0.101] [0.188] [0.187] 
Pre-crisis acquisitions          0.004   0.002 
× CEO cognitive complexity         [0.004]   [0.002] 
Pre-crisis divestitures    0.004**   0.003       
× CEO cognitive complexity   [0.002]   [0.002]       
Constant -1.659*** -1.190*** -1.190*** -3.376*** -2.714** -2.716** -0.492*** -1.862*** -1.844*** -2.237*** -0.448*** -0.430*** 
 [0.501] [0.374] [0.374] [1.282] [1.056] [1.057] [0.173] [0.618] [0.618] [0.751] [0.163] [0.162] 
             
χ2 93.82 118.5 124.5 68.66 101.6 158.0 47.35 56.27 57.66 53.57 57.12 61.42 
N 2,550 2,550 2,550 2,550 2,550 2,550 2,550 2,550 2,550 2,550 2,550 2,550 
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01; two-tailed tests 
a measured quarterly 
b coefficients of dummies for year-quarters are not reported  
  
  
Table 14 
During-crisis acquisitions/divestitures and firm financial performance (2007-2011) a 
GEE models with robust standard errors b 
 DV: Firm financial performance 
 
IV: Number of acquisitions and 
divestitures a 
IV: Size of acquisitions and 
divestitures a 
VARIABLES M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 
           
Firm size -0.001** -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002** -0.002*** 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Financial slack 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Prior year ROA 0.843*** 0.843*** 0.843*** 0.845*** 0.842*** 0.844*** 
 [0.039] [0.039] [0.039] [0.039] [0.039] [0.039] 
Cash holdings 0.028** 0.028** 0.028** 0.028** 0.028** 0.028** 
 [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] 
Board independence -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 
 [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] 
Holding company 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] 
CEO shareholdings -0.077 -0.078 -0.078 -0.077 -0.080 -0.080 
 [0.093] [0.092] [0.092] [0.092] [0.092] [0.092] 
CEO duality 0.003* 0.003* 0.003* 0.003* 0.003* 0.003* 
 [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] 
During-crisis divestitures 0.001*  0.000 0.001**  0.001* 
(annual running sum) [0.000]  [0.000] [0.000]  [0.000] 
During-crisis acquisitions  0.001* 0.001*  0.000* 0.000 
(annual running sum)  [0.001] [0.001]  [0.000] [0.000] 
       
Constant 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.014 0.014 0.015 
 [0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.011] 
       
χ2 1,611 1,596 1,640 1,803 1,580 1,838 
N 1,052 1,052 1,052 1,052 1,052 1,052 
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01; two-tailed tests 
a measured annually 
b coefficients of dummies for years are not reported  
 
  
  
Table 15 
During-crisis acquisitions/divestitures and firm exit (2007-2011) a 
Discrete-time event history analysis with clustered standard errors b 
 DV: Firm exit a 
 
IV: Number of acquisitions and 
divestitures b 
IV: Size of acquisitions and 
divestitures b 
VARIABLES M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 
          
Prior quarter ROA -114.468*** -113.931*** -120.185*** -117.226*** -120.297*** -190.655 
 [15.701] [15.892] [16.471] [16.541] [16.870] [0.000] 
Prior quarter financial slack -5.920** -6.286* -6.275* -6.439* -6.428* -11.906 
 [2.842] [3.368] [3.458] [3.354] [3.442] [14.674] 
Holding company 4.126*** 3.778*** 4.226** 4.048*** 4.297*** 8.268 
 [1.378] [1.442] [1.659] [1.441] [1.489] [8.292] 
CEO cognitive complexity  -0.372*** -0.316*** -0.319*** -0.362*** -0.312*** -0.474* 
(quarterly) [0.079] [0.078] [0.094] [0.077] [0.089] [0.272] 
During-crisis divestitures 0.495***  0.895*** 0.094  0.444 
(quarterly running sum) c [0.137]  [0.215] [0.097]  [1.421] 
During-crisis acquisitions   -0.425** -0.666***  -0.473*** -0.924 
(quarterly running sum) c  [0.191] [0.241]  [0.133] [1.764] 
       
Constant -11.102*** -10.728*** -12.032*** -11.069*** -11.306*** -19.522*** 
 [0.768] [0.762] [0.832] [0.888] [0.812] [4.321] 
       
Log-likelihood -30.76 -31.06 -29.93 -31.33 -30.40 -29.60 
N 1,482 1,482 1,482 1,482 1,482 1,482 
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01; two-tailed tests 
a coefficients of dummies for year-quarters are not reported  
b measured quarterly  
c lagging 2, 3, and 4 quarters all yielded similar results 
 
  
  
Appendix C: 
Full list of words used for creating the cognitive complexity index 
Conjunction: also, although, and, as, altho, because, but, cuz, how, however, if, nor, or, 
otherwise, plus, so, then, tho, though, til, till, unless, until, when, whenever, whereas, 
whether, while,  
Discrepancy: besides, could, couldnt, couldn't, couldve, could've, desir*, expect*, hope, 
hoped, hopeful, hopefully, hopefulness, hopes, hoping, ideal*, if, impossib*, inadequa*, 
lack*, liabilit*, mistak*, must, mustnt, must'nt, mustn't, mustve, must've, need, needed, 
needing, neednt, need'nt, needn't, needs, normal, ought, oughta, oughtnt, ought'nt, 
oughtn't, oughtve, ought've, outstanding, prefer*, problem*, rather, regardless, regret*, 
should, shouldnt, should'nt, shouldn't, shoulds, shouldve, should've, undesire*, undo, 
unneccess*, unneed*, unwant*, wanna, want, wanted, wanting, wants, wish, wished, 
wishes, wishing, would, wouldnt, wouldn't, wouldve, would've, yearn*  
Tentatativeness: allot, almost, alot, ambigu*, any, anybod*, anyhow, anyone*, anything, 
anytime, anywhere, apparently, appear, appeared, appearing, appears, approximat*, 
arbitrar*, assum*, barely, bet, bets, betting, blur*, borderline*, chance, confus*, 
contingen*, depend, depended, depending, depends, disorient*, doubt*, dubious*, dunno, 
fairly, fuzz*, generally, guess, guessed, guesses, guessing, halfass*, hardly, hazie*, hazy, 
hesita*, hope, hoped, hopeful, hopefully, hopefulness, hopes, hoping, hypothes*, 
hypothetic*, if, incomplet*, indecis*, indefinit*, indetermin*, indirect*, kind (of), kinda, 
kindof, likel*, lot, lotof, lots , lotsa, lotta, luck, lucked, lucki*, luckless*, lucks, lucky, 
mainly, marginal*, may, maybe, might, mightve, might've, most, mostly, myster*, nearly, 
obscur*, occasional*, often, opinion, option, or, overall, partly, perhaps, possib*, 
practically, pretty, probable, probablistic*, probably, puzzl*, question*, quite, random*, 
seem, seemed, seeming*, seems, shaki*, shaky, some, somebod*, somehow, someone*, 
something*, sometime, sometimes, somewhat, sort, sorta, sortof, sorts, sortsa, spose, 
suppose, supposed, supposes, supposing, supposition*, tempora*, tentativ*, theor*, 
typically, uncertain*, unclear*, undecided*, undetermin*, unknow*, unlikel*, unluck*, 
unresolv*, unsettl*, unsure*, usually, vague*, variab*, varies, vary, wonder, wondered, 
wondering, wonders 
Exclusion: but, either, except, exclu*, if, just, not, or, rather, really, something*, 
sometime, unless, versus, vs, whether, without 
